Could the African Union make better use of regional deployments?
Given its crisis resolution role, could ad-hoc security initiatives form part of the reconceptualised African Standby Force?
At its 1203rd meeting on 4 March 2024, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) discussed the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) deployments to Mozambique and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While the Council registered its concerns about developments on the ground, it also noted the deployments’ contribution to managing insecurity.
The meeting also endorsed the extension of the Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). It commended the mission’s ‘significant contributions, continued sacrifice and commitment to fight and defeat terrorism, restore peace, security and stability, and alleviate Cabo Delgado’s humanitarian crisis’.
Apart from the Council’s interest in specific cases, discussions on the missions represent the African Union's (AU) continuous support for and appreciation of the need for regional deployments to manage continental insecurity. As with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), G5-Sahel force and Accra Initiative, the two SADC deployments form part of a plethora of regional security initiatives. These are often activated in response to emerging transnational threats and regional conflicts.
The PSC and member states have made strides in implementing the African Standby Force
In the absence of the African Standby Force (ASF) amid insecurity, such deployments have become a significant tool for regional institutions to manage insecurity. Given their recent achievements and the challenges the ASF faces in becoming fully operational, the question remains whether deployments should be encouraged and mainstreamed.
Why is the ASF not fully operational?
Many observers agree that the PSC and member states have made strides in implementing the ASF over the last two decades. As a political project, the concept has successfully developed endogenous approaches to realising the African common defence policy. It has contributed markedly to ensuring joint training and capacity-building among AU member states, crucial in bolstering deployment preparedness of country contingents and civilian personnel.
AFS progress was the basis for most of the 27 AU-led, -authorised and -endorsed peace support operations (PSOs) over the last 20 years. Regionally, ASF implementation has created a community of practice with a standardised training background and doctrine, fostering the deployment and management of various AU-led PSOs.
The ASF was to be a central pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture since 2002, but full implementation has taken time. Although the PSC declared it operational in 2015 and the AU Assembly followed suit in 2020, the force is yet to be used in the strict sense for which it was conceptualised. Instead, ad-hoc mechanisms have been deployed in several scenarios and are considered as part of the ASF framework.
The African Standby Force was to be a central pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture
According to experts and policy actors consulted, notwithstanding the considerable resources and manpower invested over the years, the deployment has not been as planned for two reasons. First, it has never benefitted from an agreed-on and predictable decision-making process for authorising deployments.
As clarity is lacking in the force’s mandating process, its deployment has become highly dependent on the will of member states, regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs). Yet none has demonstrated strong political buy-in to deploy the ASF under Article 13 of the PSC protocol and per the six scenarios.
The second is the absence of adequate, predictable and sustainable funding. This has precluded ASF involvement even where there is dire need. Beyond preventing the force’s deployment, financial challenges affect force generation and training exercises. Such negative impacts manifested in the 27 PSOs.
Current AU endorsed/authorised PSOs Source: The AU PSC Secretariat, presentation at the new PSC members’ induction, 25-27 March 2024, Swakopmund, Namibia
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Funding constraints have also often caused premature transitions of PSOs to United Nations (UN) missions and affected drawdown timelines, as with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia.
Room for ad-hoc deployments
In the absence of the ASF, regional deployments have contributed significantly to continental efforts for stability, as demonstrated by tangible results in West Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, and Somalia. In Lake Chad Basin, the MNJTF, authorised by the AU in 2015, has secured areas affected by Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups and facilitated Lake Chad Basin Commission stabilisation programmes.
It has equally advanced humanitarian operations and assisted affected populations through innovative and improved civil-military relations approaches in line with its mandate. Additionally, the force’s experience has offered lessons to similar regional arrangements, such as the Accra Initiative, which seeks to secure West Africa’s coastal countries from the spillover of Sahel violent extremism.
Regional deployments have contributed significantly to continental stability efforts
Similarly, SAMIM's deployment has recorded significant achievements amid violent extremism in Mozambique. It has recaptured territories, considerably degraded insurgents’ operational capacity and helped vulnerable civilians. While endorsing the mission and SADC's decision to deploy it, the AU underscored the utility of regional response to security threats. As the PSC did for the MNJTF a few years ago, it requested the AU Commission to avail equipment from the Continental Logistics Base and urged states to mobilise additional resources to support SAMIM.
Should the AU encourage more ad-hoc deployments?
The benefits of regional ad-hoc deployments are evident in the absence of the ASF. Some argue that such benefits are among the reasons for the lack of resolute action to implement the ASF. However, the reality remains that Africa's peace and security landscape would have been worse without the contribution of regional ad-hoc initiatives.
As the force has yet to realise its potential, policy actors should consider reconceptualising it to include ad-hoc deployments, which may have several advantages. Primarily, they could offer the ‘new’ ASF flexibility to respond across states’ borders to pursue militia, armed groups or insurgents. Secondly, they could serve as urgent military solutions and strengthen the force’s operability through practical experience-sharing in counter-terrorism and civil-military relations.
In so doing, the PSC should work closely with RECs/RMs and existing ad-hoc coalitions. This would create a sustainable mandating process and ease the management of command-and-control issues and challenges between regional and continental players. Ultimately, such collaboration will foster learning and improve the ASF modus operandi and deployment capability amid the continent’s current volatile security.
The PSC could also look at capitalising on gains from deployments to shape a robust continental structure to effectively coordinate regional efforts. Additionally, the adoption of Resolution 2719 by the UN Security Council on 21 December 2023 should be a catalyst in funding the regional interventions that are at the forefront of containing insecurity on the continent.
