SANDF back to the Borders

The last South African soldiers deployed for the task of borderline control, an infantry company at Musina, on the Zimbabwe border, were to have been withdrawn in late March 2009. However, as they were about to board their transport to return to base, an instruction was telephoned to them from the office of then Defence Minister, Charles Nqakula, to remain in place. Then President Kgalema Motlanthe on April 29 signed Presidential Minute 549/2009 authorising their continued deployment there until after the 2010 Soccer World Cup, following a request from Police minister Nathi Mthethwa on 17 March 2009.

Henri Boshoff. Head Peacekeeping Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria

 

The last South African soldiers deployed for the task of borderline control, an infantry company at Musina, on the Zimbabwe border, were to have been withdrawn in late March 2009. However, as they were about to board their transport to return to base, an instruction was telephoned to them from the office of then Defence Minister, Charles Nqakula, to remain in place. Then President Kgalema Motlanthe on April 29 signed Presidential Minute 549/2009 authorising their continued deployment there until after the 2010 Soccer World Cup, following a request from Police minister Nathi Mthethwa on 17 March 2009.

 

On 18 November the Cabinet make it official; the South African National Defence Force is once again responsible for borderline control and protection. The new deployment of the SANDF will be incorporated into the border control strategy being finalised by the JCPS (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) cluster. The cluster includes the departments of Defence and Veterans, Correctional Services, Home Affairs, Justice, Police and State Security.

 

Is this a change in policy? According to the cabinet spokesman Themba Maseko it is not. This question is valid because the 2003 decision was very clear: the SANDF has to withdraw from all support to the police borderline control by March 2009; Commando units must be closed and internal support to police in crime fighting will only be on request. The 2003 decision spelled out the withdrawal of the SANDF in detail. The Departments of Defence and of Safety and Security at the time established a joint SANDF-SAPS Exit-Entry Strategy Steering Committee. This steering committee was eventually replaced by a dedicated Joint Task Team to plan, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the exit-entry strategy at national and provincial level. The Task Team is co-chaired by a Major General (SANDF) and an Assistant Commissioner (SAPS). The strategy made provision for certain exit criteria for the SANDF. These were:

  • The police had filled every possible vacuum the SANDF had left as a result of their withdrawal from continuous support in ensuring urban, rural and borderline safety.
  • The SANDF sustain the capacity, in accordance with an approved inter-departmental agreement, to support the police in joint crime combating operations where the police could not contain the situation on their own.
  • The SANDF sustain their command and control capacity as part of the JOINTS (Joint Operational Intelligence System, a command and control mechanism) to ensure joint command and control in support of the people of South Africa.
  • The SANDF maintain support to the SAPS regarding maritime and air borderline control function.
  • The police developing their capacity to take full responsibility for crime combating in urban and rural areas, as well as for the control of the landward borderline of SA.

The police`s entry criteria were:

  • The police developing their capacity to take full responsibility for crime combating in urban and rural areas, as well as for the control of the landward borderline of SA.
  •  The police maintaining their system of command and control through the JOINTS to coordinate all operational activities in support of the people of SA.
  •  To support this, the police would have the National Intervention Unit available as force multiplier across provincial boundaries whenever their support was requested.
  • The establishing of 43 area crime combating units inter alia capable of executing borderline duties
  • The establishment of sector policing.

Research conducted by the ISS last year, as well as a performance audit by the Auditor General (AG) on the Border Control and Police Advisory Council found that the SAPS has failed to take over the function of borderline control from the SANDF. In addition the AG found a lack of interdepartmental training and no all-inclusive borderline-specific training curriculum in place. As far as human resources are concerned, there is an under capacity of 71% (the proposed personnel structure is 970 members while the actual number is only 283). This means that the primary function of borderline-control cannot be effectively carried out. The AG also found no security analysis of the border fences had been performed. Places were found where border fences were inadequate or even non-existent. There were no compensating patrols or monitoring processes in place in areas where there are no or inadequate border fences.

 

The redeployment of the SANDF will take a while, as they has to get new equipment and start to build up intelligence, as well as command-and-control again. The SANDF will need funding to restore border bases, new vehicles, other mission specific equipment, proper mission-specific training, and deployment allowances. They will also have to find a way to regain the local knowledge of the border areas lost when the Commandos were disbanded. Perhaps they need to find some way to draw them into the Reserve Force under a different system.

 

The return of the SANDF to the function of borderline control in isolation will also not be successful. It must be seen against the concept of border protection that includes border post, borderline and area protection. The implementation of area protection was based on the deployment of area protection units in the form of Commando units. They were disbanded between 2003 and 2008 and the function was supposed to have been taken over by sector policing. Reports and research indicates that this concept has also failed. It is unclear how that will be rectified.

 

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