


ARMS CONTROL AFRICA



Editorial

Welcome to the fifth Issue of the second volume of Arms Control: Africa, which is published by the Arms Management Programme (AMP) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The aim of Arms Control: Africa is to provide relevant information and analysis on arms control developments that are either taking place in Africa, or have the potential to have a significant impact on the continent.

This issue focuses on recent arms control developments undertaken by African states. This year has been particularly significant with regard to Africa's participation in international arms control and disarmament agreements. The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty) entered into force in July 2009 after Burundi submitted its instrument of ratification. Burkina Faso and Moldova also ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) on the 16th of February 2010, triggering entry into force of this convention on the 1st of August 2010.

There has been significant progress in Central Africa with the adoption of the Kinshasa Convention. This is the first legal instrument for the control of small arms in Central Africa and it will open for ratifications on 1 November 2010.

October 2010 marked 10 years since the passing of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The landmark resolution calls for international security institutions to address the different impacts of conflict on women and men, and to engage women fully in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The year 2011 will be a year of commemorations of this historic achievement as well as assessments of the effectiveness of implementation to date including its link with measures aimed at controlling small arms.

Editor: Gugu Dube

Contributions to future issues of Arms Control: Africa are welcome and should focus on matters relating to small arms and light weapons, conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Articles in French, Portuguese, Swahili and Arabic are also welcome. Submissions should be no longer than 1,500 words in length. Contributions should be emailed to aca@issafrica.org.

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Major boost for Africa's quest to be nuclear weapon free

In a great show of support for Africa's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev has submitted two protocols attached to the Treaty of Pelindaba to the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia (parliament or Duma) for ratification.¹

This follows the Treaty's entry into force in July 2009, when Burundi became the 28th African States Party, and the announcement by the United States of America at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 that it would submit the protocols to its Senate for ratification.²

The Treaty of Pelindaba seeks to ensure that nuclear weapons are not developed, produced, tested, or otherwise acquired or stationed anywhere on the African continent or its associated islands. While enhancing both regional and global peace and security, it also provides for the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As of late August 2010, all 53 African states, as well as the territory known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, have signed the Treaty and 30 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the African Union Commission (the Treaty Depository), Zambia being the most recent.

Like other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties, attached to the Treaty of Pelindaba are three protocols for the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and other relevant non-state parties to sign and ratify. The NWS are the United Kingdom (UK), France, China, Russia and the United States (US), while relevant "non-state parties" refer to France and Spain who are de jure or de facto in control of territories situated within the zone.

Protocol I calls on NWS not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon against any Party to the Treaty or against any territory within the NWFZ. It has been signed by all the NWS and ratified by France, China and the UK. Protocol II calls on the NWS not to participate or assist in or encourage the testing of a nuclear explosive device on the continent. It has been signed by all the NWS and has so far been ratified by France, China and the UK. Protocol III calls upon France and Spain, who possess islands within the African NWFZ, to apply the principles of the Treaty to the territories under their control. France signed and ratified the Protocol in 1997, but Spain (which is a non-nuclear



weapons state party to the NPT) has not done so. According to Spain, three territories belonging to the country, namely the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla, two coastal cities in North Africa, are an integral part of the European Union. Therefore, Spain insists that these three territories should not be included within the African NWFZ. Spain has also argued that the Protocol does not contain any non-proliferation or disarmament provisions that Spain has not already signed on to. However, even though Spain cites its adherence to EURATOM and IAEA safeguards, which in its view contain provisions that go considerably beyond those contained in the Treaty of Pelindaba, this should not preclude them from adhering to the Treaty of Pelindaba.

By adhering to the Protocols, these states would commit themselves to respecting the status of the NWFZ. Once Russia has ratified, it will provide a legally binding negative security guarantee that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any African state and that it will not test nuclear weapons on any part of the African continent or the following islands: Agalega Island, Bassas da India, Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Cardagos Carajos Shoals, Chagos Archipelago (Diego Garcia), Comoros, Europa, Juan de Nova, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Prince Edward and Marion Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Reunion, Rodrigues Island, Seychelles, Tromelin Island, and Zanzibar and Pemba Islands.

Russia signed both Protocol I and Protocol II in November 1996, relatively soon after the Treaty was opened for signature on 11 April 1996 in Cairo, Egypt. However, on signing, the Federation made it clear that it would "not use nuclear weapons against a State

which is a party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty excluding the cases of invasion or any other armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapons State party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State".

In addition, and importantly, Russia could not regard itself as bound by the obligations under Protocol I with respect of the Chagos Archipelago islands (Diego Garcia) as they do not meet the requirements put forward by the Treaty for nuclear-weapon-free territories. In the past, both the UK and the US have argued that Diego Garcia cannot be included in the geographical area of the Treaty of Pelindaba as it is a British possession used by the US as a major military base.

The African Union, however, considers the islands to be part of Mauritius, and the map attached to the Treaty (Annex I) explicitly includes the Chagos Archipelago, although with a note in reference to the long-standing diplomatic dispute between the UK and Mauritius. While the airstrip on Diego Garcia played a central role in the war against Iraq and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2006, it is not known if the US has ever stored nuclear weapons on the Indian Ocean island.

If and when the US Senate ratifies these Protocols, it will be interesting to see if they recognise that their undertaking also applies to their activities on the island of Diego Garcia or whether they will include a reservation or declarative interpretation. If the latter, Russia may also not feel legally bound by its obligations under Protocol I with regard to the atoll.

Under Article 12 (Mechanism for Compliance) the Parties agree to, entry into force, establish an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) in order to ensure compliance with their undertakings. According to the Treaty, "a Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the Depository (that is, the African Union) as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty". The Cairo Declaration, which was adopted on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Pelindaba on 11 April 1996, clearly states that "the first session of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty shall be held not later than one year after its entry into force, and also endorsed the

establishment of the headquarters of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy in South Africa". The Conference was hosted by the African Union on 4 November 2010.

African States that have ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba

Algeria
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania (United Republic of)
Togo
Tunisia
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Amelia Broodryk and Noël Stott

¹ Russia backs African nuclear treaty. United Press International, 24 August 2010. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/08/24/Russia-backs-African-nuclear-treaty/UPI-65881282680525/

² Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Debate, New York, 3 May 2010.

Les experts discutent le plan de mise en œuvre de la convention de Kinshasa

Experts discuss the implementation of the Kinshasa Convention

Du 23 au 24 septembre 2010 s'est tenu à Lomé (Togo), sous l'égide de UNREC (UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa) une réunion d'experts indépendants pour examiner le projet de plan d'action de mise en œuvre de la convention sur les armes légères et de petit calibre de l'Afrique centrale. Il faut rappeler qu'en Avril 2010,

11 pays de l'Afrique centrale, membres du Comité Consultatif permanent des Nations Unies pour les questions de sécurité en Afrique centrale avaient examiné et adopté au cours de leur réunion ministérielle le projet révisé d'instrument juridique pour le contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre en Afrique Centrale.

L'organisation de cette réunion d'experts indépendants est la première étape du processus d'adoption d'un plan d'action de mise en œuvre de la convention de l'Afrique Centrale. Cette réunion avait comme objectif d'améliorer le projet de plan préparé par UNREC avant sa soumission aux Etats membres en novembre 2010. Les experts venant d'horizon divers – ISS, ECOSAP, GRIP, IANSA etc ont été choisis selon leur propre expertise et expérience dans le domaine du contrôle des armes légères. Mais plus important est la nécessité pour UNREC de permettre au projet de plan de mise en œuvre de se relier aux pratiques et expériences parallèles avec les plan d'actions

de mise en œuvre de la convention de la CEDEAO, du protocole de Nairobi et le plan d'action des Nations Unies. Cela permettra à ce projet de plan d'action de prendre en compte des éléments actualisés et harmonisés en matière de lutte contre les armes légères.

Le projet de plan de mise en œuvre de la convention conformément au texte de la convention se décline en 8 chapitres que sont : les transferts, la détention par les civils, la fabrication, la distribution et réparation, les mécanismes opérationnels ; la transparence et l'échange d'informations ; l'harmonisation des législations nationales ; les arrangements institutionnels et de mise en œuvre et les dispositions générales et finales.

Le projet de plan de mise en œuvre de la « convention de l'Afrique centrale sur les armes légères et de petit calibre (Convention de Kinshasa) » met en exergue les principales activités à conduire au niveau national par les Etats parties, et au niveau sous régional par le Secrétariat Général de la CEEAC. Il retient trois types de mesures – d'ordre institutionnel, -d'ordre normatif- d'ordre opérationnel.

Sur le pan institutionnel le plan d'action demande la mise en place et ou le fonctionnement adéquat des structures nationales chargées du contrôle des armes légères et de petits calibre. Ces structures nationales devront regrouper les représentants des départements et services



Membres du groupe d'experts indépendants sur la mise en oeuvre de la convention de Kinshasa, réuni à Lomé du 23 au 24 septembre 2010.

techniques chargés de la question des armes légères et examineront l'ensemble des questions liées au contrôle des armes légères comme la gestion des transferts, le marquage, les licences de fabrication etc.... La structure nationale (ou Commission nationale) sera chargée au niveau national de la mise en œuvre de la convention.

La convention autorise la fabrication industrielle et artisanale d'armes légères et de petit calibre mais cette autorisation est assortie de certaines conditions notamment la délivrance d'une licence de fabrication par l'Autorité nationale compétente, le marquage des armes fabriquées – le marquage classique et le marquage de sécurité – sur le plan normatif. Les Etats partis à la convention devraient définir et adopter les techniques, normes, standards et procédures de marquage et sur le plan opérationnel, ils devront procéder à l'inventaire des fabricants locaux et l'enregistrement dans la base de données nationales, de toutes informations relatives à la fabrication locale.

Le plan propose en outre aux Etats partis, l'harmonisation des législations nationales sur les armes à travers l'élaboration et l'adoption d'un guide d'harmonisation qui devrait être proposé par le Secrétariat Général de la CEEAC. Les Etats partis devraient à partir de ce guide procéder à la révision et l'actualisation des lois et textes d'application relatifs au commerce, au port, à la fabrication, à l'utilisation et à la détention des armes.

En termes de dispositifs institutionnels, outre les Commissions Nationales, le Secrétariat Général de la CEEAC jouera un rôle central de coordination de mise en œuvre de la convention. Pour ce faire, il est proposé la création d'un programme de mise en œuvre, des aspects opérationnels de la convention et de renforcement de capacité des commissions nationales. La CEEAC s'inspire ainsi de l'expérience de l'Afrique de l'ouest avec ECOSAP et de la région des Grands Lacs avec le RECSA.

Ceci n'est possible que lorsque Etats membres et les partenaires techniques et financiers mettent à la disposition de la CEEAC des moyens financiers et techniques nécessaires.

Mohamed Coulibaly

Des défis de la lutte contre la prolifération des armes en Afrique

Challenges facing the control of arms proliferation in Africa

C'est sans doute que l'Afrique est bien douée des ressources naturelles, mais qu'elle manque la compétence de bien gérer ces ressources. C'est pour ce la que lorsqu'une guerre éclate dans un pays voisin, l'exploitation des ressources naturelles devient, presque aussitôt, le tourbillon autour lequel la guerre se nourrit. La conséquence c'est que la demande des armes légères et de petit calibre (ALPC) créée par la guerre attire des commerçants illicites des ALPC. Ces commerçants profitent toujours entre autres, de la faiblesse des frontières des pays limitrophes.

Notant que beaucoup de marchés frontaliers dans les villages africains sont de simples foires, subordonnées à des villes et gérés à distance par elles. Ces marchés frontaliers sont également caractérisés par la faiblesse du nombre de résidents permanents, l'absence d'une structure d'organisation, et de gestion endogène. Parfois, les responsables de la sécurité basés aux frontières manquent soit les moyens de sécuriser les frontières, soit ils tombent dans le piège de corruption mené par des criminels comme les trafiqueurs illicites des ALPC.

Dans la plus part des cas on ne se demande pas pourquoi les mouvements des rebelles se manifestent souvent aux frontières des pays, pendant les guerres. Par exemple dans les cas de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), les mouvements des rebelles se sont concentrés à l'Est de la République, et à la frontière avec le Rwanda, le Burundi et l'Ouganda. Dans le cas de l'Afrique de l'ouest, il n'y a pas longtemps les responsables du Sénégal, de la Guinée-Bissau, des îles du Cap-Vert et de la Mauritanie, ont abordé, entre autres questions, la rébellion en Casamance au Sénégal, citant que depuis un certain temps on a assisté à une recrudescence des combats le long de la frontière entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau.

C'est important de citer également que la fin de la guerre dans plusieurs pays africains, favorise souvent la prolifération des armes légères dans des pays limitrophes. Cet aspect arrive surtout lorsque les frontières ne sont pas bien gérées, permettant le mouvement des ex-combattants (avec leurs



armes) d'un pays à l'autre. Pour éviter ces conséquences maléfiques, les pays africains sortant des conflits doivent élaborer une bonne combinaison des mécanismes qui prennent comme ciblé la gestion des défis, tels que des programmes de Désarmement, Démobilisation de Réinsertion/réintégration (DDR), aussi bien qu'une bonne gestion des frontières, surtout au niveau des marchés frontaliers au village.

L'essentiel c'est aussi la sensibilisation des civils à l'importance de la lutte contre les ALPC, y compris l'évolution des projets cibles pour la promotion de la lutte contre la pauvreté parmi les citoyens. Ceci souligne l'importance d'une coopération et de programmes de coordination entre pays limitrophes. C'est comme cela que des millions d'armes légères illégales qui tombent entre des mauvaises mains et aboutissent dans des bandes de criminels seront réduites. Ces armes ont non seulement prolongé de nombreux conflits violents mais ont aussi menacé dangereusement la sécurité locale et régionale par l'escalade de l'insécurité.

Loice N Gimoi



UN Security Council Meeting on Women, Peace, and Security – Photo Credit: UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras/2008

Impact of Resolution 1325 on Small Arms – 10 years later

Easy access to and misuse of weapons have remained a serious threat to the human rights of women in Africa. Small arms have become the weapon of choice in most of today's conflicts and are directly linked to the death, injury, rape and forced displacement of women during and after conflict.

This year, as we celebrate 10 years since the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 was adopted, we consider its links with small arms control, and possible action across Africa.

SCR 1325 is now the cornerstone of women's participation in disarmament processes and the development of small arms and light weapons (SALW) control policy and practice. There should be cross-referencing between SCR 1325 and policy and practice relating to small arms control, as there are obvious connections between them, especially regarding violence prevention and women's participation. Part of IANSA's work is to highlight this link and to ensure that these processes relate to each other.

SCR 1325 has served as a catalyst for women all over the world in their efforts to achieve equal participation. Women at the grassroots level have used this resolution to lobby for their voices to be heard in peacebuilding processes, in post-conflict elections, and in the rebuilding of their societies. This landmark resolution brought women's participation and gender mainstreaming issues to the forefront of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.

The ultimate goal of the Resolution is

to achieve gender equality and to build sustainable peace and security, but it has also proven to be a decisive mandate for the field of small arms policy and practice through gender considerations and the inclusion of women in decision-making. It contains some specific entry points that are useful to SALW control, policy and strategy development. For example, Article 8 of SCR 1325 relates to measures that need to be taken to support local women's small arms initiatives through increased capacity-building, provision of resources, and funding. The UN Secretary-General's 2002 Report on SCR 1325 acknowledges the role that women's grassroots organisations play in supporting disarmament processes. It notes that women's groups and networks can provide important information regarding perceptions of the dangers posed by the number or types of weapons, the identification of weapons caches and the transborder weapons trade.

Despite some progress, governments continue to find it difficult to translate the resolution into concrete policy and strategic actions in conflict-affected regions, where it is most critical that peace and reconstruction efforts take women's needs and capacities into account. Understanding of how to implement SCR 1325 is limited and the breach between policy rhetoric and actual progress for women is vast.

SCR 1325 provides a framework for a comprehensive approach for conflict management and violence prevention, and there is increasing demand for SCR

1325-specific policies and plans of action. SCR 1325 should be implemented at three levels, namely national, regional and global. At a national level, it involves relevant ministries, departments and agencies; at a regional level it involves organisations such as the African Union (AU); and at a global level it involves the UN.

However, there is an absence of political leadership at all levels in advancing the women, peace and security agenda. At the national level, this results in responsibility for SCR 1325 being marginalised to under-funded gender ministries, rather than being led by ministries working on peace and security issues. Therefore it is vital that clear lines of responsibility are developed at high political levels for the implementation of SCR 1325. It is important for African countries to get international support to facilitate the implementation of the Resolution. The resolution can only reach its objectives if countries can make it part and parcel of their formal procedures.

The Secretary-General's 2004 Report on SCR 1325 called for all UN Member States to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) to ensure the implementation of the Resolution. These plans should link humanitarian, conflict, defence and diplomacy work, all of which are important to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In the first ten years of SCR 1325, at least 21 countries have developed NAPs on implementing the Resolution. Of these, six are in Africa and they include: Côte d'Ivoire (2008), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2009), Liberia (2009), Sierra Leone (2010), Rwanda (2009), and Uganda (2008).

At a minimum, Member States of the African Union should immediately begin the process of developing NAPs by understanding the benefits of this approach. The first benefit can be considered to be the "result", which means to have an actual plan in place with concrete and coordinated actions, timelines, budgets and the ability to measure impact. The second benefit, which may be even more important, is the "process", which means reflecting on security with different stakeholders in a comprehensive way. Such plans should include clear gender-sensitive benchmarks, indicators and lines of responsibility. African countries must integrate gender aspects into all policies and action plans on peace and security, development, gender equality, women's rights and SCR 1325.

Joseph Dube

The Convention on Cluster Munitions enters into force

Sunday 1 August 2010 saw the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The activation of the CCM was triggered by the deposition of the 30th instrument of ratification exactly six months earlier. By the end of March 2010, 30 states had ratified the CCM. On 1 August, the number climbed to 37 states, with 107 states having signed the CCM. To date, there are 43 ratifications and 108 signatories to this convention.¹

The CCM prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions, and requires states to clear contaminated land, destroy existing stockpiles and provide care and assistance to victims of cluster munitions.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement strongly support the CCM. Indeed, the ICRC played an important role in the process that led to the adoption of the Convention, which is an indispensable instrument that will help to end the suffering caused by these weapons. "This new instrument of international humanitarian law clearly prohibits and stigmatises the use of cluster munitions," stated Jakob Kellenberger, the president of the ICRC. "This is a milestone in the fight against the use of cluster munitions and should put an end to decades of suffering for men, women and children. We take this opportunity to call on all States party to the Convention to start implementing it without delay, and we hope that the entry into force will also affect the practice of States that have not yet adhered to the treaty."

The CCM's entry into force comes a mere 21 months after the treaty was opened for signature in Oslo, Norway, on 3 December 2008. This is a comparatively short period of time in multilateral treaty-making terms, and the speed with which this Convention has entered into force compares favourably with the entry into force of other major weapons treaties that have been widely ratified. For example, within two years of being opened for signature, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by 20 states; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention by 29 states; and the 1997 Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention by 87 states. "The entry into force only 21 months after the treaty was opened for signature in Oslo clearly demonstrates the strong commitment of the States Parties, and their collective will to begin addressing the humanitarian problems caused by these



Cluster bombs – Photo Credit: Simon Conway

weapons," said Mr Kellenberger.

The entry into force of the CCM is a significant development in the history of disarmament and of International Humanitarian Law, which now provides a comprehensive framework for preventing and ending the civilian suffering caused by these "weapons that can't stop killing". Together, the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, the 2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War and the 2008 CCM are a far-reaching response to the humanitarian consequences of unexploded and abandoned ordnance. It gives hope for a future where affected communities can one day live without the threat of these weapons.

The entry into force of the CCM on 1 August 2010 also means that states have begun to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties, which will be held from 8 to 12 November 2010 in Vientiane, Lao PDR (Laos). This will be the first collective opportunity for States Parties to begin implementing the CCM's obligations. The meeting will also develop tools, such as reporting formats and the structure for future expert meetings, to facilitate the full implementation of the CCM. The meeting will furthermore adopt an action plan outlining specific objectives to help ensure that the Convention brings relief to affected communities. Participation in the first meeting is open to all governments and all states are urged to attend. States that have not signed or ratified the Convention are able to attend as observers.

For states that have not yet joined the CCM, the meeting is an important occasion to learn more about the instrument, its implementation and the approaches and mechanisms that States Parties are adopting to ensure that land contaminated with cluster munitions is cleared, stockpiles of these weapons are destroyed, relief is provided to victims, and assistance is made available to affected countries. In the view of the ICRC, this meeting must focus on providing concrete support for the clearance of cluster munitions and victim assistance in affected States Parties.

It is noteworthy that the first meeting of States Parties is held in Laos, the country most heavily affected by cluster munitions. The ICRC estimates that between 9 and 27 million unexploded submunitions remain in Laos and that some 11,000 people have already been killed or injured, more than 30 percent of whom children. The choice of Laos is therefore a further testament to the commitment of States Parties to prevent cluster munitions from causing further civilian suffering, to help countries currently affected by the weapons, and to bring victims the care and rehabilitation they require.

Other states and territories affected by cluster munitions are Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia,

Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco (including Western Sahara), Russian Federation (Chechnya), Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, United Kingdom (Falklands/Malvinas), Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.

Implementing the provisions of the CCM will require the mobilisation of resources to clear contaminated areas, destroy stockpiles, and provide assistance for those whose lives have been adversely affected by cluster munitions. It will also require the adoption of domestic laws and regulations to ensure that the CCM is enforced at national level. Through its Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC is able to offer states the technical assistance and advice they may need to prepare this legislation.

The ICRC calls on all states to adhere to this important instrument of international humanitarian law immediately. States that have signed but not yet ratified the Convention are urged to do so as soon as possible, as they have already committed themselves to the humanitarian goals of the Convention and to becoming parties to it.

For further information, please visit the ICRC's website (www.icrc.org) or contact the ICRC's Pretoria Regional Delegation.

Chris Black and Louis Maresca

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¹ 43 Ratifications (alphabetical order): Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Croatia, Denmark, Equador, Fiji, France, Germany, The Holy See, Ireland, Japan, The Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Luxembourg, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia

South African arms exports: a balancing act

Democratic states that have a domestic arms industry with an export capacity face a fundamental moral dilemma: the arms and the military equipment that they sell or donate to other states can directly or indirectly violate the core principles and values upon which democracies have been established, especially the protection of human rights. Hence, most arms exporting democracies, including South Africa, apply human rights protection criteria when determining arms export destinations. Nevertheless, human rights concerns are often weighed up against competing national and diplomatic considerations.

This balancing act is explicitly outlined in South Africa's National Conventional Arms Control Act, which requires the South African government when considering arms export applications to, amongst other considerations: safeguard the national security interests of South Africa and its allies; avoid arms transfers to governments that systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms; adhere to international law, norms and practices and South Africa's international obligations and commitments, including UN Security Council arms embargoes; and avoid the export of arms that may be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the importing government. The main purpose of this arms export criteria is an attempt to ensure that South Africa is a responsible and reliable arms trader.

Over the past 15 years, South Africa's adherence to these criteria has been widely criticised. The criticism primarily relates to incidences where national, diplomatic and other considerations appear to have trumped human rights imperatives. In 1997, South Africa was criticised both internationally and domestically for arms transfers to Rwanda at a time when military groups linked to the Rwandan government were allegedly responsible for human rights abuses. In 2008, the South African government authorised the transport of Chinese arms to Zimbabwe via South African territory at the time of an acute domestic crisis in that country. However, due to legal action by civil society groups, the delivery of this arms consignment via



The An Yue Jiang, anchored off Durban, South Africa, was blocked from unloading weapons destined for Zimbabwe
Photo credit: Associated Press/2008

South African soil was blocked. In 2009, the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition, accused the South African government of authorising "dodgy" arms deals to states with questionable records of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, citing Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. During July 2010, the Ceasefire Campaign accused the South African government of selling arms to countries that are "problematic" in terms of internal oppression and respecting fundamental freedoms. The Ceasefire Campaign made reference to Algeria, Colombia, India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Indeed, a number of states to which South Africa exports arms arguably do not adhere to the high standards of human rights protection that are enshrined in the South African Constitution. The reasons for this state of affairs are not easily palpable, but appear to relate to the nature of the arms control legislation, the imperatives of South Africa's national interest and foreign policy, as well as dynamics within the domestic and international arms industry.

The National Conventional Arms Control Act does not require the government to adhere to specific and quantifiable human rights benchmarks. The human rights criteria in the Act are entirely subjective, reinforced by the requirement that arms export authorisations be made on a case-by-case basis. The advantage of this approach is that the government is in a position to consider current and relevant human rights information prior to making a decision on whether to grant an export permit or not. However, a key disadvantage is that there may be significant inconsistencies in South Africa's arms exports in terms of the respect for and protection of human rights.

There is also no clear prioritisation of criteria within the Act. This can be problematic where the South African government has strong national or diplomatic interests to grant an

export permit, but the recipient government does not adhere to a high standard of human rights protection. In such circumstances, human rights considerations may play second fiddle to national and diplomatic interests. This was arguably the case in the incident involving the granting of the permit for arms to be transported to Zimbabwe in 2008.

For decades the South African government has invested substantial resources in the domestic arms industry. Since the 1980s, due to shrinking demand for defence products and services in South Africa, a key strategy for the industry's survival has been to target the export market. However, the South African industry is a minnow compared to the industries of the United States, the European Union and China. Consequently, the South African arms industry often has limited options as to which states it can sell its products and services. Added to this, states with exemplary internal human rights records and that are not engaged in a foreign war are not major arms consumers.

Given this state of affairs, South Africa is likely to continue to export arms to some states with questionable human rights records in the foreseeable future. However, individuals and organisations concerned with the protection of human rights may be able to mitigate this trend. Options include strategic public pressure and the lobbying of relevant Members of Parliament to hold the Executive accountable for its approval of arms export applications. The enactment of amended arms control legislation that allows for broader public scrutiny of South African arms exports has been indefinitely delayed, and campaigning on this issue could be a useful departure point.

Guy Lamb



Wananchi wa Congo wasalimisha silaha kwa dola 50 za marekani

Congolese civilians surrender guns at 50 US Dollars

Mwanzoni mwa mwaka huu wa 2010, serikali ya Jamhuri ya kidemokrasia ya Congo, ilianzisha mpango wa kukusanya silaha haramu mashariki mwa nchi hiyo kutoka kwa wananchi. Ilisemakana kwamba kila mmoja anayesalimisha silaha yake angekabidhiwa dola za marekani hamsini taslimu. Hii ni kati ya harakati nyingi ambazo serikali ya kidemokrasia ya Congo inatumia kuhakikisha kwamba suala la biashara haramu ya silaha ndogo ndogo, ambalo ni nyeti katika nchi hiyo limetiliwa mkazo.

Ni wazi kwamba eneo la maziwa makuu ya Afrika limeadhiriwa mno na vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe ambavyo huhusisha silaha ndogo ndogo. Nchi ya kidemokrasia ya Congo ndiyo kubwa zaidi ikilinganishwa na nchi zingenezo katika eneo hilo, na vilevile ni nchi kati ya zile ambazo kwa sasa zinaongoza kwa idadi ya silaha haramu mikononi mwa rahia katika bara la Afrika.

Zoezi hilo ambalo lilizinduliwa katika eneo la Kivu kaskazini lilitarajia kukusanya takribani bunduki elfu thelathini katika muda wa mwezi mmoja tu. Yamkini kati ya bunduki elfu ishirini na thelathini zilisalimishwa na rahia kwa mda wa mwezi mmoja wa zoezi hili. La kushangaza ni kwamba utifiti unaonyesha kuwa kununua bunduki kwa kutumia fedha ni kama kuongeza balaa juu ya nyingine. Matatizo kadhaa hutokea, tunaponunua silaha kutoka kwa rahia, na kati ya hayo matatizo ni kama:

-Uwiano wa fedha na bunduki huzusha tamaa ya bunduki zaidi: Unapobadilisha bunduki haramu na pesa ni kama kunfunza mmiliki wa bunduki haramu kwamba bunduki ni chombo cha umuhimu ambacho anaweza "kuuza" wakati wowote. Ubaya wa hali hii ni kwamba soko la bunduki haramu huenea kunapotokea zoezi la kusanya (kwa kununua) bunduki hizo. Mwishowe, rahia wanaweza kuenda hata kwenye nchi jirani na kununua bunduki zingine kwa bei rahisi, na kwa haraka ili waje kuziua tena ncini kwao. Mwishowe tatizo hilo halitakua limetatuliwa kamwe.

-Uzoevu wa kubadilisha silaha kwa fedha huzua hisia miongoni mwa rahia: Mara bunduki zinanunuliwa na serikali, rahia huanza kuona tena uzuri wa bunduki, huku wakiwaza kwamba kuna uzuri wa kumiliki silaha, kwa vile siku moja kutatokezea mwito wa serikali kuzinunua tena hizo silaha. Hali hii huweza kuwafanya rahia wasikubali mwito wa kusalimisha silaha kwa kujitolea pasipo na fedha za kununua silaha hizo. Hii huchangia kwa kuenea zaidi kwa silaha hizo haramu.

Tukizingatia vidokezo vilivyotajwa hapo juu, ni wazi kwamba infaa serikali zetu ziwe zinazingatia sana hali inayodumisha usalama bila kuwawacha rahia wakiwa wanatamani kuzimiliki bunduki zingine. Kwa mfano ingekua vyema kama serikali ya demokrasia ya Congo ingezindua miradi ya maendeleo vijijini kama mabomba ya maji, kliniki, shule, mifugo na hata biashara zinazojumuisha

vijiji vizima, badala ya kununua bunduki kwa pesa. Hali hii ingaliwasaidia watu wote kwa jumla, bila kutofautisha waliyo na silaha na wasiyo nazo. Ijapokua idadi kubwa ya silaha ilikusanywa, hatujui kwaba ni idadi gani ya silaha ilionunuliwa tena na rahia, kwa matarajio kwamba hivi karibuni zoezi jingine kama hilo litazinduliwa. Kweli, katika hali kama hii, tutakua twaziba ufa ama twauzibua?

Nelson Alusala

Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: The conflict economy and arms control

The security challenges posed by pastoralist conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa currently present one of the leading causes of instability. These security threats, often deeply intertwined with the proliferation of small arms, generally lead to incessant insecurity and instability. In order to foster an environment that guarantees peace and security, the regional states are confronted with the urgent need to develop a degree of cooperation in order to move towards stability.

Security concerns in the pastoralist communities are a long-standing problem in the region. The USAID Conflict Baseline Study conducted among the Karamajong in Kenya and Uganda established that livestock raiding has been accepted as a traditional practice of replenishing depleted herds and as an opportunity for young men to acquire their herds and assert their manhood. The level of pastoralist involvement in conflicts seems to be mounting; other than cattle rustling, pastoralists are also involved in political rebellion and secessionist movements.

Lately, however, the conflicts have also been linked to economical deprivation and societal differences. The socio-economic circumstances are deeply intertwined with the security situation, effectively forming a vicious circle of conflicts. Causal arguments on these conflicts focus on struggle for resources, notably ubiquitous water and pasture issues. The pressure on scarce

resources is broadly viewed as the trigger of most conflicts in pastoralist regions of Africa. Furthermore, the role of socio-ethnic undertones is emphasised by the fact that communities now live in ethnically distinct territories that are restricted to neighbouring pastoralist groups.

Conflicts among pastoralist groups have become salient because of the presence of modern weapons. This has been compounded by rising incidents of banditry, road robberies, and uncontrolled killing and lawlessness. This generates new challenges and security problems in the region. The weapons also often find their way into the non-pastoralist zones and threaten security in urban precincts in particular.

Granted, the Greater Horn of Africa is practically the most politically volatile region in Africa. This makes the region a major source of illicit proliferation of arms, which causes violence in unstable communities. Thus the Horn of Africa is believed to be one of the most heavily armed parts of the world, although hard data on the number of illegal small arms is lacking, proliferation of weapons is essentially driven by the prevailing demand and supply dynamics. As noted, pastoralists mainly demand arms for protection of animals and people from attacks by hostile neighbouring groups. Conversely, on supply side, the unstable states in the region remain the primary sources of weapons.



Pastoralist armed with AK-47, Oropoi, North-western Kenya - Photo Credit: Siegfried Modola/IRIN/2007

Sustained insecurity due to profusion of illicit firearms is a plain indication that disarmament remains a precondition for security and stability. However, the transnational character of the pastoralist conflicts complicates the problem of combating proliferation of illicit weapons and securing the region. To sustain security, there is also a need to respond to the threats the communities face from across the borders. So far, previous disarmament programmes, mostly unilateral level efforts, have not brought the expected results. For example, attacks by the Karamajong in northern Kenya continue, despite the fact that the Ugandan government has been carrying out a disarmament program in the Karamoja area for the past decade. In Kenya, disarmament efforts have been undertaken by the successive governments. But in spite of these programmes aimed at reducing the reducing the circulation of illicit firearms, livestock rustling, continues, often with fatalities.

There is growing recognition that multilateral collaboration in disarmament programmes is crucial for eliminating or at least reducing the presence of small arms in the region. Multilateral initiatives emerged as the possible focus of conflict resolution on the control and reduction of small arms

and light weapons (SALW). The 2004 Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa is a case in point. So far the Nairobi Protocol provides the most relevant forum that galvanises collaborative efforts among regional governments to maximise security.

There is a compelling need to find lasting solutions to the problems posed by the conflicts, particularly in those areas that experience persistent friction. The peculiarities of different groups and circumstances are crucial in designing disarmament programmes. Previous disarmament programmes, which largely involved the use of force, achieved poor outcomes and created more distrust. For example, the 2009 disarmament program in Kenya, which intended to collect 50,000 firearms from pastoralist communities, gathered only about 2,400.

However, it is important to acknowledge that engagement at the grassroot level is imperative to successful disarmament. It has become increasingly clear that the successful implementation of disarmament strategies must be developed in conjunction with and owned by the communities themselves. Disarmament programmes undertaken

in cooperation with the communities underline the notion of sustainable security. Sustainable security entails the capacity of the affected communities to solve their own problems peacefully without an external administrative or military presence.

In a more practical sense, however, effective community economic development, which diversifies income sources, is a vital component for sustained peace and stability. The increased hostilities among ethnic groups are reasonably the outcomes of diminishing resources such as land and water, and conflicts are motivated by competition, where one group views its stake on these resources as threatened. With limited access to livelihood opportunities, pastoralist communities view firearms, not as instruments of war but of livelihood. The continued possession becomes essential to shield them against loss of their livestock to competing communities, and enable them to restock when they experience loss of livestock to drought or raids.


Paul Omondi

Towards Regulating the SALW Trade: Lessons from the Mine Ban Treaty

Since the 1990s there have been strong campaigns against landmines and both the legal and illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). While a treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines has been in place since 1997, there is no treaty to regulate the trade in SALW. This has led to a vibrant debate about why, if it was possible to create an international treaty controlling landmines, a treaty to limit the legal distribution of SALW is yet to be agreed on.

It is admittedly difficult to regulate the SALW trade, as a large number of weapons fall within this category, many of which have legitimate uses for policing and defence. It is nevertheless crucial to reduce and control the supply of SALW, which have both direct and indirect negative effects. Where SALW are found in large quantities, development is inhibited because projects are obstructed, infrastructure is damaged, and workers are endangered.

The introduction of the landmines treaty is a striking example of the power of advocacy



movements, particularly given that the United States (US) opposed the creation of the treaty as a matter of security policy. Moreover, the ability of less powerful states to coalesce around a contentious security issue suggests that similar cooperation on the issue of SALW is indeed possible

During the Cold War, the international community focused on the control and regulation of weapons of mass destruction. But by the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, landmines had become a leading issue on the global humanitarian agenda because of a growing awareness

of their harmful effects. This was spurred by the creation of a broad transnational coalition, namely the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

The success of the landmine campaign can be attributed to several factors: coordination, pressure and persuasion, the division of labour between advocates, the use of grassroots advocacy, and partnership with key states. Additionally, the anti-mines campaign was able to turn the issue into a global one by linking with NGO advocacy networks, the International Red Cross and UN bodies around the world.

The importance of "celebrity diplomacy" should not be underestimated: the active support of public figures, most notably Diana, Princess of Wales, provided the anti-landmine movement with momentum and visibility. Prominent state advocates, including Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, stepped forward to reinforce the work of informal non-state advocates. Yet the vocal support of high-profile individuals, although useful to ignite and mobilise humanitarian efforts, was underpinned by key stakeholders who were essential to the movement's success. The NGO coalition would likely not have resulted in a Mine Ban Treaty without the cooperation of supportive governments.

The international community responded to the landmine issue by creating the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Mine Ban Treaty), which bans anti-personnel mines, and then by adding the 2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, which requires nations to remove explosive remnants of war after conflicts. Together with the 1996 Protocol to the 1980 Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, these constitute the primary international legal instruments for the prevention and reduction of landmines and explosive remnants of war.

At the upcoming 10th meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2010, states will need to look at ways to universalise the treaty. No state has ratified or acceded to it since November 2007. However, the US is reviewing its landmine policy. Poland, Finland and Lao PDR have pledged to ratify or accede to the treaty.

Although the campaign to eliminate landmines was effective, movement towards a treaty that regulates the legal trade in SALW has been slow. This is not surprising given that, while the Mine Ban Treaty eliminates an entire category of weapons, the same is impossible for SALW, which

have legitimate uses in security institutions. Therefore it is necessary to control, rather than ban, SALW. But the international anti-arms movement has been weakened by its inability to decide exactly how the legal SALW trade should be regulated. The sluggish rate of progress on the SALW issue may also be the result of the failure to focus on the humanitarian issue of SALW rather than on security, as well as states' focus on the illicit arms trade instead of a wider focus that includes the legal arms trade.

Although movement towards a treaty is not quick, there are promising signs of a shift in attitude towards recognising the need to reduce, if not eliminate, the transfer of SALW. There have been numerous proposals to encourage the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of capital to development. For illegal weapons, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) has been established to provide a coordinated response in the international community, although it is weakened by the fact that it is not legally binding.

Support has also begun to grow for a comprehensive, legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which would regulate (not ban) the import, export and trade in conventional weapons, including SALW. Adherents have proposed the creation of common binding standards for states to determine whether an arms transfer is likely to result in the violation of principles of international human rights law. The United Kingdom formally introduced Resolution A/RES/61/89 in 2006, which requested that the UN Secretary-General obtain the opinions of UN member states on the drafting of a treaty.

The US initially opposed the initiative and voted against Resolution A/RES/61/89, but reversed its position in 2009 following their change in administration. The US's arrival on the international stage of arms trade talks potentially heralds an important step forward in negotiations, although the US has indicated its belief that the provisions of the ATT should be agreed upon using consensus decision-making. It remains to be seen whether states will be able to draft an ATT that satisfies the concerns of all parties.

The international legal frameworks needed to ban landmines and to regulate the legal SALW trade have certain important similarities. Both involve the identification and destruction of arms stockpiles, development and peacebuilding in conflict zones, the integration of disarmament into

peace agreements, and the enforcement of arms embargoes. The missing ingredient needed to move forward on the SALW issue is the political will of individual states. If there is one lesson to be learnt from the Mine Ban Treaty, it is that civil society and key states can compliment the efforts of the international community towards comprehensive, legally binding instruments governing weapons of warfare.

Paige Morrow

Moving forward on an Arms Trade Treaty

Since 2000, efforts to put in place global mechanisms to control the import, export, transfer and transit of weapons have focused on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and as such have largely fallen under the non-binding United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA).

More recently, however, the arms control community has focused on developing a set of international guidelines to include all conventional weapons, leading towards an international treaty governing the arms trade in general. This is commonly referred to as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

At the 61st UN General Assembly meeting in 2006, member states adopted Resolution A/RES/61/89, "Towards an arms trade treaty: Establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms". The resolution called on the UN Secretary-General to "seek the views of Member States on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms". It also called on the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) to address such a treaty and to report its findings at the 63rd session of the General Assembly.

Following the release of the report by the GGE in October 2008, the ATT process faltered as divergent views and a lack of consensus on a number of elements relating to the specifics of an ATT became evident.

In an attempt to build consensus on these elements, an open-ended working group (OEWG) was established in 2009. The OEWG met twice in 2009, and in January 2010 the UN passed a resolution that detailed a process to further consensus on elements of an ATT and eventually lead to the negotiation of the actual treaty. The resolution called for a UN Conference on the ATT, to be held in 2012, to negotiate the treaty. The resolution also declared that the four remaining sessions of the OEWG should be considered a preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the conference. The first of these was held from 12 to 23 July this year at the UN headquarters in New York.

The aim of the first PrepCom was for governments to make "recommendations on the elements that would be needed

to attain an effective and balanced legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms." The meeting also aimed to reduce divergent views and address states' concerns.


The scope of the ATT is one element that is proving difficult to reach consensus on, as there have been mixed responses to the inclusion of certain types of weapon systems and dual-use goods. There is also still some disagreement over the objective and parameters of the treaty. Some states would like to see the ATT as a mechanism for assisting in the prevention of human rights and international law violations, while others are proposing that it be limited to preventing legal arms from being diverted to illicit markets.¹

As a continent severely affected by the proliferation and misuse of SALW, Africa has continued to express its support for the ATT process. In a statement made during the first PrepCom, the Africa Group continued to stress that an ATT "...must particularly take full account of the special responsibilities of major arms producers and the special rights of arms importing States. Production and stockpiling of conventional arms by major producers should thus be part of any potential ATT."

The first PrepCom was successful in getting the ball rolling on what an eventual ATT will look like. It is yet to be seen if an agreement can be reached on the more controversial elements of an ATT during the remaining PrepComs and if an effective universal ATT can be negotiated in 2012. Of particular concern at the first PrepCom was the exclusion of civil society from the discussions, despite the fact that many civil society representatives had attended initial sessions. This is somewhat ironic given that the ATT stemmed from a civil society initiative and that one of the underlying principles of the ATT is increased transparency in the arms trade. Also disappointing was that, while the Africa Group assured the meeting of its support for and co-operation with the process, attendance and engagement from individual African states was minimal.

Dominique Dye

¹International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) feedback from the First Preparatory Committee meeting on the arms trade treaty, 14 July 2010.



Important Arms Control Dates

November to December 2010

4-5 November	1st Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba on African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Addis Ababa
8-10 November	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization: Thirty-fifth Session
8-12 November	Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Standardised Instruments for Reporting Military Expenditures: Geneva
9-12 November	1st Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Laos
22 - 23 November	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocol V, 4th Conference: Geneva
24 November	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, 12th Conference: Geneva
25-26 November	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of States Parties: Geneva
29 November – 3 December	10th meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: Geneva
29 November – 3 December	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): 15th session of the Conference of the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): The Hague
6-10 December	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC): Annual Meeting of the States Parties: Geneva

February 2011

28 February – 4 March	2nd ATT Preparatory Committee meeting: New York
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Supporting the implementation of arms control and disarmament initiatives at the national and regional levels



AMP

Arms Management Programme

Background

Africa is a diverse continent in terms of culture, language and geography. Achieving sustainable peace and development in many African countries is forestalled by violent conflict, poverty and weak state capacity. This situation is exacerbated by the availability of small arms and light weapons, the distribution of landmines and other explosive remnants of war, as well as the potential threat posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Despite these dynamics, inter-governmental organisations, national governments and civil society groupings in Africa have taken significant steps to control and prevent the proliferation of arms and reduce incidents of armed violence.

The Arms Management Programme (AMP) at the ISS has been working on arms control and disarmament issues in Africa for more than a decade - undertaking policy-oriented research, transferring knowledge and providing training to key government and civil society stakeholders. AMP facilitates workshops, seminars and conferences in support of the implementation of relevant international and regional arms control and disarmament protocols, treaties and conventions.

Goals

The two main goals of AMP are:

- To contribute to disarmament initiatives in Africa and to the implementation of effective arms management and control measures;
- To increase knowledge about the relationship between arms, violence and development

It pursues these goals by:

- Supporting and facilitating the implementation of arms control and disarmament initiatives at the local, national, regional and continental levels, and sharing the lessons from these efforts with the international community.
- Collecting and analysing information that will influence the formulation and implementation of arms control and disarmament policies and legislation.
- Providing capacity building and training to appropriate stakeholders.

AMP works closely with a number of official intergovernmental and sub-regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), and a number of civil society organisations.

Internationally, AMP actively supports the implementation of the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects – a key global process to tackle the illicit trade in small arms.

In addition, the programme seeks to identify and strengthen Africa's role in international efforts to reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament as it relates to weapons of mass destruction in the context of Africa's developmental imperatives. Thematically this project engages with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Chemical Weapons Convention; and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions such as UNSCR 1540.

Source of Information

AMP serves as an information resource on many aspects of small arms, light weapons, conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction in Africa. AMP hosts and maintains a collaborative internet-based reference tool for policy makers, researchers, journalists and civil society activists working on these issues. AMP welcomes contributions and partners wishing to play a role in the development of the website. www.armsnet africa.org

AMP produces the quarterly electronic newsletter: Arms Control: Africa which aims to provide relevant, succinct information and analysis on arms and arms control developments that are either taking place within Africa, or which have the potential to have an impact on the continent. The newsletter includes articles in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Swahili. Contributions to Arms Control: Africa are welcome, and should be emailed to aca@issafrica.org



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