During the 1960s, policymakers in a number of countries started to elevate the issue of organised crime on their national agendas when they realised that the activities of organised criminal groups had developed into a growing threat to national security. The rhetoric and changing attitudes towards the concept of ‘organised crime’ stem largely from the United States’ experience — particularly since former US Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, testifying before the Senate Committee hearings in 1963, warned that sophisticated criminals were moving into legitimate business via violence and intimidation.¹ Since then, many countries have introduced policy changes, implemented new and sometimes far-reaching legislation, and devised new policing strategies to counter organised crime more effectively.

And yet, despite these efforts, the expanding global role of criminal organisations has necessitated a reassessment of strategies by governments. The focus on organised crime as a domestic law and order problem has had to be reviewed as it became clear that transnational organised crime was posing an international security threat.² This realisation is reflected in the decision of member countries of the United Nations in mandating the General Assembly in December 1997, to begin the elaboration of an international United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Organised crime had developed into a global threat, and the formulation of a global response had become necessary.

South Africa had remained largely isolated from the international developments that affected organised crime, both as far as the nature of organised criminal activities within the country are concerned, and the ways in which the state has responded to these. Only since the early 1990s have steps been taken to catch up with developments elsewhere in the world. The authoritarian and security dominated environment under apartheid had held back (but not prevented) the expansion of international links by South African criminal organisations and made it very risky for international crime syndicates to move aggressively into South Africa.

While the state’s law enforcement agencies were focusing their attention on political opponents, indigenous criminal groups were increasing their activities significantly within the country during the 1980s. Despite relatively strict border controls, crossborder organised crime between South Africa and its neighbouring states expanded.³

The political changes that occurred in 1994, when apartheid was replaced by a constitutional democracy, created the opportunity for both indigenous and international organised criminal groups to exploit the new low-risk environment that South Africa provided for criminals. The country had entered a political transition, and state structures (including the police) were being transformed and were therefore weakened. Border control was more relaxed, while international trade and tourism expanded. South Africa became more accessible to the international community, including criminals.

Today, with the new government in power for more than five years, and with many of the uncertainties caused by transition subsiding, organised crime is thriving in South Africa. The government has declared it a priority crime and has taken far-reaching steps to counter it. This article will examine some of the developments that have characterised organised crime in South Africa during the past five years. It will attempt to identify some of the main trends and refer briefly to recent steps taken by the state to counter organised crime.

ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS ACTIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The first attempt to assess the extent and seriousness of organised crime in South Africa was made by the South African Police Service (SAPS) in July 1994. Since then, two further audits were conducted in 1995 and in 1997. Analysts in the SAPS, however, have accepted that the results of these first audits cannot be regarded as accurate indications of the prevalence of organised criminal groups or ‘syndicates’, as they are commonly referred to in South Africa. These were the first attempts at a national audit and the methodology contained many inadequacies. The SAPS is currently engaged in its first ever scientifically conducted Organised Crime Threat Analysis. The outcome of this exercise should provide a relatively accurate threat analysis of organised crime for the country. Even though there is a question mark over the accuracy of earlier audits, they do provide an indication of the number of criminal groups active in South Africa. Some of the findings are reflected in Table 1.⁴

The sources of information that were relied upon for each of the three audits were not identical. This complicates any attempt at a comparative analysis based on the above figures. What seems clear is that there are at least 500 organised criminal groups (syndicates and target groups) operating in South Africa, many with African and international links. Their activities have not remained static and their operating methods are continuously being adapted. Some of the main trends that have been manifested during the past four to five years are:

the continued growth in organised criminal activities;


the expansion of activities by international criminal groups;


the increased sophistication of indigenous criminal groups; and


the use of more lethal weapons.

Some crime categories that are typically the domain of organised criminal groups, such as the hijacking of cars and trucks, have shown a significant increase during the past three years. It is common cause that cars stolen and hijacked in South Africa are standard currency in neighbouring states, as well as within South Africa, in exchange for narcotics, illicit weapons and other contraband. It is estimated that the majority of hijackings and incidents of car theft are linked to the growth in organised crime.⁵ During 1998, for example, co-operation between the police forces of some of the Southern African states led to the recovery of about 1 600 stolen cars in neighbouring states, eighty per cent of which were stolen in South Africa.⁶

Criminal organisations that engage in these activities are typically the indigenous ones that have not yet reached the sophistication level at which they have accumulated sufficient capital to pay for their illegally acquired goods in cash.

The number of reported cases of carjacking have increased from 12 860 in 1996, 13 011 in 1997, to 15 111 in 1998. The increase of 16,1 per cent between 1997 and 1998 is cause for serious concern. A similar trend occurred in the reported cases of the hijacking of trucks. For the same three years, the numbers are 3 694, 4 296, and 5 773,⁷ respectively. In this case, the increase between 1997 and 1998 was a staggering 34,4 per cent

The criminal organisations involved in the hijacking of large and fully loaded trucks are ones that have developed extensive and colluding contacts within the factory warehouses from where these trucks depart. The subsequent sale and distribution of the stolen goods are also dependent on a well-developed distribution network within the criminal world. It is therefore reasonable to infer from the increases in the reported hijacking of cars and trucks that those organised criminal groups that are engaged in these activities have expanded and become more active.

Another indicator of the expanding role of organised criminal organisations is the increase in the trafficking and use of harder drugs such as crack cocaine in South Africa.⁸ Seizures of cocaine nationally by the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) have shown a steady increase from 78 kilograms in 1993 to 636 kilograms in 1998.⁹ Medical research confirms that the abuse of crack cocaine has spread to smaller cities, such as Port Elizabeth, where it was not encountered before.¹⁰

Recent investigations and seizures of mandrax (methaqualone) by the South African police suggest that increased volumes of the drug are being imported into South Africa and that the manufacture of the drug in the country is also expanding.¹¹ Again, the manufacture and smuggling of this drug are almost the exclusive terrain of organised crime groups, therefore illustrating their expanding role.

Although results from the most recent organised crime threat analysis are not yet available, preliminary indications are that it has expanded since 1997.¹² All indicators therefore suggest that South Africa faces a growing threat to its security and stability from this source.

It has been clear for some years that international criminal organisations involving, among others, Nigerians, Russians, Chinese, Moroccans and Italians are operating in South Africa. The exact extent to which such criminal organisations are active, will hopefully become clearer once the results of the national organised crime threat analysis are known.

Police investigators confirm that Nigerian crime syndicates now dominate the illicit trade in cocaine in South Africa. The first Nigerian syndicates established themselves in Johannesburg during the late 1980s, many of them consisting of illegal immigrants. They became prominent as cocaine dealers in about 1993 and, during the past three years, have moved into larger cities and towns throughout South Africa. It is estimated that between 45 000 and 100 000 Nigerians live in South Africa. According to the Nigerian High Commission, there are only 700 legally registered Nigerians in South Africa.¹³ The Nigerian syndicates have by now established a countrywide network of contacts and co-operation and continue to expand their activities.¹⁴ They have close links with Nigerians in South America, from where the bulk of cocaine is imported, but also with fellow countrymen in countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland.

Police at Johannesburg International Airport confiscated 30 716 kilograms of cocaine powder in 1994 and 218 070 kilograms in 1998.¹⁵ According to police of the narcotics unit in Johannesburg, they confiscated 339 kilograms of cocaine during the five months from 1 January to 31 May 1999 compared to 183 kilograms during the same period in 1998.¹⁶ Indicators therefore point to a significant expansion in the illicit trade in cocaine by Nigerian syndicates. According to the police, these syndicates have branched off into the cannabis trade in recent years and have since emerged as key exporters of Southern African cannabis to Europe.¹⁷ There are also indications that Nigerian syndicates are becoming involved in trafficking of heroin although still on a small scale at this stage.

A new phenomenon involving Nigerian syndicates is the kidnapping or killing of victims of the Nigerian ‘419’ letter scams. The scam involves appeals to international businessmen requesting their help in the transfer of over-budgeted money in exchange for a promised percentage commission. In June 1999, three Nigerians, one Ghanaian and a South African were arrested in connection with the kidnapping of a Jordanian businessman who had been lured to South Africa and then kidnapped upon his arrival. His kidnappers demanded US $40 000 from his family for his release.¹⁸ Police are currently investigating seven similar cases of kidnapping. Four of the victims were foreign businessmen who were lured to South Africa and then kidnapped. Substantial ransoms were then demanded from their families. One of the victims was shot and killed.

Available information indicates that no arrests of Russian criminals in South Africa have taken place to serve as confirmation that organised Russian crime groups are active in the country. Senior police officers, however, confirm that organised criminal activities of Russians came to their attention for the first time during 1995. They are of the view that Russian organised crime groups or networks have not only been involved in organised crime for some time, but have been expanding their activities.

When the South African Minister for Safety and Security visited Moscow in November 1998, he told a media briefing that Russian criminals in South Africa were involved in arms-smuggling, fraud, car theft and drug-trafficking. He provided the Russian authorities with a list of 23 names of persons, some of them known internationally,¹⁹ who were under suspicion for involvement in criminal activities in South Africa. He informed the media briefing, held in Moscow on 24 November 1998, that the South African police feared that Russian criminals could also be dealing in uranium.

Police confirm that Russian criminals are operating throughout Southern Africa. Aircraft, including large Russian manufactured former military transport planes, piloted by Russians, are known to have landed under cover of darkness at some of the many small and unguarded airstrips in South Africa to offload and load goods. According to a senior police investigator, the Russians in South Africa operate in networks of small groups. There are indications that some of them have links with the Russian Mafia in Russia and that networking with them takes place. Police believe that a number of suspects are conducting their criminal activities, including money-laundering, behind the cover of legitimate business operations, a typical phenomenon of the Russian Mafia and other internationally more established criminal groups. At the media briefing in Moscow, the South African Minister for Safety and Security confirmed this when he told the briefing that there would be closer working relations between Russian and South African police. Such co-operation would include the checking on companies registering in the respective countries because "... some people set up licit companies to cover illicit business."²⁰

Russian organised crime does therefore constitute a threat to South Africa. More intelligence and police investigations will be required before a clearer assessment can be made of the impact and scope of their activities.

South African detectives, particularly in the Western Cape and Gauteng, have been aware of the involvement by Chinese criminal groups in a range of criminal activities for many years. These include the ongoing smuggling of abalone to the East (a delicacy and aphrodisiac in China), illicit trading in rhino horn and ivory, the importation and distribution of drugs, money-laundering, tax evasion, the illegal trafficking of Chinese immigrants into South Africa and trading in contraband goods.

It was only during 1992 and 1993 that police investigations were able to confirm for the first time that Chinese criminals active in South Africa were linked to at least three different Chinese triad organisations based in Hong Kong and Taiwan. These links were with the Hong Kong-based ‘14K’, and the ‘Wo Shing Wo’ triads. Others, who were part of the so-called ‘Table Mountain Gang’ in Cape Town, were linked to triads in Taiwan. Police soon discovered that members of these triads were also operating in the Johannesburg/Pretoria area, as well as in other harbour cities in South Africa. They further confirm that Chinese criminal groups in South Africa with links to triads have expanded their activities in the country in the past few years.²¹

Cape Town is no longer their main area of operation. The Johannesburg and Pretoria areas have become the hub of their activities and accommodate a far higher number of Chinese criminal organisations than Cape Town. Their presence has recently even been observed in small seaside resorts such as Port Alfred in the Eastern Cape. Detectives estimate that about eighty per cent of the turnover of Chinese crime groups result from the illegal trade in abalone. This percentage is likely to decrease as they expand into other lucrative illegal activities.

The legal business of harvesting and selling abalone, in which Chinese syndicates are now trying to establish themselves, is worth approximately R550 million per annum. Police estimate that the illegal harvesting and trade in abalone, in which the Chinese criminal groups dominate, is worth approximately R500 million. The risk of being caught is low because inadequate attention is being given to the depletion of marine resources, and the product can be sold legally in Hong Kong or Taiwan.

During May 1999, for example, police observed approximately a 100 divers in the water in a marine nature reserve at Cape Recife near Port Elizabeth, diving for abalone. They consisted mainly of unemployed white males from Port Elizabeth, who, according to the police, were augmenting their income by supplying Chinese criminal organisations with illegally caught abalone. The process of depleting the Cape coast of abalone therefore continues unabated.

The fact that Chinese organised crime is diversifying into other areas of activity is illustrated by recent arrests. During the first six months of 1999, police and customs investigators intercepted two freight containers, one in Johannesburg and the other in Durban, containing more than one million mandrax (methaqualone) tablets each.²² A number of Chinese citizens were arrested. Police believe that the mandrax originated from China from where it was shipped through Singapore to South Africa.

South Africa’s recently established full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China holds the promise of increased trade, but also of an increase in organised crime in the country.

Freight containers loaded with drugs, intercepted by South African authorities during the past two years, indicate that not only Chinese, Nigerian and Russia criminal groups are targeting South Africa, or using it as a conduit for re-shipment. The following schedule illustrates that links exist with Indian, Angolan, Colombian, Armenian and Romanian criminal networks. The illicit drug trade in South Africa is therefore truly international and large volumes are involved (see Table 2).²³

"Table 2: Drug Trafficking – Freight Containers Intercepted, 1997-1999"

DATE	ORIGIN	TYPE OF DRUG	AMOUNT SEIZED	ESTIMATED VALUE	DESTINATION
April	"Armenia, "	Cannabis	18 000	R18 m	Transit
1997	Colombia	(compressed)	kilograms	($3 m)	Johannesburg
	via				to Netherlands
	Singapore
August	Russia	Mandrax	625 000	"R18,75 m "	Via Beira to
1997	via	(methaqualone)	tablets	"($3,1 m)"	South Africa
	Romania
September	"Armenia, "	Cannabis	21 000	R21 m	Johannesburg
1997	Colombia	(compressed)	kilograms	"($3,5 m)"
December	Colombia	Cocaine	4 300	R66 m	Johannesburg
1998		(dissolved)	kilograms	($11 m)
January	"Moradabad, "	Mandrax	180 000	R5.4 m	"Via Lubango, "
1999	India	(methaqualone)	tablets	"($0,9 m)"	"Angola, to "
					South Africa
February	China	Mandrax	"1,08 million "	R32.4 m	Johannesburg
1999		(methaqualone)	tablets	"($5,4 m)"
March 1999	Zhong Shan, China	Mandrax (methaqualone)	1,8million tablets	R54 m ($9 m)	Johannesburg

The renewed interest shown during the past three years in the activities of Cape Town-based, Sicilian-born, Mr. Vito Palazzolo, alleged by Italian authorities to be involved with the Sicilian branch of the Cosa Nostra (Mafia),²⁴ has raised questions about the presence and involvement of the Italian Mafia in South Africa. Palazzolo, who arrived in South Africa during the 1980s, and who appears to have developed long lasting ties with security operatives of the apartheid state and with organised crime, is wanted by the Italian police on charges of membership of the Sicilian Mafia, drug-trafficking and money-laundering.

According to a 1998 secret report to the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, Palazzolo was identified as the ‘boss’ of a Mafia structure in the Western Cape.²⁵ A man of considerable wealth, the police found some R500 000 worth of diamonds, and documents indicating that he had invested more than R25 million in various companies in South Africa and Namibia, when arresting him in 1998 on a Swiss extradition warrant.²⁶ Italian authorities have also linked him to other alleged mafiosi who were sheltering in South Africa. Palazzolo "never gets his hands dirty", but is said to be a master at corrupting government officials, and is believed to have suborned an ANC cabinet minister, a security force general, a top immigration official and ‘many’ policemen.²⁷

Police in South Africa have relaunched their investigation into the activities of Palazzolo, but are reluctant to throw any light on the extent of involvement by the Italian Mafia in South Africa. Cape Town and Johannesburg appear to be the centres from which Italian criminals operate. In Cape Town, Palazzolo is reported to have frequented a nightclub which was also the favourite haunt of well-known leaders of Cape Town organised crime groups such as Rashied Staggie, leader of the Hard Livings gang, and others.²⁸

The sophistication of senior Italian Mafia operators world-wide has enabled them to penetrate middle and senior government echelons. The extent to which that has happened in South Africa will hopefully become clearer once present police investigations are completed.

In addition to organised crime groups based in South Africa’s neighbouring states, there are Indian and Pakistani groups involved mainly in the smuggling of contraband goods, narcotics and illegal immigrants. Portuguese organised crime groups are involved in truck-hijacking and the smuggling of illicitly obtained diamonds and gold. Moroccan criminal groups in the Cape Town area have become part of extortion rackets and dealing in narcotics.

The first world component of South Africa, including its modern infrastructure, banking sector, telecommunications, international harbours and airports, combined with its wealth and potentially growing market, have made the country a haven for international organised crime. The weak criminal justice system and the resultant low-risk environment for criminals, have provided an additional inducement. An explanation for the continued and expanding role of international organised crime is therefore not difficult to find.

Greater exposure to and competition from established international criminal groups active in South Africa, have been some of the factors that contributed to the increased sophistication of South Africa’s indigenous organised crime groups.

Before 1994, for example, the six or seven largest crime syndicates in the Western Cape that were primarily involved in the narcotics trade, were constantly engaged in debilitating turf battles. This made them more vulnerable to police action and provided an environment that was very conducive to the recruitment of informers by the police who were tasked to inform on rival gang activities.²⁹ Rival gangs also used the criminal justice system to try and neutralise their opponents by laying criminal charges against them.

With the opening up of South Africa’s borders after the 1994 election, and with the realisation that foreign crime syndicates were likely to exploit the new situation, most of these Western Cape syndicates decided to establish a cartel. Their aim was to reduce turf battles, to order bulk shipments, to distribute the drugs in pre-arranged proportions at agreed prices, and to allocate distribution areas in terms of a set of agreed principles.³⁰ Called the ‘Firm’, this cartel substantially changed the nature of organised crime in the Western Cape after 1994. By 1996, enormous profits had been generated which needed to be laundered and invested. Members of the Firm started buying fixed properties in rural areas and along the Cape coastline. Some of the more assertive syndicates (often referred to as ‘gangs’ in the Western Cape) that formed part of the Firm, such as the Hard Livings, set up branches of their gang in many communities and towns and made contact with Chinese triads and the Sicilian Mafia.

Most of the local leaders of the Hard Livings were provided with seed capital and cars in order to run their own drug trade. The role of the leadership of the Hard Livings had then become one of merely collecting money and co-ordinating activities. These developments — the consolidation and better co-ordination of activities — are typical of what occurred within some criminal groups elsewhere in South Africa. They reflect a typical path of progression of a common criminal gang moving up the ladder of sophistication on its way to becoming a well-organised criminal group that thinks strategically after assessing its own strengths and weaknesses.

In addition to the increased structural and organisational sophistication being shown by many indigenous criminal groups, they have also adapted very quickly to utilise modern technology to their advantage. Through corruption and with the assistance from ‘friends’ in the police, some criminal groups have equipped themselves with radio receivers that can hone into frequencies used by the police to listen to police communications. They are often forewarned of police raids, roadblocks or general plans of action by the police. It is also becoming very common for even teenage ‘runners’, i.e. street-corner peddlers of narcotics, to be equipped with cellular phones.

The increased sophistication evidenced by many indigenous criminal groups is clearly not something that is peculiar to South Africa. What does make this development very challenging in the country, is that the innovation and adaptability evident among some of these criminal groups have occurred at a very rapid rate during the past five years.

A more recent development is the increased use of lethal firepower by organised criminal groups that specialise in bank robberies and cash-in-transit heists. During 1997 and 1998, these syndicates, operating in groups of up to fifteen, netted more than R100 million in many violent attacks.³¹

Since 1996, the police have had considerable success in apprehending members of these syndicates, with the result that the number of bank robberies and robberies of cash-in-transit have decreased since 1997. The number of reported robberies of cash-in-transit dropped from 410 in 1996, 230 in 1997, to 214 in 1998. The number of reported bank robberies for the same periods were 642, 497 and 214,³² respectively. The special police investigating team that has been appointed to deal with bank and cash-in-transit robberies, ascribes its recent successes to the increased reliance on intelligence-gathering activities and better co-ordination.

According to police investigators, the disruption that resulted from police actions has caused criminal groups responsible for these robberies to regroup and to adjust their methods of operation. In addition to a sudden increasing spate of such attack during the past two months, a new tendency has been for the attackers to arm themselves with heavy calibre, military-type assault rifles and with armour-piercing bullets. Hand grenades and petrol bombs have also been used. A special meeting of senior police investigators has been planned for September 1999 to consider how to respond effectively to new developments.

The use of heavy calibre, military-type assault weapons is not confined to criminal groups that specialise in bank robberies. The leader of a large organised crime syndicate in the Western Cape, Rashied Staggie, is presently on trial on charges involving the theft of weapons from a police armoury. It is alleged that the thieves made off with nineteen military-type R5 assault rifles, twelve R1 assault rifles, eighteen shotguns and nine pistols.³³ The police believe that the weapons were to be used to arm Cape Town’s underworld against anti-drug vigilantes.

These developments come at a time when the government is reviewing its policy on the possession and ownership of firearms with a view to tighten and provide stricter controls. The use of more lethal, illegal firearms to commit crimes will increasingly attract severe sentences of imprisonment. At the beginning of September 1999, a South African High Court sentenced a member of a crime syndicate, who had participated in an armed cash-in-transit attack, four times to a life sentence plus an additional 96 years of imprisonment. Several persons were killed during the attack in which military-type assault and automatic rifles were used.³⁴

The four trends in the development of organised crime that have briefly been dealt with — the continued growth of organised crime, the increasing role of international criminal groups, the growing sophistication of indigenous criminal groups, and the use of more lethal weapons — by no means cover all noteworthy developments in organised crime in South Africa. There are, for example, indications that organised crime groups are starting to succeed in penetrating middle and senior-level government structures.³⁵ The role of elements in the private security industry, as well as former members of the security forces of the apartheid state and of the liberation armies, in organised crime is becoming more evident.

The trends and developments described above will remain out of context without a brief reference to the state’s responses to these developments. There can be no doubt that more has been done during the past four years at policy, legislative and operational levels to combat organised crime than in the past fifteen years. Since 1990, of the ten new laws that impact on organised crime, five came into operation in 1997, 1998 and 1999,³⁶ and two more are likely to be implemented during 1999.

One of these laws is the far-reaching and controversial Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1999. This law allows for the prosecution of an individual for being a member of a criminal organisation and for the civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, i.e. without first obtaining a criminal conviction. It was implemented in 1999, but the first few attempts at asset forfeitures by the state resulted in immediate court challenges and the subsequent return of the assets to the suspected criminals. The deficiencies in the law have recently been attended to by Parliament and it is expected that senior figures in organised crime will continue to be targeted.

On the operational level, the police, the prosecution services and the intelligence agencies have followed the international trend of establishing specialised multidisciplinary units to target sophisticated organised crime. In addition to the existing organised crime units and units of the narcotics bureau of the SAPS, the last two years saw the establishment of separate specialised units focusing on vehicle-hijacking in Gauteng and on organised crime and gang activities in the Western Cape.

The most recent development was the establishment at the beginning of September 1999 of the so-called ‘Scorpion’ unit. This specialised unit, which will consist of special prosecutors, detectives, forensic scientists, electronics experts and others, will have national jurisdiction and will fulfil the role played by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States in many ways. The Scorpion unit aims to have a staff complement of about 2 000 of the best investigators within the next two years. International assistance, including training and the provision of expertise, will be utilised to the full.

The biggest challenge remains the effective implementation of the new operational policing plans and new legislation. The shortage of skills and resources within the criminal justice system, however, is likely to remain a handicap for some time to come.

Despite all the encouraging steps taken by the state, organised crime continues to pose a serious and growing threat to South African society. Organised criminal groups, particularly international ones, continue to be one step ahead of law enforcement agencies in South Africa, grasping and exploiting the benefits presented by globalisation and modern technology. The threat of them undermining state structures and the fragile new democracy in South Africa through corruption, bribery and increasingly violent crime, should not be underestimated. What provides grounds for encouragement though, is the fact that the South African government has acknowledged that organised crime presents a serious problem and that it has recently taken firm and far-reaching steps to counter it.

This is an edited version of a paper read at the conference on South Africa after the elections — Stock-taking and future perspectives, Wildbad Kreuth, 22 and 23 September 1999.

M E Beare, Criminal conspiracies: Organized crime in Canada, Nelson, Canada, 1996, p 140.



P Williams, Transnational organised crime and national and international security: A global assessment, in V Gamba (ed) Society under siege: Crime, violence and illegal weapons, TCP Series, I, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, September 1997, p 13.



P Gastrow, Organised crime in South Africa: An assessment of its nature and origins, ISS Monograph Series, 28, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, August 1998, p 22.



R van Wyk, Crime threat analysis, unpublished paper, Crime Information Analysis Centre, Detective Service Head Office, SAPS, Pretoria, February 1999, p 3.



M Shaw, Crime and policing in post-apartheid South Africa, unpublished paper read at a conference, South African Embassy, Dublin, March 1999.



J Seepe, War is to blame for rise in car hijackings, Sowetan, 9 February 1999, Johannesburg.



CIAC, Crime in the RSA for the period January to December 1994 -1998, Crime Information Analysis Centre, SAPS, May 1999, Pretoria.



Medical Research Council, South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (SACENDU), Press Release No 13/99, 4 June 1999, Cape Town, <www.mrc.ac.za/pressrel/1999/14press99.htm>, (3 August 1999).



Medical Research Council, Fact Sheet: Cocaine and Heroin in South Africa, Cape Town, <www.mrc.ac.za/urban/ factsheet.htm>, (3 August 1999).



Ibid.



Document submitted by the South African Narcotics Bureau at a briefing of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Safety and Security, Cape Town, 15 September 1999.



C de Kock, Interview, Head, Crime Information Analysis Centre, SAPS, Pretoria,3 September 1999.



M Fourie, The roots, shoots & fruits of cocaine, Servamus Police Magazine, 92(8), August 1998, p 5, <www.servamus. co.za/cocaine.htm>, (10 September 1999).



Interview, senior police officer, South African Narcotics Bureau, Pretoria, 10 June 1999.



Fourie, op cit, p 4.



Ibid.



Interview, 10 June 1999, op cit.



G Gifford, Police crack kidnap ring, Cape Times, 24 June 1999.



World Justice Information Network (WJIN) News, Russia linked to arms and drugs in South Africa, 25 November 1998,<www.wjin.net>, (2 December 1998).



Ibid.



Interview, senior police investigators, Cape Town, 31 May 1999.



Interview, senior police officer, Pretoria, 6 June 1999.



G Mason, Document, Senior Superintendent and Head, South African Narcotics Bureau, briefing of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Safety and Security, Cape Town, 15 September 1999.



Men of honour, Africa Confidential, 40(3), 5 February 1999, p 2.



R Friedman, Cape Times, 3 July 1998.



Ibid, p 2.



M Burger, The untouchables, Marie Claire, November 1998, p 31.



Ibid, p 2.



W Schaerf & C Vale, The Firm: Organised crime comes of age during the transition to democracy, Unpublished paper, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1996, p 3.



Ibid, p 5.



Heist gangs regrouping, armed with heavy weapons, Cape Times, 9 September 1999.



Crime in the RSA for the period January to December 1994-1998, Crime Information Analysis Centre, SAPS, Pretoria, May 1999.



Cape Times, 9 September 1999.



D W Potgieter, Swaar vonnis gee polisie en wetsgehoorsames weer moed, Rapport, 12 September 1999.



The resent arrest in Durban of a senior police officer in charge of investigating organised crime, is an example. He has allegedly become involved in extensive organised crime activities.



M Schönteich, How organised is the state’s response to organised crime?, African Security Review, 8(2), 1999, p 10.