Introduction

As the consequences of internal conflict have become more visible, more affecting, and more widespread in their impact, a growing constituency has developed in many quarters for a broader use of external intervention in some cases of internal conflict. The issue of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ has attracted particular interest and attention in the West. In the African context, the debate has expanded beyond what might be called ‘humanitarian’ objectives to include the possibility of intervention to address a range of important political and other objectives, including whether intervention should also be considered where effective state authority has completely collapsed, where spill-over effects threaten regional stability, or where democratisation or democratic processes are threatened.

Indeed, Africans have in many respects been at the forefront of the new debate about intervention, with events in Africa unfortunately providing some of the most compelling cases for action – whether in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia or Sierra Leone.

But the trend towards intervention – especially military intervention – for humanitarian and other motives has not been universally welcomed. The ad hoc and sometimes seemingly arbitrary nature of the interventions that have taken place in the past has given many governments and commentators cause for concern, and the stakes in the intervention debate are therefore extremely high, especially for Africa. On the one side, is the potential ability to take effective action to save large numbers of human lives or perhaps defend essential human and humanitarian interests. On the other side, is the very real danger that poorly planned or executed interventions will do more harm on the ground than good, while weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations may increase the likelihood and potential for conflict between and among states.

What is clear, however, is that the greater willingness in recent years to consider military intervention as a means of advancing broader human and humanitarian interests, responds to real and actual need and derives both from our growing interconnectedness as well as from the fundamentally good human impulse not to be mere idle or indifferent bystanders when conflict is unfolding in front of us. Still to be answered, however, is whether the tool of military intervention – as we know or can conceive it – is likely in any or all of these cases ultimately to do more good or more harm.

Non-intervention: Africa’s historical perspective

Intervention has a long and often very sordid history in Africa, and it is impossible to appreciate properly the significance of the shift that has occurred in African practise and thinking in recent years, without clearly understanding this.

While African countries have collectively implemented intervention in new ways and in new areas, African countries have in general also remained extremely cool towards the notion of any global rewriting of the rules of intervention and non-intervention as embodied in the United Nations (UN) Charter, and Africans across the political spectrum have generally been hostile towards any discussion that expressly touches upon the question of sovereignty.

The principles and norms of non-intervention

The fundamental objective of the system of international relations established by the UN Charter is to maintain peaceful relations between states by promoting universal adherence to internationally recognised rules of good conduct and the peaceful resolution of disputes among states. The fundamental tenets of this system are a repudiation of the use of force as a means of settling disputes between states, an affirmation that all states are equally sovereign in the law of international relations, and a strong precept against interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states – consistent with the duty of all states to fulfil their common and recognised responsibilities under international law.

Article 2.4 of the UN Charter expressly states that:

“All Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The Charter provides exceptions only for cases of self-defence (Article 51) and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, where the Security Council agrees to take action in response to a threat to “international peace and security”.

In the absence of an authorisation by the Security Council, the traditional legal view has been that action to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state is considered to be aggression under international law and inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Charter.

Supporters of this viewpoint argue that to give the sanction of law to such actions, whatever the supposed motivation, would diminish the standing of international norms and rules, encourage aggression, and undermine the authority of the Security Council, making Council approval merely a desirable option rather than a binding requirement.

It is easy now to take these basic principles for granted, but we should not forget that non-intervention has not always been the norm in international relations, and that in the not too distant past, wars of aggression were commonplace and territorial expansion by the strong at the expense of the weak was a familiar and accepted part of international relations.

The importance that nearly all nations – including the most powerful – now attach to the principle and norms of non-intervention reflect not just the turbulent history of conflict in preceding centuries, but also the present desire to avoid dangerous and destabilising arms races, as well as the economic and political costs of compiling and maintaining excessive military arsenals.

For obvious reasons, the non- intervention principle has always been especially important to smaller and less powerful states, which often see it – in conjunction with sovereignty – as one of the few meaningful tools at their disposal in dealing with larger, stronger or more aggressive countries. Non-intervention has also historically played a critical role for many post-colonial states as they have struggled (and in many cases continue to struggle) with the challenges of nation-building and long-term political, economic and social development. This has been particularly true in Africa. States struggling with these tasks have both needed and demanded the political space necessary to pursue these objectives effectively and in earnest – and in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Wars of aggression and other types of conflict between states have not disappeared, but the principles and institutions built into the UN Charter have worked to help diminish the number, magnitude and scope of such events. There are many therefore, who view with understandable dread any development that could weaken the general applicability of the non-intervention norm, or provide a pretext upon which ill-meaning aggressors could advance their ambitions.

Africa’s historical experience of intervention

Africa’s traditional perspective on intervention is understandably based to a large extent on the continent’s past experience and geopolitical situation, including: colonisation; the legacy of neo-colonial and Cold War–related activity in Africa; the complex political dynamics between African states; and Africa’s political and economic weakness in the broader global context.

The manner in which Africa was colonised continues to impact African thinking on intervention, particularly with respect to the activities in Africa of non- African powers. European powers sought to justify their land grab in Africa partly through assertions of a humanitarian mission to ‘bring the benefits of Christianity and Western Civilisation’ to the subjugated peoples – a fact that rightly continues to make Africans (and many others) inherently wary of external assertions of benevolence or humanitarian protection.

Similarly, the exploitation and degradation that resulted from African societies losing sovereignty and control to a foreign colonial entity, has prompted post-colonial states in Africa to be fiercely attached to international rights, protections and the recognition of that regained sovereignty. Likewise, because of our colonial experience and the subsequent struggle for independence, there is in Africa an almost allergic reaction to any suggestion of trusteeship for failing African states, however bad the situation may be (as in Somalia, for example) and irrespective of how such a process might be established or administrated (including by the UN).

Also important in shaping African attitudes towards intervention has been a rather sordid post-colonial legacy of neo-colonialist actions and, prior to 1990, of Cold War power politics and interventionism. The traumatic examples of Belgium’s various interventions in the Congo, and of France’s many political and military adventures in Africa, continue to cast a shadow of suspicion whenever their involvement in an intervention in Africa is raised. Even amidst the genocide in Rwanda – it was hard for many to believe that France, through Operation Turquoise, was acting with humanitarian rather than political motives – the outcome of that action, together with the regional turmoil left in its wake, have largely confirmed these fears.

Moreover, during the Cold War, issues such as democracy, human rights and good governance carried little weight with either superpower or their supporters in the battle for ideological allies. During the Cold War, non-intervention as a principle was also disregarded where competition between the superpowers was at issue. In many places around the world, the support and often the creation of armed movements to challenge governing national authorities became standard fare in international relations. The legacy of these efforts continues to scar many countries today.

The result of these two phenomena is that the righteous, benevolent and self-assured image which the mature industrialised democracies of the West have of themselves, is viewed with different eyes elsewhere. It cannot necessarily be taken for granted that whatever emerges from their individual or collective councils is always guided by the best of intentions. These countries have their interests too, and history counsels caution and scrutiny.

The importance of promoting harmonious relations on the continent by trying to minimise both the causes of potential conflict among neighbouring states and the means for resolving grievances, also strongly reinforces Africa’s natural pre- disposition to be wary of intervention and to place great emphasis on non-intervention as a strong norm. The decision by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that states would accept and respect their inherited boundaries, can be seen in this context. In particular cases, proximity to large and sometimes forceful regional powers on the continent has made the non- intervention doctrine especially important and appealing.

Finally, it should be noted that Africa’s traditional wariness about intervention is also very much a reflection of the continent’s overall geopolitical weakness. Because many African states – with a few notable exceptions – could not easily maintain their sovereignty and independence through sheer political or military power, they are compelled to rely instead on respect by others for international law and the established rules of international relations. The strength of these rules and codes of conduct is for many states their only effective defence. Anything that threatens to undermine these rules or diminish the degree to which the more powerful feel bound to respect them, is therefore inherently threatening. It was precisely this fear that prompted many states to react so negatively to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) assertion that it was entitled to disregard the established rules of the international system in deciding to intervene in Kosovo, whatever the underlining justification. If NATO can decide to play by different rules, then others can, in theory, do the same.

Why Africa must revisit its traditional non-interventionist posture

As African countries have struggled with the challenges of state and nation building, and with the transition towards democratisation and more accountable governments, there have in some cases been notable setbacks. These setbacks to African state and societal development have prompted new types of responses from Africa and have required new ways of thinking. While Africa’s historical experience and geopolitical situation have largely shaped the continent’s underlying predisposition towards intervention, these new and ongoing challenges have in recent years prompted African states and institutions to move significantly away from traditional non-interventionist approaches. Primary among these challenges has been the phenomenon of failing states, the risks of conflict spill-over, threats to democratic processes, and abject failure to act in the face of humanitarian catastrophe.

Failing states

In Somalia, the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 was followed by intense in-fighting that led to the collapse of state institutions and the descent of Somalia into anarchy. The result was a complete breakdown of law and order, a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, and a power vacuum in Somalia that some believed could have a potentially destabilising impact on the sub- region.

In response to the political crisis and humanitarian tragedy that was unfolding in Somalia, an ambitious intervention was authorised by the UN Security Council to address the humanitarian crisis in the country and to re-establish functioning state institutions. Although the intervention to address the war-induced famine in Somalia was widely supported, the broad support that the operation initially enjoyed dissipated when the military component of that operation became engaged in efforts to address the underlying political conflict in that country. The result was that the success in addressing the humanitarian aspect of the crisis was soon overshadowed by a political failure for the UN of substantial proportions – an outcome that not only failed to advance the political prospects for peace in Somalia, but also proved a significant obstacle to efforts to rally international support to address other crises in Africa, including the genocide in Rwanda that began in 1994.

Spill-over

In Liberia, the ouster of President Samuel Doe’s regime by insurgents led by Charles Taylor ushered in a period of factional fighting in Liberia that saw the collapse of virtually all state institutions and authority outside of the capital, Monrovia. The result, as in Somalia, was the near complete breakdown of law and order, and a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions. But the conflict in Liberia also had significant implications for other countries in the sub-region, and the conflict soon spilled over into neighbouring Sierra Leone and Guinea, and threatened to draw in and destabilise still other countries in the sub-region.

The importance of preventing the further spread of the conflict in Liberia and addressing its destabilising effect on the sub-region added a broader dimension to the concerns that some had earlier expressed regarding the dire humanitarian crisis that had resulted from the civil war in that country. The need to try to contain the conflict in Liberia was therefore a key reason why the countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) persevered with its peacekeeping efforts over so many years, despite the enormous costs and numerous setbacks – in sharp contrast to what happened in Somalia.

Threats to democratic processes

The issue of the use of military force to restore an elected government is not unique to Africa; there is the case of Haiti, for example. In Africa, however, the issue is especially strongly felt, and action has been taken by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, and on behalf on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lesotho. The reasons for Africa’s preoccupation with this issue are not hard to determine. In a continent where democratisation is still very much a work in progress, and democratically elected governments sometimes feel threatened by armed groups operating within their own territories, the overthrow of an elected government anywhere on the continent is rightly viewed by many as a threat to all elected governments on the continent, as well as a threat to the democratic processes and institutions, which many countries in Africa are striving to build and strengthen. The political, economic, social and developmental setbacks suffered by many African countries as a result of the wave of military take-overs that occurred in Africa in the past, make clear the high humanitarian and human rights costs to African peoples of again going down this path.

Failure to act

The shooting down in March 1994 of the aeroplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi set in motion a humanitarian tragedy of enormous proportions. Within four months, millions died in Rwanda as part of a planned genocide. As the slaughter unfolded, the Security Council reduced rather than strengthened the UN presence in the country, and appeals for intervention to stop the killing fell on deaf ears in the council and elsewhere.

The impact of the failure of Africa and the international community to respond to the genocide has been felt in a number of areas. One clear and lasting lesson for Africa has been that the international community’s interest in Africa is capricious and fickle in nature, and the costs of being dependent on others for action can be unacceptably high. It is a lesson reinforced by the experience in Liberia, where Liberians waited in vain for US intervention, only to discover that in their hour of need it was to their neighbours in the sub-region that they had to look for effective intervention to help end the suffering and turmoil created by the civil war in that country.

Rwanda demonstrated both the most compelling need for intervention on humanitarian grounds, and the most compelling failure to meet that need. On Africa’s agenda therefore, must be the problem of how to ensure that action is, and can, be taken when needed.

The ‘humanitarian intervention’ debate

While Africa has struggled to come to terms with how African states can best address the broad range of circumstances and conditions that might warrant external intervention in internal situations, the broader international community has focused more narrowly on the particular question of whether humanitarian emergencies may provide a new and universally enforceable exception to the general prohibition in international relations against the use of force by one state against another.

The debate has been fully joined and hotly contested at the highest international levels and has set off often passionate debate on a global scale. Africa too has weighed into this debate, generally joining Asia, Latin America and other parts of the developing world in opposing universal recognition of any doctrine in international relations that might authorise any one country or group of countries to intervene anywhere on an asserted humanitarian basis.

Background to the debate

The debate about so-called humanitarian intervention is about the manifest failure of the international community to respond in a coherent or effective manner to the humanitarian crises that have unfolded in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo in particular. The UN Secretary-General, in September 1999, reflected upon “the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century,” noting the failure of the UN – and of the Security Council in particular – to respond adequately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, or to the situation that developed in Kosovo in 1998. Warning that humanity would look elsewhere for peace and justice if the UN failed to rise to the task when action was needed, the Secretary-General challenged the UN Member States to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity”.

In the General Assembly and elsewhere, the Secretary-General’s remarks sparked a vigorous and often heated debate on issues of sovereignty, intervention and human security. Even in Africa, where intervention for humanitarian purposes has been formally recognised and codified by treaty at sub-regional levels, opposition by the African governments to the idea of humanitarian intervention was strong.

Establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

The government of Canada responded to the Secretary-General’s challenge by announcing in September 2000 the establishment of an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The commission was to comprise prominent and experienced individuals, balanced between developed and developing countries, and representing a wide range of geographical backgrounds, perspectives and experiences. The objective was to ensure there was a diversity of opinion and viewpoints on the commission that reflected well the main lines of the broader international debate. The commission was given a one-year mandate, and asked to examine the issues raised in the Secretary-General’s address and to report on what could be done to facilitate the task of finding common ground on issues related to state sovereignty, intervention and human security.

The commission met for the first time on 5–6 November 2000, in Ottawa, Canada. At that meeting, the Commission mapped out a strategy for carrying out its mandate, agreeing that its work process should be transparent, inclusive and global. With the support of the Government of Canada, this strategy focused on the establishment of a core research directorate for the commission’s work, together with a series of regional roundtables and national consultations that were intended to ensure the commission’s exposure to a wide and diverse range of views, while at the same time helping to inform world public opinion about the commission’s work and objectives. The commission placed particular emphasis on the need to ensure that views of affected populations were heard and taken into account, in addition to the views of governments, intergovernmental and non- governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and others.

Regional roundtable meetings and/or national consultations were held by the commission in Ottawa, London, Geneva, Maputo, Washington, Santiago, Cairo, Paris, New Dehli and St Petersburg. Individual commissioners and members of the research team also attended a large number of conferences and seminars, often by special invitation or in a representative capacity. The commission made a particular effort to avail itself of as broad a range of academic thinking and expertise as possible, and decided to produce a companion volume of basic research related to the report.

The commission’s focus

The commission’s mandate was to examine the issues of sovereignty and intervention, including by implication for human security, and to suggest where and how common ground could be found. Key objectives included to help:

facilitate protective intervention where it is appropriate, while relying on other approaches where intervention would be inappropriate or do more harm than good;



establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining when, how and whether to intervene; and



ensure that intervention when it occurs is carried out efficiently, effectively and for the purposes proposed.

The commission’s report is due to be released in December 2001.

The Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has focused on intervention in a broad sense, encompassing actions taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes that are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. By far the most controversial form of such intervention is military, and a great part of the report necessarily focuses on that. But the commission has also been concerned with alternatives to military action, including all forms of preventive measures, and coercive intervention measures (sanctions and criminal prosecutions) falling short of military intervention.

Consistent with its mandate, the commission has limited its efforts to interventions that are called for or undertaken primarily for humanitarian purposes, the so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’. The commission has not tried to define or determine when intervention would be appropriate or warranted in other circumstances, but only whether particular actions or justifications could serve as a basis for a new ‘humanitarian exception’ to the general rule against intervention, including military intervention. Outside the commission’s scope therefore, are acts of self-defence (covered by Article 51 of the UN Charter), as well as various actions that may be proposed and justified on political, rather than humanitarian, grounds. The latter may well be justified but should be authorised in the prescribed way rather than taken as part of a possible exception to the general prohibition.

What the commission heard

Undoubtedly, the richest and most important source of inputs and information into the commission’s work were provided by the regional and specialised roundtables, and the national consultations conducted by the commission. These gatherings were important both because of the particular and sometimes unique perspectives which they provided, but also because of the shared concerns and common ground they helped to highlight.

A faithful and comprehensive summary of the popular lessons that were learned from each roundtable or consultation is not possible here. A brief general indication of some of the highlights, preoccupations and perspectives may, however, be useful, especially in showing the broad and multifaceted nature of the issue. Among the Northern industrialised democracies, there was an overriding concern with human rights and with finding an effective mechanism to facilitate necessary action. Among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (excluding the US), there was a strong focus on making the council the focal point of efforts to address situations that might warrant intervention. In the US there was a clear emphasis on preserving possible latitude for action, and on how to intervene most effectively – and a striking lack of concern about questions of authority and legitimacy regarding a possible intervention.

In Africa, the commission found strong support for intervention for humanitarian purposes in principle, and an interest in intervention on a wider range of issues. There was, however, also a clear message to the commission from the African consultations that unless intervention is properly authorised, conducted and managed, it may well do more harm than good. In the Middle East, there was a strong preoccupation with the Palestinian issue and whether the failure to protect the Palestinians amounted to an international double standard. In Latin America, there was a strong aversion to anything that smacked of unilateral action, especially of a military nature and a cautious but still open approach on the issue of the possibility of intervention for humanitarian purposes. In Asia, there was a strong emphasis on sovereignty and a wariness of actions that would legitimate the use of force. Among the UN Specialised Agencies, other international organisations, and humanitarian and human rights NGOs there was ideological support for actions in support of human rights, an overriding preoccupation with preserving the capacity of humanitarian organisations and agencies to act, and a clear division on the use of military force.

Especially important was the common ground that was clearly evident in a number of key areas. There was near universal recognition that the issue of what action to take in cases of humanitarian catastrophe or emergency – including what means were appropriate for what types of situations – presented a genuine problem that needed to be addressed. While there was some disagreement on the meaning, relative importance, and continued relevance of sovereignty, there was universal recognition that sovereignty implied certain responsibilities on the part of the state towards its people, and that this imposed some limitations on what a particular government could or could not do with respect to its own people. There was consensus that Security Council authorisation for any intervention is preferable to unilateral action and other alternatives, and there was general concern to avoid an outcome that would discredit the Security Council, or that would undermine respect for an international order based on rules and principles rather than simply on power. But despite the importance attached to the Security Council in particular, it was also clear that few, if any, states or commentators were prepared to insist on and in all cases to abide by the principle that Security Council authorisation is a necessary precondition for intervention of any type to occur, though there are considerable differences in views about the level of deference which should be shown to the council. There were also strong and repeated calls for reform of the Security Council to make it more representative.

Taken together, these areas of particular concern and areas of common opinion provide a solid foundation upon which the commission can build in helping to achieve greater common ground in the context of intervention for humanitarian purposes.

An African agenda on intervention

When, how and whether to intervene in internal crises are likely to continue to be issues of great international debate – not just in terms of means, but also in terms of the desired ends. Africa must be an active and positive participant in this global discussion. Africa has important interests at stake, and should be clear about its priorities. In the context of intervention it would seem that four clear priorities for Africa can be identified, namely:

better prevention;



reinforcing international norms against aggression and strengthening respect for the rule of law in international relations;



mobilising support for action when action is needed; and



better intervention.

Better prevention

Prevention should be the highest priority and the first thought with respect to addressing internal conflict. The need to do much better on prevention, and to exhaust prevention options before rushing to embrace intervention, were constantly recurring themes in the commission’s worldwide consultations. Unfortunately, for reasons that are already well known, it is often easier to mobilise action to address a conflict that has broken out, than to invest time, effort and resources in avoiding conflict. But preventive efforts are important not just because they can help to reduce and sometimes eliminate the need for intervention altogether, but even where they have not succeeded in preventing conflict they provide a context for understanding underlying issues and an important base from which to begin contemplating post- intervention strategies.

Prevention of deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophe are first and foremost the responsibilities of sovereign states, and the communities and institutions within them. Preventing conflict requires addressing the underlying causes of conflict. This may mean addressing political needs and deficiencies, strengthening legal protections and institutions, embarking upon needed reforms to the military and other state security services, or working to achieve a fairer distribution of resources throughout society. No single prescription can be universally applicable, but efforts to ensure accountability and good governance, to protect human rights, to promote social and economic development and to ensure a fair distribution of resources, point toward the necessary means.

Prevention should receive greater priority not just at national level, but also at the regional level and more generally throughout the international community. The failure of prevention can have wide international consequences and costs. For prevention to succeed, moreover, strong support from the international community is often needed, and in many cases may be indispensable. Such support may take many forms. It may come in the form of development assistance and co-operation to address inequities in the distribution of resources or opportunities; promotion of economic growth and opportunity; better terms of trade and permitting greater access to external markets for developing economies; or efforts to provide support for local initiatives to advance good governance, human rights, or the rule of law or in the form of good offices missions, mediation efforts and other efforts to promote dialogue or reconciliation. In some cases international support for prevention efforts may take the form of inducements; in others, it may involve a willingness to apply tough and perhaps even punitive measures.

Reinforcing international norms against aggression and strengthening respect for the rule of law in international relations

An international order based on peaceful relations and mutual respect among nations and on respecting the rules and principles of law in international relations is very much in Africa’s interest. To achieve this, the sovereignty and independence of states must be respected; the conduct of international relations must be based on agreed norms and rules rather than on unilateral actions or the force of arms; and governments must better live up to the responsibilities that sovereignty entails.

In assessing the need and the nature of any new approach to intervention, Africans will understandably seek to reject any notions that might imply an unequal sovereignty or that call for rewriting the book on sovereignty as an element of international relations. Although state sovereignty is not, and has never been, an absolutist concept, sovereignty remains a strong and necessary restraint on interventionist impulses, while effective and legitimate states remain the best way to preserve world order, promote and ensure the protection of human rights, and preserve the dignity and independence of human societies. As has been observed elsewhere, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the co-operation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.

Due respect for the sovereignty and independence of states and societies is best demonstrated by a strong commitment by states to abide by the norms and rules of international relations in their dealings with each other. This means respect for the UN Charter and for the institutions established therein, which provide the foundation and the agreed ground rules for relations between states. It means that when intervention occurs it must be authorised and carried out through the responsible institutions in the prescribed manner. Anything less necessarily means that force alone will be the argument that carries the day.

But just as Africa has a strong and tangible interest in ensuring that the sovereignty and independence of states are appropriately respected in international relations, so too does Africa have a paramount interest in ensuring that sovereignty has real meaning for the people of Africa and not just for their governments. Sovereignty also means responsibility and sovereignty must be understood also to imply that the state authorities are responsible for the protection of the safety and lives of citizens and the promotion of their welfare. It is therefore not a question of redefining sovereign relations between states, but rather of better understanding what sovereignty entails in its domestic aspect.

Mobilising support for action when action is needed

While there is understandable wariness in many quarters about the implications of redefining the scope of intervention at the global level, at present the more immediate and practical problem is most likely to be the failure of action to occur when action is clearly called for and needed. In this respect, the failure of the international community to act in Rwanda is more likely to be typical of international reaction than the determination of NATO to act in Kosovo with or without broader international sanction. High on Africa’s agenda must therefore be the question of how to ensure that when action is needed, appropriate action is taken.

A credible and widely agreed doctrine of intervention in special cases is necessarily an important component of this effort. In the context of the ongoing international debate about ‘humanitarian intervention’ in particular, it is clear that Africans have a strong interest in promoting the establishment of such a norm, and an equally strong interest in ensuring that any such norm is genuinely humanitarian and cannot be used as a pretext for political adventurism or the pursuit of other agendas by the strong and more powerful. A high threshold will be required, and a proper procedure for authorising action must be insisted upon.

But as Rwanda has demonstrated, even a duly authorised mandate for action is no guarantee that action will be taken. On issues that are important to Africa, it is equally important that Africans ensure that they have the capacity to act in support of the principles they establish. The Security Council and others with a responsibility to act or to provide assistance may or may not do so. In all cases concerning Africa, the continent must aim to ensure that it has the capacity not only to provide political leadership for the rest of the international community, but also the capacity to take effective action on the ground.

Regional and sub-regional action and co-operation is critical to the capacity of African countries to defend their collective interests or advance Africa’s priorities among the broader international community. Regional and sub-regional organisations have intervened in their member states, doing so in accordance with mandates and treaty obligations of the organisations concerned. Regional and sub-regional capacity building in conflict prevention and management needs to be given the highest priority, for when action is needed the stark reality is that it is most likely to take the form of sub-regional action. Where matters affecting the continent are concerned, the model should be one of Africans defining and asserting their own priorities and then seeking support for these from others.

Better intervention

When military intervention is needed, it is critical not only to mobilise the political will to act, but also to ensure that the intervention is given the best chance of succeeding operationally. In short, intervention needs to be done better. Too often in the past, operational failures in planning or executing an intervention have undermined and frequently diminished the achievements of those actions. Indeed, even interventions undertaken with the best of intentions can be completely undone by poor planning, poor conceptualisation, inadequate resources, and poor execution. The clearest message that came out of the African roundtables organised by the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, was that if intervention is to be undertaken it must be done right.

Military intervention to protect endangered human lives should and will occur only as a last resort, after the failure of other measures to achieve satisfactory results. If military intervention continues to be used to save human lives, protect democratic institutions and support other such goals, it is likely that a new type of military operation will evolve – different from war making and different also from peacekeeping.

Past interventions have taught a number of lessons: some have been learned and some have not. The list of problems to be solved is daunting, and include such issues as coalition building, mission creep, exit strategies, mandates, resources, rules of engagement, civil–military relations, application of force, casualties, the media, transfer of authority and post-conflict peacebuilding. The Report of the Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty will provide a useful vantage point from which to approach some of these issues, but substantially more work needs to be done in this area on all sides – political, military and humanitarian. Africa has a real interest in ensuring that adequate attention is paid not just to the means for action, but also to the impact.

Conclusion

Military intervention must always be regarded as an exceptional action of last resort. Such action is inherently a symptom of failure. But as long as states will be unwilling or unable to protect their populations or effectively carry out their responsibilities as states, intervention will be needed, and there will be irresistible pressure for it to occur. Africa has been on the frontline of the intervention challenge, and the continent is now at the vanguard of global thinking on these issues. The objective must be for African states to do the things necessary to ensure that local grievances do not become matters of domestic conflict, and that domestic conflicts do not explode into matters of regional and broader international concern. This means, in particular, good governance, respect for human rights and a commitment to democracy and democratic processes.

Note

This essay is published under the auspices of the Training for Peace in Southern Africa project, which is funded by the Government of Norway. This is an edited version of a paper by Stanlake Samkange entitled, External intervention as a response to internal conflict, presented at a Fund for Peace Conference, Regional responses to internal war (Africa consultation), Washington, DC, 7–10 October 2001.