LIVING IN TERROR

The looming security threat to Southern Africa

Lindy Heinecken
Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies (Military Academy), University of Stellenbosch

Published in African Security Review Vol 10 No 4, 2001
Unlike terrorism, HIV/AIDS deaths are seldom spectacular. The reason being, that those dying are dispersed and the impact not clearly visible. Yet it is one of the greatest threats to mankind as the disease slowly erodes the social fabric of society and weakens national economies, making it difficult for states to respond to the social challenges and political instability this disease poses. This is especially the case in countries with large inequalities in income, which experience rapid urbanisation and where there is high mobility and a breakdown in social cohesion within society. Armed forces are a crucial part of any state’s security, but are often worst affected by this disease as it impacts directly on their operational effectiveness. Where armed forces face high infection rates it renders them less capable of coping with the internal disruption this disease causes as well as with the ability to provide humanitarian and peace support to those in need. With Southern Africa being the region most affected, South Africa as the regional economic and military power is becoming less capable of serving as regional peacekeeper or stabilising force as the impact of the disease becomes more visible.

Introduction

The world reeled on 11 September 2001 as the United States (US) fell victim to the worst ever terrorist attack in history, killing over 3000 people. Yet in Africa, where a silent killer – HIV/AIDS – is sweeping through the continent killing an estimated 6000 people a day, most remain mute. Few realise that this disease is as great, if not a greater, transnational security threat than terrorism. Already, more than ten times as many people are dying from AIDS than from wars in sub-Saharan Africa.

Far from being a war stopper as some anticipated, the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS leaves states unable to curb social and political unrest, protect state sovereignty and defend national interests.1

This article reflects on the potential impact HIV/AIDS poses for peace, stability and regional security in Southern Africa – the region worst affected by the epidemic. More and more it is recognised that ‘health’ is part of the fabric of what constitutes a country’s security, not only due to the impact the disease poses for political stability, but the state’s ability to maintain internal stability and external security. Ironically, armed forces, which form the first and last line in a country’s defence, are often the worst affected. On the one hand, they are both at high risk of infection and a core transmission group, especially in societies confronted by instability and war. On the other, they are often the first to be called upon to tend to the humanitarian crises this epidemic evokes.

Given the potential impact HIV/AIDS has on human, national and international security, an attempt is made to identify the strategic implications high infection rates among the armed forces pose both for operational effectiveness, and ultimately, for regional peace, stability and development in Southern Africa.

HIV/AIDS and Southern Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa where the main mode of transmission is heterosexual contact, more than 25 million adults and children were living with HIV/AIDS by the end of 2000. This represents 70% of global infections and more than one-tenth of the adult population aged 15–49 infected with HIV/AIDS in the region, most of whom will die within the next ten years. Average life expectancy which rose to 59 years in the early 1990s, is set to drop to just 45 years between 2005 and 2010.2 Within the next decade, more than 40 million children in Africa (approximately equivalent to the population of South Africa) are due to lose one, if not both parents to AIDS.3

The countries worst affected are all clustered in the southern cone of Africa. In at least seven countries in the region, one in five adults aged between 15 and 49 are infected with HIV. At the end of 1999 Botswana had an estimated HIV/AIDS infection rate of 36%, followed by Zimbabwe (25%), Swaziland (25%), Lesotho (24%), Zambia, Namibia and South Africa (all 20%), Malawi (16%) and Mozambique (13%).4 With some 4.7 million infected, South Africa has the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world.

The reasons for the rapid spread of the disease throughout the region are complex. Unlike other infectious diseases, where the signs are obvious and death follows shortly afterwards, the long period during which the HIV infection shows no symptoms helps spread the virus unknowingly, at alarming rates. Infection rates can easily soar to 20-40% within less than a decade.5

In Swaziland, for example, within one year – 1994 – infection rates went from 4% to 21% – in peacetime.6 The rapid spread of HIV in the region since 1984 has been well documented by various international agencies such as the United Nations (UN).7

The regional differences in HIV prevalence are only partially understood. Poverty and instability perpetuate the spread of HIV/AIDS, but are not the main drivers. For example, Botswana with an HIV/AIDS infection rate of 36%, is one of the most stable, peaceful and wealthy countries in the region. The countries worst affected, have some of the highest per capita incomes in the region (see Table 1).

Table 1: Comparative income, inequality, urbanisation and mobility

Country
Per capita income
Gini index
Urbanisation
Number of vehicles
1998 US$
(%)
per 1000 people
Botswana
3600
–
68
44
South Africa
2880
58
50
142
Uganda
320
41
13
4
Zambia
330
46
44
26
Zimbabwe
610
57
31
32
Source: Whiteside and Sunter 2000, 62

Vast inequalities in income, rapid urbanisation and mobility appear to contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially in economies based on mining and commercial farming. Such sectors are labour intensive and foster a system of labour migrancy, which leads to another crucial variable facilitating the spread of HIV: the breakdown in social cohesion. The migrant labour system cultivated by the apartheid homeland policy as well as the use of foreign migrants from Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique and Malawi (all highly infected countries) on South African mines, is well known.8 Splitting up families through single sex recruitment has been part of the process whereby HIV is passed to wives and spouses in the rural areas. On South African mines, infection rates are around 29%.9

The Gini index measures inequality of income. A Gini index of zero would indicate perfect equality, every person having the same income; and an index figure of 100 would indicate perfect inequality, one person having all the income and the rest having nothing.

Another important variable affecting social cohesion is the disruption caused by war, conflict and political instability throughout the region. The subsequent breakdown in social services, the physical collapse in infrastructure, expanding urban squatter settlements and refugee flows, all provide conditions conducive to the spread of HIV/AIDS.10 By the mid-1990s, most countries in Southern Africa were experiencing political and economic instability, leaving their populations more prone to illness and at greater risk of economic decline.

HIV/AIDS: Why a security threat?

Under these conditions, political instability and disease reinforce each other to provide a lethal mix undermining human, national and international security. At the level of the individual household, a single member with HIV/AIDS threatens family income and food security. This is specifically so in countries where family income is directly related to agricultural activities, as is the case in 80% of Africa. In Zimbabwe, for example, the death of a breadwinner due to AIDS was found to cut maize production by 61%, vegetables by 49%, groundnuts 37% and cattle-owned by 29%.11

HIV/AIDS has been blamed for much of the current violence in the country. A 1998 study on the impact of HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe found that “increasingly alienated youths form their own political organisations well beyond the boundaries of constitutional politics or democratic parties”.12 Of interest would be to establish whether there is a link between youths claiming to be war veterans and AIDS orphans.

In cases where both parents and family support structures crumble, millions of young people are left destitute. Many are taken out of school to tend to the sick, or work to support the family, further undermining the knowledge and skills base of society.13 Where children are fortunate enough to have an extended family network, the burden is often too much for elderly grandparents or aunts and uncles to cope with. Research by Catherine Cross on the economic impact of HIV/AIDS on rural households in KwaZulu-Natal, aptly illustrates this.14

In South Africa alone, by 2005, there are expected to be around one million orphans under the age of 15, rising to some 2.5 million by 2010.15 Children growing up under these conditions are at higher risk of anti-social behaviour and of not becoming productive members of society. In desperation, many may flock to urban settlements in search of work, turn to crime to survive, or become the subjects of exploitation and radicalisation. In Africa, it is often been these desperate children who find ‘another home’ in the armed forces, and become child soldiers.16

For national governments, the ability to fund institutions to deal with the problems associated with an increasingly impoverished and unstable internal situation, becomes all the more difficult given the impact the epidemic has on national economies. The premature death of half of the adult economically active population causes a decline in productivity, an increase in absenteeism and a surge in health care and training costs. As a direct result of HIV/AIDS the gross domestic product (GDP) of South Africa, for example, is expected to decline by 3.1% between 2006 and 2010. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, estimates are that GDP was reduced by 6% in 2000, with a further decline of as much as one-third expected over the next 20 years.17

Training costs in countries seriously affected by the epidemic are estimated to increase between 24–63%, depending on the availability of labour to replace skills lost.18 In South Africa, between 40–50% of employees are estimated to die within the next decade. The actual impact depends on which employees are affected, the ease with which they can be replaced, and what sectors are affected.19

In this regard, the public service, employing large numbers of skilled personnel are critically affected, weakening the capacity of crucial institutions – governance, health, the judiciary, educators, teachers and the armed forces. For example, 30% of teachers in Malawi and Zambia have been affected. In some African countries, armed forces report HIV/AIDS infections of up to 80%.20 In Botswana (Gaborone), a lawyer stated that he “can no longer count on the legal system to function because of the absences of court officials”.21 In Uganda, in some regions there is effectively no local government. In Kenya, the death among politicians is feared to undermine the process of democratisation in the country.22

High HIV/AIDS infection rates force national governments to shift their priorities from other pressing socio-economic and development issues affecting their nations, to health. In 1997, for example, public health spending for AIDS alone in seven out of 16 African countries exceeded 2.5% of their GDP.23

In South Africa, conservative estimates are that the public sector currently spends between R4000–R4500 (this is without drugs such as AZT) on treating one AIDS patient per year. With an estimated 4.7 million already infected, with a further 1500 becoming infected daily, annual increases in health spending is expected to increase by R4 million per annum by 2008 – this is without anti-retroviral therapy.24 Currently Zimbabwe spends close to half of its health budget on treating AIDS patients.25

For South Africa, seen as the engine of economic growth and development in the region, the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the country holds huge implications for Southern Africa as a whole. Deprivation and poverty are not only a source of internal conflict, but can easily spill over into tensions between states. Given the interconnectedness of the economies of the region and the dependence on South Africa for employment, it can already be seen how diplomatic relations can become strained as a result of HIV/AIDS. Already there are claims that South Africa repatriated 13 000 Malawi mineworkers and requested the Malawi government to test all prospective employees for HIV/AIDS before seeking employment in South Africa.26 Mozambique recently launched an investigation into similar allegations that South African authorities have been repatriating Mozambican miners infected with HIV/AIDS.27

This evidence illustrates the inter-dependence of social, economic and political systems and how HIV/AIDS can undermine security. It is this realisation that led the UN Security Council to declare:
“HIV/AIDS is a security issue as destabilising as any war … that threatens not just individual citizens but the very institutions that define and defend the character of society.”28
The CIA issued a similar warning:
“HIV/AIDS adds to political instability and slow democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia and the former Soviet Union, while also increasing political tensions in and among some developed countries.”29
Evidently, governments weakened by the impact of HIV/AIDS and the development this poses, face the prospect of growing lawlessness and internal conflict.

HIV/AIDS: the impact on armed forces

For governments this becomes even more of a crisis, where the armed forces and police have become enfeebled and unable to curb the unrest and instability within society. As a sector of society, the armed forces are both at high risk of infection and transmission because of the age group they employ, and the circumstances under which they are deployed. Most are young, male and sexually active; most are deployed for lengthy periods away from home, subject to peer pressure, prone to risk taking and often exposed to opportunities for casual sex and sex workers. Bachelor conditions, alcohol abuse and regular pay are seen as contributing factors, propagating infection among the armed forces, especially in poverty stricken regions.

Prevalence rates

In some sub-Saharan African countries where the virus has been present for more than ten years, reports claim that infection rates are as high as 80%, especially among the officer corps.30 While the statistics quoted are speculative, it appears as if the epidemic has hit the armed forces more severely than civil society (see Table 2).31 The relatively lower rate of infection for South Africa and Namibia is partly because the HIV/AIDS epidemic affected these countries later, and because these countries have been subject to less political and socio-economic instability than many of the other countries.

Among the countries of Southern Africa, at least one in four adults is infected and this almost doubles in the case of at least five national armed forces in the region. Currently, at least three other armed forces are involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As previously mentioned, high mobility, social disruption and conflict increase the susceptibility to infection and one can only presume that this is contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS within the region. Adding to this, the four countries involved in the conflict not only have some of the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates in Southern Africa, but they spend the most on defence as a percentage of their GDP (see Table 2).

Table 2: Estimated HIV/AIDS infection by country. Prevalence within national armed forces and percentage gross domestic product (GDP) for Southern Africa

Country Size of population
-2001		 HIV/AIDS (%)
-1999		 Size of forces
-2001		 HIV prevalence armed forces (%) for year indicated Defence budget as (%) of GDP
Angola 10 860 000 2.78 113 000 50 (1999) 16.5
Botswana 1 450 000 35.8 7 800 33 (1999) 5.2
DRC 50 340 000 6.43 31 100 50 (1999) 7.8
Lesotho 20 090 000 23.57 2 050 40 (1999) 4.2
Malawi 9 840 000 15.96 10 800 50 (1999) 1.8
Mozambique 16 700 000 13.22 6 100 Not available 4.1
Namibia 1 880 000 19.54 8 100 16 (1996) 4.4
South Africa 42 830 000 19.94 90 500 15-20 (2000) 1.3
Swaziland 970 000 25.25 3 000 48 (1997) 2.5
Zambia 10 240 000 19.95 21 500 60 (1998) 2.5
Zimbabwe 12 290 000 25.06 36 000 55 (1999) 6.1
Sources: UNAIDS and WHO, 1999, Du Plessis, 2001,32 South African Defence Intelligence Assessment.

The implication of such high infection rates within society, and specifically in the armed forces, impacts directly on the operational capacity and capability of these forces. HIV/AIDS impacts on all the generic processes involved in ensuring a combat ready force, namely force procurement, force preparation, force employment and force sustainment.

Impact on force procurement

Force procurement refers to the ability of forces to recruit suitable personnel into the armed forces. The impact naturally depends on the type of force one is referring to, whether structured as a conventional military force or paramilitary force, as is the case with most sub-Saharan armed forces.33 For those armed forces that have reached at least a modest level of modernisation in terms of weapons and professionalism, the greatest challenge lies in the ability to recruit the required quality and quantity personnel.

Estimates are that by 2010 South Africa, for example, will lose nearly a third of its adults.34 The changing demographic composition has a number of implications for armed forces. Not only does it mean that less adults are available, but less with the required education, as increasing numbers of impoverished and orphaned children are taken out of school at an early age.

The current testing policy adopted by most armed forces, while intending to reduce the incidence of HIV within the ranks, also limits their ability to recruit suitable personnel in a shrinking skills market.

The problem with pre-employment testing is that many prospective candidates may self-select away from the military knowing that they will be tested, depriving the military of high quality manpower. The other issue is that where service members contracts are not renewed on the basis of their health status, the skills are lost to the organisation. Within Southern Africa, most armed forces have a testing policy pertaining to recruits. How this is applied once in service, is broadly the same for most forces of Southern Africa, with minor differences depending on the respective county’s national HIV/AIDS policy and service contracts of members.

Impact on force preparation

To illustrate the impact of HIV/AIDS on force preparation, reference is made to the education, training and development of South African Army officers. On average it takes an army officer between 5–7 years (age 23–25) before he/she can be promoted to captain, 8–11 years (age 25–30) to major, 12–15 years (age 30–35) to lt-colonel and 16–19 years (age 35–40 and higher) to the rank of colonel.35

Within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the age group most affected is between 23–32 years with up to 50% of those infected with HIV/AIDS in the age group 25–29 years. This age groups provides the largest number of operationally deployable members and typically officers and non-commissioned officers in this rank group perform highly skilled, supervisory and management functions. The potential shortage of qualified and experienced members in these ranks inevitably leads to a ‘hollowing out’ of the organisation at the level of middle management. Presuming that the SANDF, with its intensive HIV/AIDS awareness and education programme is able to keep infection rates on par with national figures, the visual impact is clear just looking at the estimated AIDS deaths within the next ten years (see Figure 1). The main deaths will occur in the rank groups, captain to colonel.36

Figure 1: Age distribution of AIDS and non-AIDS deaths in 2010

Unlike the private sector, commanders cannot be recruited off the street. Should the SANDF compensate for the loss of continuity of command by promoting inexperienced members, this will not only undermine professionalism, but the overall competency of the armed forces. Because the epidemic is still in the infection stage, with few physically ill or dying from HIV/AIDS, the real impact will only be felt within the next five years. Estimates for the broader private sector are that 3.1% of highly skilled, 22.8% skilled and 32.8% semi- and unskilled workers will be infected with HIV/AIDS by 2005.37 Training and re-training costs can increase by as much as 34%.38

For the SANDF, which invests most of its time in training its forces, the costs of having constantly to recruit, train and retrain personnel will have a significant impact on the future personnel budget. The biggest challenge, however, lies with having to accommodate large numbers of HIV compromised persons (possibly 20% of the full-time forces) who are no longer capable of performing the tasks for which they have been trained. The inability to dismiss and having to utilise unfit, untrained personnel in support functions, will erode operational effectiveness even further.

Impact on force employment

If this is the envisaged impact on the SANDF, the impact on the national armed forces of the rest of Southern Africa, with estimated HIV/AIDS infection rates of between 30–60%, is so much the more. Many report that they are unable to deploy a full contingent, or even half of their troops, at short notice.39 AIDS is the leading cause of death in the military and police forces in some Southern African countries, accounting for more than half of in-service and post-service mortality.40 Most of these countries have been subjected to the epidemic longer than South Africa.

Increasingly, as HIV/AIDS spreads within the ranks, it becomes all the more difficult for armed forces to deploy ‘homogeneous’ units – i.e. units that have been trained together and form a cohesive unit. An SANDF officer involved in force preparation for external operations expressed his concern as follows:
“Current policy does not allow us to know who is HIV-positive. I continue to train and retain members for peace support operations (PSOs), but when the actual day comes for deployment, certain members will be removed on the basis of their ‘health status’.”
There are also no clear guidelines of what to do with those left behind.41 Complicating last minute replacements is that external deployment is voluntary and suitably qualified personnel many not be readily available.

HIV/AIDS impacts both on internal and external deployment in various ways. While South Africa (as most armed forces in the region), supports the UN recommendation not to deploy HIV-positive members for PSOs, the impact on HIV/AIDS on deployment is not limited to external operations. Currently, in some operational units, 90% of the members were found to be medically unfit to be deployed. Strategic gaps are often left, with junior leaders falling ill and needing to be replaced from other units, in turn affecting discipline, morale and cohesion.

Complicating force employment, is that soldiers are subject to a battery of immunisations such as vaccinia (small pox), rubella, polio, typhoid and yellow fever. In the case of HIV-positive persons, live attenuated virus immunisations are unwise due to the danger these viruses pose for actual infection. This makes the deployment of such individuals (even if they are still capable of performing their duties) problematic, especially where yellow fever and tuberculosis is epidemic. Adding to this, soldiers are frequently deployed in adverse conditions with limited infrastructure to deal with emergencies. Ordinary ailments such as diarrhoea or the common cold in the immune compromised person can be serious enough to require hospitalisation, in some cases being fatal if not treated immediately. This implies an increase in evacuations and replacements, which in turn places undue pressure on command and military budgets.

Another factor affecting deployment is that the longer units are deployed in a given area, the more prone they are to infection. For example, HIV prevalence among Nigerian military personnel increased from just fewer than 8% for those serving one year to 16% for those with three years service (see Figure 2). It is virtually impossible to keep soldiers separate from the civilian population. The dilemma is that frequent rotation in turn proliferates the spread of HIV by the armed forces throughout society. This becomes even more of a problem when deployed in high infected areas. The challenges range from deploying healthy peacekeeping forces being infected by coalition peacekeeping forces and local populations with high infection rates, to poor and inadequate health care facilities in host countries, to the high-risk behaviour of troops themselves. Until now the perils of committing forces to PSOs in high HIV prevalence countries have not been given serious attention, despite the indisputable evidence that troop deployment for peacekeeping and other purposes increases HIV transmission to and from host countries.

Figure 2: HIV prevalence in Nigerian military personnel according to years of duty as peacekeepers 1998 - 1999

The question is how willing will nations, including South Africa, be to volunteer their armed forces for future involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in the region, knowing the forces they are being deployed with, and the civilians they are to help, protect or save, have high infection rates?

Impact on force sustainment

Force sustainment refers to the ability of armed forces to clothe, feed, equip and support soldiers during the course of their duties. Obviously, governments become less able to fund the armed forces as resources are channelled to health. One may therefore expect that with the defence budget presently only at 1.3% of GDP, the SANDF will find it increasingly difficult to maintain its operational capability, as not only GDP declines and government priorities shift, but as its own budget is eroded by rising health costs.

In some military hospitals in Africa, three-quarters and in some cases up to 80% of military beds are occupied by AIDS patients.42 At present, HIV is by far the most critical disease affecting members of the SANDF, amounting to 38% of all chronic illnesses. This will place a heavy burden on the military medical health system, further undermining its capacity to equip, maintain and support the operational elements. The South African Medical Health Service (SAMHS) is bound to come under tremendous pressure in future as it treats not only those in service, but their dependants.

Currently, the SANDF is deployed extensively in internal operations, in support of the police in law and order functions, in borderline control to combat illegal immigration and continues to render extensive support in humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Even without the impact of HIV/AIDS, the present capacity of the SANDF to fulfil these obligations is proving increasingly difficult under present budgetary constraints.43

The main concern at present is not with human resources, but with force sustainment.44 Obviously, as health costs eat into the military budget, the SANDF will become less able to perform these functions unless additional government funding is channelled to defence.

Strategic implications for regional security

All indications are that the states of Southern Africa are facing a major public health and social development emergency as a result of the social disruption, poverty, hunger and instability caused by HIV/AIDS. Where governments are weakened by this kind of development impact, they become less able to meet the needs of their people – this, in itself, is a security threat. The growing destabilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, and increasingly in Southern Africa, is partly due to the increased stresses on state capacity to deal with the impact of HIV/AIDS. As indicated, in many of these countries more than a quarter of the economically active population will be dead. This radically compromises the ability of governments to ensure a viable system of internal governance and external security.

Because military troops are the ultimate instrument of the state in maintaining security, the severe impact HIV/AIDS has on operational capability, compounds the security implications. The increase in infection rates among military personnel not only weakens the capacity to defend their nations and maintain civil order, but to provide qualified personnel for peacekeeping and other humanitarian aid missions. Sending incompetent, unqualified and ill-prepared troops into conflict zones, will not only fuel the epidemic, but will contribute to the further spread of HIV within the region.

In this regard, governments face a difficult dilemma. If they invest in the armed forces to ensure a viable capacity, it may lead to increasing tension within society as the legitimacy of this decision is questioned. Yet, at the same time there is a growing realisation that HIV/AIDS is a security threat and that where civilian agencies such as the police, health and other sectors fail to cope with the impending crisis, their reliance on the armed forces increases. This awareness may lead to a major change in how countries, such as South Africa, both continue to fund and deploy the armed forces in years ahead.

Given the potential impact this disease poses for regional peace and stability, military forces, whatever their capacity, will inevitably be deployed in either a preventive role or in the aftermath of humanitarian disasters. Such situations often require massive state response and in most cases only the military has the ability to react quickly enough with adequate resources.45 As regards Southern Africa, looking at the impact of HIV/AIDS on the armed forces in the region and their strength in terms of equipment, training and funding, only South Africa has the capacity to render such support.

But for how long – granted the combined effect of eroding military capability and increasing economic decline? For South Africa, as the foremost economic and military power in the region, but as the country with the highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, the potential impact on national security and regional peace and stability is both daunting, and difficult to comprehend.

Concluding remarks

HIV/AIDS is a pending national disaster – a strategic priority. Effective prevention, support and care programmes may minimise the extent of the impact, but to win this battle it is necessary to first break the silence and stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS. It is the secretiveness of this virus that makes it the most deadly killer known to mankind.

The other most prudent response, given the destabilising nature of this disease, is to prepare the armed forces for the challenges lying ahead. If it is the job of the military to protect lives, then it has no choice but to gear itself up against this enemy which will touch the lives of every citizen in this country, whether infected or not. In this regard, all the military can possibly do is serve as a safety net, nothing more.

Only a global response, such as that to the recent terrorist attack on the US, may be sufficient to subdue this enemy. Unfortunately, too few yet realise the impact on mankind, and when they do, it may be too late.

Notes

  1. Peter Piot, Reaching a turning point. Global Issues, July 2000, p 1, <http://www.usinfo. state/journals/ itgic/o700/ijge/gjo5.htm>.

  2. Gellman, Aids declared threat to security, Washington Post, 30 April 2000.

  3. Sandra Thurman, The shared struggle against AIDS. Global Issues, July 2000. <http://www/ usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0700/ijge/gj01. htm>

  4. UN Report, 1999, United Nations report on the global HIV/Aids epidemic, <http://www. unaids.org/epidemic_update/report/index. html>

  5. David Bloom, Lakshmi Bloom and River Path Associates, Business, AIDS, and Africa, in The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p 27.

  6. Elizabeth Reid, A future, if one is still alive: The challenge of the HIV epidemic, in Moore, J. (ed), Hard choices: Moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p 270.

  7. For a graphic representation of this see UNAIDS, 2001, Twenty years of HIV/AIDS <http://www/unaids.orf/fact_sheets/files/AIDS twenty_en.htm>

  8. Alan Whiteside and Clem Sunter, AIDS: The challenge for South Africa, Cape Town: Human and Rousseau and Tafelberg Publishers, 2000, pp 62-63.

  9. Kristina Quattek, The economic impact of AIDS in South Africa: A dark cloud on the horizon, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Occasional Paper, June 2000, p 49.

  10. Louis du Plessis, The historical development of sub-Saharan military capabilities, in Louis du Plessis and Mike Hough (eds), Protecting sub-Saharan Africa: The military challenge, Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1999, pp 26-28.

  11. Anita Alban and Lorna Guinness, 2000, Socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa, <http:/ /www.unaids.org/publications/index.html>

  12. Anon, Another nail in Zimbabwe’s coffin, Africa News Service, 5 December 2000.

  13. UN Report, 1999, op cit.

  14. Catherine Cross, Sinking deeper down: HIV/AIDS as an economic shock to rural households, Society in transition, 32 (1), 2002, pp 133-147.

  15. Sunday Times. Impeding catastrophe revisited: An update on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, Parklands: Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation Publication, 2001.

  16. Conflicts in Africa, 2001, <http://www. globalissues. org/geopolitics/africa.asp.htm>

  17. Greg Mills, AIDS and the South African military: Timeworn cliché or timebomb, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Occasional Papers, June 2000, p 68.

  18. David Bloom, et al, op cit p 30.

  19. Ibid.

  20. Claire Bisseker, Africa’s military time bomb, Financial Mail, 11 Dec, 1998, p 34.

  21. Desmond Cohen, 1999, Responding to the socio-economic impact of the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa: Why a systems approach is needed, <http://www.undp.org/hiv/ publica- tions/issues/english/issue34e.htm>

  22. Ibid.

  23. UN Report, 1999, op cit.

  24. Kristina Quattek, The economic impact of AIDS in South Africa: A dark cloud on the horizon, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Occasional Papers, June 2000, p 42.

  25. Lester Brown, HIV epidemic restructuring Africa’s population, Worldwatch Issue Alert – Earth Policy Institute, October 2000.

  26. Wiseman. C. Chirwa, Aliens and AIDS in Southern Africa: The Malawi-South Africa debate, African Affairs 97, 1998, pp 53-79.

  27. South African Broadcasting Association, 2000, Maputo probes deportation of HIV-infected Mozambicans from South Africa, <http://www. sabcnes.com/SAMBnes/africa/southern/_Africa/1,11009,1022,00.htm>

  28. Richald Holbrooke, Battling the AIDS pandemic. Global Issues, July 2000, <http:// www.uninfo. state.gov/journals/itgic/0700/ijge/ gj02.htm> (13 September 2000).

  29. J. Kindra, AIDS a threat to democracy, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 7 April 2000.

  30. Claire Bisseker, op cit.

  31. Figures quoted for infection rates vary according to source. The figures provided were obtained from the, South African Defence Intelligence Assessment: HIV/AIDS prevalence among the armed forces in sub-Saharan African countries, No. 28 of 2000. Department of Defence, 2000.

  32. Louis du Plessis, Armed Forces as reflections of their societies: A perspective on sub-Saharan Africa, Paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar of the Armed Forces, Baltimore, 19-21 October, 2001.

  33. Deon Mortimer, The challenge of effective sub-Saharan ground forces, in Louis du Plessis and Mike Hough (eds), Protecting sub-Saharan Africa: The military challenge, Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1999, p 110.

  34. Lester Brown, op cit.

  35. These are averages calculated on the basis of the South African Army’s present career planning policy.

  36. Lindy Heinecken, War is a bloody business: AIDS the enemy, Paper presented at the South African Sociological Association Congress, University of the Western Cape, 2-5 July 2000.

  37. Kristina Quattek, op cit, p 34.

  38. David Bloom et al, op cit, p 30.

  39. Clare Bisseker, op cit, p 34.

  40. Helen Jackson, The quintessential AIDS in the workplace issue, Alliance Newsletter, 2 (4), 1996, p 5.

  41. Lindy Heinecken, Preparing for operations other than war: How equipped is the SANDF to deal with soft missions, Paper presented at the African Defence Summit, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, 22-23 August 2001.

  42. Helen Jackson, op cit.

  43. Lindy Heinecken, 2001, op cit.

  44. Ibid.

  45. Paul Smith, Transnational security threats to state survival: A role for the military. Parameters, Autumn, 2000, pp 77-91.