Introduction

Zimbabwe joined more than 120 other countries in signing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in Palermo, Italy at the end of 2000. The country thus committed itself to take steps to ratify the convention, which enshrines the latest initiatives to develop effective strategies against transnational organised crime. The Palermo convention also makes demands on the laws and institutions of states parties which, if met, could enhance their capacity to confront organised crime.

More than six months after its signature, it is clear that not every signatory, including Zimbabwe, is ready to ratify the convention. Ratification signifies competence to implement the prescribed obligations, which can only occur after introducing suitable domestic laws, and adopting the necessary administrative mechanisms. Whatever infrastructure is introduced has to be submitted to the Secretary-General of the UN. The required reforms are bound to have certain policy and legislative implications. The purpose of this essay is to explore the obligations arising from the Palermo convention and discuss the initiatives required to prepare the legal system and related infrastructure of Zimbabwe for its implementation.

The Palermo convention has two goals: to set standards for domestic laws, and to reduce and eventually eliminate differences among national legal systems, which could impede international co-operation in combating organised crime. The Palermo convention seeks to foster such international co-operation, reiterating a perennial dimension of international relations, which is surprisingly fraught with recurrent problems. The assumption seems to be that the principles it extols are so firmly rooted in so many legal systems that they override transient political squabbles. This assumption can lead to a dangerous simplification of important factors that influence the uneven development of legislative systems which, in turn, can influence appreciation of the extent of required reforms.

The convention is premised on the understanding that globalisation provides new opportunities for organised crime. These opportunities should at least be minimalised or, at best, eliminated. The primary responsibility for this rests on states parties, and the convention purports to set out ways of discharging this responsibility. Organs of state do not exist or function in isolation. This essay therefore does not only examine the role of organs of state. Non-state institutions have a legitimate interest in the creation of an environment free of organised crime. They constitute part of the context in which the envisaged legislative and other measures will be formulated and implemented, and their capacity to determine the content of such measures is also discussed.

Substantive law standards

The convention targets certain activities perceived to constitute either acts of transnational organised crime or manifestations of it, and singles them out for universal criminalisation. It requires states parties to proscribe:

participation in an organised criminal group, which includes conspiracy to commit organised crime;


money-laundering;


corruption; and


obstructing the course of justice.

In addition, the convention acknowledges that organised crime may assume other forms. It therefore also considers general serious crime motivated by financial or other material benefit to constitute organised crime. Serious crime is defined by referring to the potential punishment it may attract.¹ The obligations in the convention apply when a state is faced with one of the specified offences or any serious offences which are transnational in nature and committed by an organised criminal group. In terms of article 3, one or more of the following characteristics distinguishes a transnational offence:

The offence is committed in more than one state.



It is committed in one state, but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control took place in another state.



It is committed in one state, but involves an organised criminal group which engages in activities in more than one state.



It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.

Participation in criminal activities

The approach to participation in organised criminal activities of Zimbabwe’s criminal law seems to be ambivalent. In common law, the principles relating to aid in the commission of an offence, or in concealing the offender, would penalise an accessory to crime. The law is not as clear with regard to those who plan, but do not participate in any other way, in committing the crime. It would be difficult to use the common law to convict masterminds of general criminal activity, such as drug-dealing, who do not, for instance, directly sell drugs. Statutory law does not take the matter any further. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act does not permit the arraignment of a conspirator separately from the principal offender. If the principal offender was not arrested, or the crime for which the conspiracy occurred was not committed, the conspirator would get away with it, with his or her conduct regarded as no more than anti-social activity.²

Since the convention envisages a widening of the concept of criminal participation (article 5), Zimbabwe would need to consider the various kinds of less visible participation in organised crime and recognise these as criminal, as a prelude to ratification.

Money-laundering

In the conduct of organised crime, money-laundering has at least two functions. One is to generate capital, while the other is to evade the law by disguising the illicit origins of money that is laundered.³ Former South African minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, said:

"Cash lends an anonymity to the proceeds of many forms of criminal activity and it is known that most money laundering is done by organised criminal groups. In fact, it is a vital necessity to organised crime as it prevents the detection, and consequently, the prosecution of those responsible for the management and financing of criminal syndicates. It also insulates those at the top of a criminal organisation from the sordid reality of their crimes. Money laundering breaks the paper trail, thus creating obstacles to any investigators as the money trail often represents the only link between the leaders of the criminal organisation and the crime itself. This makes it very difficult to investigate, let alone prosecute, the criminal leaders."⁴

Money-laundering can also involve transactions in gold bullion, jewellery, unit trusts, fixed assets and other securities. Its inclusion as a specific organised criminal activity in the convention (articles 6 and 7) is expected to raise its profile in law enforcement planning.

Since 1990, Zimbabwe has nominally recognised the laundering of the proceeds of crime as a distinct crime.⁵ The relevant legislation categorises the acquisition, possession, use or disposal of property derived from crime as money-laundering.⁶ This seems to be in line with the convention (article 6 (b)). The conceptual defect in the existing law is that it does not highlight the deceptive purpose of the disposal or handling of the laundered object to which article 6 paragraph (1)(a) of the convention draws attention. Money-laundering is usually property conversion or transfer, with the knowledge of its criminal origins, to conceal or disguise its illicit origin, or to help any person involved in committing the predicate offence to evade legal consequences. This approach to the offence should be adopted in the revision of the law.

Corruption

Corruption is probably the most universally vilified form of abuse of power. On account of underlying moral overtones and its numerous variations, corruption defies comprehensive definition. It is only recently that measures have been taken to recognise corruption as a criminal offence in international law. Article 8 of the convention, with its obvious imperfections, represents an important initiative in this regard.⁷

The relationship between corruption and organised crime has been described as symbiotic. Corruption facilitates crime by protecting the clandestine nature of criminal activities. It also diverts or compromises law enforcement resources and distorts the decisionmaking process.⁸ Corruption is blamed for providing "the air that organised crime needs to survive."⁹

Regular revelations of high-level corruption provide anecdotal evidence of the kinds of corruption that Zimbabwean law needs to respond to. The public procurement of goods and services is a prominent sphere where public and private sector corruption converges, with the awarding of contracts and tenders featuring regularly. Statutory corporations and the departments of Defence and Rural Development have been regularly mentioned in the media, creating the impression of a consistently deteriorating state of affairs. This suggests that conditions favourable to corruption are growing rather than shrinking. Questions arise about the structures of government, the integrity of public sector functionaries, the capacity of the non-state sector (as broadly conceived, including the private sector, labour movement and civil society formations), and the orientation and capacity of law enforcement institutions. They also arise in relation to the regulation of conduct in the economic sphere (investment, trading and finance, among others).

Zimbabwe’s primary law against corruption is the Prevention of Corruption Act.¹⁰ The Act covers well-known manifestations of corruption such as bribery and employee infidelity. It tends to be limited in practice to the public sector, affecting private corporations or individuals only where they participate in corrupt transactions with public officials. In terms of focusing on local public sector corruption, the Act compares well with the convention, and may even go beyond its requirements. The Act is not effective in respect of corruption in the private sector, or transnational corruption. Corruption is obviously not just a public sector problem, or confined to the exchange of favours. An update of the Act needs to be informed by an empirical study of private sector corruption, as well as contemporary regional initiatives.

The crusade against corruption has been given impetus in Southern Africa by recent developments, among them the impending Protocol against Corruption of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The protocol is due to be considered later in 2001 by SADC heads of state. Article III of the protocol defines corruption in broader terms than the Prevention of Corruption Act, and includes private sector corruption. By virtue of the terms of the protocol, article III must be considered as a starting point in a legislative review. If international co-operation is to be enhanced, the threshold at which conduct is considered criminally corrupt should be standardised, at least at a regional level.

Imperatives for the reappraisal of procedural law

Culture of secrecy

Like corruption, secrecy promotes organised crime. The boldness of criminals is often influenced as much by their calculation of the risk of publicity as by the assurance of impunity in the event of discovery. In Zimbabwe, as in other parts of Southern Africa, the public sector dominates economic activity. Much business has to be conducted in, or with the public sector. The public sector can present opportunities for transnational organised crime, particularly if it is pervaded by a culture of secrecy. At the same time, preventing or detecting the incidence of criminal activity is rendered difficult. Among the factors that construct such a culture are the very laws vesting official discretion. While these laws should be grounded in principles of sound and accountable management of public power, they rarely are.

The most important principles were crystallised in 1995 in the first report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life in the United Kingdom, as:

Selflessness: a requirement to act in the public interest, and disclose conflicting interests.



Integrity: the awareness of and adherence to ethical practices, as well as the formulation and observance of codes of conduct.



Objectivity: fairness to affected parties, which is shown as respect for merits rather than illegitimate considerations.



Accountability: reaching decisions on the basis of demonstrable factors, and recording reasons for them.



Openness: communicating clearly and with sensitivity, and submitting decisions and their basis to scrutiny.¹¹

Zimbabwe has not achieved the transition from a society characterised by closed enclaves in the public sector. Discretion in public administration is often exercised under the shelter of secrecy laws, some of which are inconsistent with sound and accountable management. These laws, exemplified by the Defence Procurement Act,¹² the District Development Fund Act,¹³ and the Public Service Regulations,¹⁴ insulate decisions motivated by criminal intentions. Public security, the national economic interest, or the interests of justice are labels of convenience employed in many statutory provisions to justify the concealment of information relating even to public procurement.

Apart from contributing to poor management practices, this legislation can be used to suppress revelations of criminal conduct in the public sector. A subordinate public official in the defence ministry or an officer in the defence force who blows the whistle on corruption in the procurement of supplies, risks reprisals. He or she can be lawfully barred from revealing such information, and in the event of defiance, would not be protected by section 14(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The section seeks to prohibit victimisation for disclosing corruption or criminal activity, but only if such victimisation is without lawful excuse.

The role of the resulting secrecy in the proliferation of corruption cannot be overstated. It may be argued that the culture of secrecy creates a favourable environment for the penetration of the public sector by organised crime syndicates.¹⁵

Witness protection

Syndicated crime is associated with systematic violence, partly to promote itself and partly to pre-empt or obstruct the legal process. The Palermo convention incorporates a commitment to protect witnesses effectively from intimidation or potential retaliation.

Witness protection programmes have become a standard response to threats to witnesses. Cost and effectiveness constitute major drawbacks.

The system geographically closest to Zimbabwe is the South African witness protection programme that falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. In mid-January 2001, it covered 730 people, requiring protection for an average of two years. A protected witness who has to be relocated, and loses income on account of it, is entitled to compensation. An unemployed witness is entitled to a basic monthly food allowance of US $71.25 (which at an exchange rate of 1:55 equals Z$3 919); two people living together would get US $90 (Z$4 950). In the case of a family of five, the monthly food allowance is US $146 (Z$8 044). The witness protection programme also provides funds for accommodation, water, electricity, medical and educational expenses. A monthly outlay of US $625 (Z$34 375) is not unusual. The number of five-member households was not provided in the programme’s January 2001 breakdown. Assuming that there were 100 such families, this would translate into a food bill of about US $15 000 per month, the equivalent of more than Z$800 000 or about Z$9 million per year. Larger programmes, such as the federal witness protection programme in the United States, inevitably cost more.

It is in the face of this harsh fiscal reality that Zimbabwe has to decide whether a witness protection plan is justified and, if so, how to create one that is affordable but effective. The deployment of significant financial resources does not guarantee success of the programme. South Africa’s programme has been breached on a number of occasions, raising questions about its efficacy.

Transnational obligations under the Palermo convention

Legislative strategy

The Palermo convention seeks to enhance the development of complementary systems and strategies against crime. Sakoane has highlighted three strands underpinning the framework of legislative strategies to be adopted.

The first strand is directed at reducing or eliminating the benefits of participation in criminal enterprises, such as corruption, motor vehicle theft, drug-dealing and trafficking in firearms. Assets of criminal suspects should be seized and turned over to the state.



The second strand aims to support cross-jurisdictional co-operation and mutual assistance in evidence-gathering, criminal investigation, exchange of information, extradition of offenders and the transfer of property involved in criminal proceedings from one jurisdiction to another.



The third strand involves using customer identification, as well as recordkeeping and reporting mechanisms of suspicious transactions by institutions considered vulnerable to money-laundering, such as banks, professional bodies, voluntary associations, traders and dealers.¹⁶

Ratification invites a review of the legislation in light of the elements of the framework. All strands are relevant to transnational crime, even though the first and the third might at first glance appear to concern only local crime. Considered as components of an integrated framework, they comprise a basis for mutual assistance legislation.

A key question to consider when assessing the efficacy of mutual assistance provisions is whether they are contingent to criminal proceedings.¹⁷ Contemporary developments have proven that such contingency can be debilitating, if for some reason it is not feasible to institute criminal proceedings. At the same time, some mutual assistance measures, such as the freezing or seizure of assets or forfeiture, cuts across the hallowed presumption of innocence, recognised by the constitution in Zimbabwe.¹⁸

Perhaps on account of the potential disharmony with the constitution, the seizure provisions in the Criminal Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act¹⁹ may only be invoked where the criminal process has been started and, even then, only to authorise a temporary seizure pending the finalisation of proceedings.²⁰ Other assistance may be in the recording of evidence, or the production of documents. The attorney-general may also request the enforcement of orders issued by the local judiciary or the enforcement of a forfeiture order pursuant to a conviction. On account of the advent of non-criminal forfeiture (i.e. without requiring a conviction) in jurisdictions like South Africa, the question is whether the Act allows asset seizure where either criminal proceedings are pending or the holder has been acquitted. It appears that this would not be permissible in the face of the presumption of innocence. A constitutional amendment would have to precede changes to the Act.

Co-operation in enforcing the law across national borders involves the collaboration of not only law enforcement officials, but also legal systems. The feasibility of co-operating with other legal systems will certainly be tested, particularly as differences in background, values and levels of development tend to impact on these systems. Questions of mutual compatibility of investigative systems and probative rules of adjectival law will arise. The former are probably easier to harmonise than the latter.

Article 18 of the Palermo convention relates to cross-jurisdictional co-operation. It acknowledges some of the dilemmas to be expected in effectively implementing mutual assistance. A particular source of conflict is the friction over capital punishment. Extradition laws in neighbouring Namibia and South Africa express abhorrence to the death penalty by making extradition to countries which permit the penalty conditional to an undertaking not to impose or carry it out. Article 18(21)(c) of the convention allows a state to decline a request for mutual assistance that would violate its own laws. There are sovereignty implications in seeking or giving the penalty undertaking, and it is evident that some countries view the situation as untenable.²¹ Zimbabwe could be required to give such an undertaking. The spirit of article 18 is to promote harmony rather than friction, and it seems that states parties have to anticipate and reconcile procedural conflicts (article 18(30)). Extradition law in Zimbabwe does not insist on the kind of undertaking envisaged by Namibia and South Africa.

The Extradition Act²² in Zimbabwe is indifferent to nationality. If there is a prima facie case, a national may face extradition. While this is consistent with the ideals of the Palermo convention, there is a further requirement in the convention to liberalise extradition, making every convention offence extraditable and designating every fellow state party a state with which extradition transactions can occur. The latter extension requires minor legislative amendment. This could take the form of a schedule to the Extradition Act, which can be expanded by subordinate legislation.

Law enforcement authorities in SADC member states (including Zimbabwe) appreciate the benefit of co-operation and information-sharing in the containment of organised crime. In this regard, the initiatives of the Southern African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) anticipated article 19 of the convention. SARPCCO was set up to "promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications."²³ Co-operation under its auspices has yielded notable success in the spheres of motor vehicle theft and firearms-smuggling.

Brief reference was made above to the inadequacy of the legislation against money-laundering. A more insidious impediment stems from the state of the system in which the law has to operate. The capacity of the government and public law enforcement agencies to police serious economic crime is intricately linked to the strength of the formal economy. Zimbabwe is labouring under the demands and pressures of transformation (economic empowerment of previously marginalised groups and privatisation of the public sector), which have taken a heavy toll on sectors important in the fight against organised crime.

In Zimbabwe, the demand for investment capital exerts pressure on the capacity of the financial services sector to police money-laundering. The attitude of a sector besieged by a shortage of investment capital to an injection of cash is likely to be ‘deal first, ask questions later’.²⁴ especially if the cash is hard currency. Contemporary reports indicate that the banking sector is afflicted by bad debts amounting to more than Z$10 billion (R1.4 billion) and that some banks could go bankrupt if they cannot secure heavy capital injections.²⁵ As South points out:

"Laundering strategies involve financial transactions the size of which are extremely profitable and hence attractive to the legitimate financial enterprises that process them; laundering diverts money from an illegal economy into needed and welcome investment in the legitimate economy."²⁶

In addition to the incentive to flout a new system against money-laundering, there is the cost factor. Gatekeeping for the state requires additional administrative infrastructure, of which even the simplest costs money to set up and run effectively. Common elements of a money-laundering control system include:

a customer identification mechanism;

effective recordkeeping; and

a duty to report information about transactions entered into with the financial institution.

The duty to report may be onerous if it is widely defined to include both transactions of a certain magnitude and transactions that raise suspicion. Yet, a system that purports to be effective must define the duty widely.²⁷ In addition, if reporting is to be performed timely, it must be done, in the case of a multibranch financial institution, directly from branch level rather than through a central unit. This has significant cost implications.

Reporting violates banker/client confiden-tiality. For the client, it can introduce a new risk to the notion of investment. In an environment where there is little or no trust between the public, in general, and the state system, for which the banker now acts as agent, the risk is multiplied many times over. The distrust harboured by clients is transferred to the banker-agent, resulting in a breakdown of confidence in the bank. An incentive to withhold information or assets from the bank is created. The simultaneous incidence of shortages in the supply of commodities can exacerbate this breakdown of the banker/client relationship. In an economy afflicted by high inflation, the inevitable result is a tendency to keep money at home rather than in the bank.²⁸ This, in turn, could affect key aspects of the functions of the banking sector, such as lending, and later the viability of the financial services sector as a whole. The ‘parallel market’ phenomenon tends to result from an absence of confidence in the official system. As has been demonstrated time and again, the stability of a country’s economy is closely linked to the health of its banking system.

At the same time, it is in the interest of financial institutions and the economies in which they operate to take effective measures to prevent organised crime from entrenching itself. Productive, long-term, foreign direct investment is unlikely to be attracted to an institution or a country that is openly receptive to the proceeds of organised crime. There have been countries that perceived such proceeds with indifference, or even encouraged their investment, but on account of international initiatives, the latest of which culminated in the Palermo convention, the number of such countries is rapidly diminishing.²⁹

Implementing mutual assistance laws requires law enforcement. There is an underlying assumption in the convention of the capacity of member states to mobilise the necessary institutions to discharge this function. Capacity for law enforcement can easily be taken for granted. It can be compromised by weaknesses in the organs of state and/or related institutions. A state in which the relationship between central government and other centres of power is dominated by mutual suspicion and fear is unlikely to be a capable state. In Zimbabwe today, the government is paranoid about retaining power and, as a result, tends to marginalise other institutions.³⁰

This has two notable implications. First, the capacity of institutions outside central government to make an input into the formulation of legislation is diminished. Second, very little room is left for political neutrality in implementing and enforcing laws. This insidiously weakens the ability of the government itself to deal with organised crime, particularly if it emanates from, or aligns itself with functionaries within central government. The formulation and implementation of legislation in Zimbabwe tend to be dominated, if not monopolised, by central government. The content of legislation is determined almost entirely by the government’s perceptions, as is the timing and manner of implementation. Occasionally, this results in legislation gathering dust after enactment that could impact upon corruption and organised crime.³¹

To carry through an effective strategy against crime requires intersectoral co-operation with institutions outside the police. Other sectors of what could be called a national integrity system are also important. Each sector should be viable. Apart from a credible judiciary, these sectors include an autonomous and functional prosecution service; free media; a network of institutions to monitor democratic accountability (including, among others, parliament, anti-corruption agency, ombudsman, auditor-general and tender authority) and a vigilant, effective civil society. Zimbabwe is equipped in some of these areas, but deficient in others.

The judiciary is generally competent and credible, although concerns have been raised about the looming prominent role of party politics in appointments to and within the higher judiciary.³² The power of public prosecution, outside cases arising within the military sphere, is exclusively vested in the attorney-general. Even though it is public power, the attorney-general is not openly accountable to other components of the national integrity system in exercising this power. It has been argued that to make this office accountable would compromise its independence, and thus prejudice the interests of justice. The reality is that the attorney-general is not independent of the government, institutionally or functionally. The attorney-general is susceptible to government influence, some of which might be improper. It is in respect of this possible illegitimate influence that controversy exists in Zimbabwe about the ability of the prosecution to complement a crime-combating strategy. In cases where influential members of the executive have an interest, the prosecution’s ability to exercise a free hand is greatly emasculated, notwithstanding its nominal independence. The central role that is envisaged for the attorney-general in Zimbabwe’s legislation relating to organised crime makes it imperative for the issue of prosecutorial autonomy to be reviewed.

It has been repeatedly demonstrated that media which enjoy freedom can play both an investigative and a monitoring role. The public would not have known about Paweni (fraudulent claims by a private contractor, with the collusion of a minister and public officials, in respect of food deliveries during the first post-independence drought), Willowgate (illegal acquisitions and resales of motor vehicles for exorbitant profits by ministers in the 1980s), national housing (diversion of funds for constructing houses for public officials to influential functionaries, including judges and the president’s wife in the early 1990s), and the war victims compensation scandal (the exploitation of loopholes in the claims system by former freedom fighters and others, including the president’s brother-in-law, to loot the fund). Through exposing actual or perceived crime and corruption, the non-government media have established themselves as components in the national integrity system. The viability of the system depends on the continuation of the media’s ability to obtain information and publish it without illegitimate restrictions.

Indications of government intolerance of the operations of the free media abound. Journalists do not enjoy easy access to information, and are also subjected to harassment and physical violence.³³ Twice in the space of a year, the main non-government owned Daily News had its offices and premises shattered by explosives of a kind accessible only to the military. To date, its printing press is still incapacitated, and no tangible action has been taken against the perpetrators. The foreign press is under increasing pressure. Foreign journalists are required to apply for accreditation from outside the country a month before the intended arrival date. The electronic media are tightly controlled,³⁴ and the only broadcaster is used as the propaganda mouthpiece of the governing party.

A continuation of the friction between government and the media is likely to impede the discovery and dissemination of information useful in fighting organised crime that involves government functionaries.³⁵

Parliament is among the institutions of national management. Its strength is as much a function of its composition as it is of its modus operandi and resources. It could hardly be expected that a parliament which is monopolised or dominated by a monolithic group and insulated from the pressures of competitive politics, would be an effective watchdog on behalf of the public. It is a trite observation that monopolies tend to breed nepotism, the abuse of power and corruption. When this extends to policymaking institutions, the product is usually unenlightened, and often motivated by short-term considerations.

In this regard, there is reason for guarded optimism. The 2000 elections delivered a legislature which represents views opposed to those of the governing party. Law and decisionmaking are occasionally preceded by sharp debate, and competitive politics sometimes have a bearing on the product. The disappointing feature, however, is the undisguised reluctance of the governing party to accept both the idea of an opposition party and the validity of its views on major national issues. Barbaric tactics such as the infliction of physical violence on opposition parliamentarians, or the destruction of their property continue to be employed by the ruling party through its militia or state agents.³⁶ Perpetrators are not punished or arrested, and the incidents are hardly ever investigated. The antagonism that this creates detracts from parliament’s capacity to exercise oversight responsibilities over the executive. Yet, parliament has an important role in helping to mould the laws and oversee their implementation that will enable Zimbabwe to ratify both the Palermo convention and the SADC protocol.

Anti-corruption strategies in many parts of the world recognise the role of a vigilant civil society in preventing and exposing corruption. The Palermo convention and SADC protocol may be directed at organs of state, but implementing them involves civil society. If appropriately organised and informed, civil society can play an active role in combating not just corruption, but also other manifestations of organised crime, in particular through:

research and monitoring compliance;

lobbying and advocacy;

increasing public awareness; and

holding other institutions to account.

The empowerment of civil society in Zimbabwe is hostage to the contemporary turbulence in the economic and political environment. Conditions are hardly ideal for the fortification of civil society structures. Some of the important roleplayers are under severe financial and administrative stress.³⁷ Consequently, their ability to pay attention to matters beyond immediate ‘bread and butter’ issues is questionable. In addition, the governing party is generally inimical to the emergence, let alone empowerment of other centres of power, as demonstrated by its attitude to opposition politics. It can therefore be expected to impede the development of civil society. For these reasons, civil society is a dysfunctional cog in the wheel of national integrity.

Conclusion

While it seems to have dawned on Zimbabwe that organised crime threatens human security and development, the country is substantially unprepared for the full range of changes required for appropriate responses. In signing the Palermo convention, Zimbabwe declared an intention to join the international endeavour to combat organised crime. It is clear that to transform the endeavour from the lofty ideals underlying the convention to enforceable legal rules, certain realities have to be faced. The legal system is not necessarily conducive to this, and reforming it may be politically risky. Given the paranoia of the governing party in Zimbabwe, some of these changes will be regarded as harsh, and therefore not welcome. The last 18 months have been characterised by a disturbing retreat to autocracy in Zimbabwe, which does not augur well for positive political reform.

With regard to the changes that do not have obvious political connotations, there are good prospects of achieving immediate reform of the substantive criminal law to comply with the Palermo convention. The same can be said of the SADC protocol. Problems with criminalising a wider range of activities connected to organised crime, or extending the coverage of anti-corruption law cannot be envisaged. There should also be no problem in modifying money-laundering legislation to capture the essence of the proscribed acts. Problems will arise, however, in establishing the frameworks required to give effect to the changes in the reach of substantive law. Given the economic and political climate in which these changes would be expected to occur, resources constitute a significant impediment. Among other structures, the convention envisages administrative mechanisms to detect and nullify money-laundering strategies. It also requires measures to protect witnesses, both during investigations and trials.

There is no point in setting up mechanisms of this nature half-heartedly. An anti-laundering system or a witness protection programme has to be comprehensive and well resourced. The alternative is a system that promises more than it can deliver, generating frustration and danger to those caught up in it. Zimbabwe will unlikely afford the establishment of the required mechanisms in the short to medium term.

Regional initiatives that are complementary to the Palermo convention are expected to catalyse positive changes in Zimbabwe’s response mechanisms. For instance, the commitment to combat organised crime has been expressed often enough by SADC to avert scepticism. The existence of SARPCCO is a positive development. The organisation has already proven its worth in improving the exchange of knowledge and skills among the structures responsible for detecting and investigating organised crime. It should be possible to build on what has been achieved by SARPCCO to expand areas of co-operation. The existing mutual assistance legislation should be useful in this regard.

Notes