Coups d’états in West Africa are not entirely negative
Coups allow the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its member states to self-assess and improve governance, says Ambassador Francis Oke, ECOWAS Permanent Representative to the African Union (AU).
ECOWAS’s response to the upsurge in unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) is not producing convincing results, unlike it did in previous decades. What is your assessment?
The coups d’état and crises witnessed are evidence of West Africa’s mature democracy. They are manifestations of the discontent of the region’s citizens, who are demanding that the rules of the democratic game be respected. Contrary to perceptions, these issues are not totally negative. I see them as an opportunity for ECOWAS and its member states to assess themselves and adjust certain aspects of their governance.
ECOWAS has the same instruments and mechanisms that helped resolve similar crises in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Niger a few decades ago. However, are they being implemented in the spirit in which they were drafted in and if so, why are there limitations? If not, we need to correct the situation.
We also need to make ECOWAS more effective. Member states must fully transfer their supranationality to the organisation. If ECOWAS is struggling with current crises, it is partly because its power to act is limited by increased member sovereignty, notwithstanding the community conventions to which most subscribe.
How consistent is ECOWAS in managing UCGs?
Responses have varied from one state to another, depending on the type of UCG. ECOWAS has sometimes fumbled in its responses to constitutional manipulations. On the other hand, it has been more reactive to seizures of power by the military, imposing sanctions and adopting strict political measures against those involved in coups.
As a result, a feeling of ‘double standards’ has emerged in public opinion and among putschists in countries affected by recent coups. The legitimacy of ECOWAS to respond to unconstitutional actions of the military has been somewhat undermined, creating fertile ground for putschists to resist the sanctions imposed on them.
Existing mechanisms helped resolve similar crises in West African countries in the past
Today, coup plotters believe that the use of arms is the only difference between them and state heads who manipulate constitutions to extend their mandates. However, military or civilian, once you exploit your position to ‘trample’ on fundamental texts and illegally seize state power, you are committing a coup. ECOWAS should, therefore, have sanctioned such occurrences with determination, instilling in the perpetrators and any would-be coup plotters that good governance frameworks must be respected despite their shortcomings.
When I was in the United States in 2008 during the election, Americans, Republicans and Democrats alike constantly repeated ‘our constitution has its shortcomings, but it’s our constitution and we abide by it’. We need this culture in Africa, particularly in our region. This is why ECOWAS ― in the name of equity of sanctions and impartiality ― should have reacted to both the extension of mandates and military coups.
Secondly, ECOWAS should be proactive, strengthening and implementing its mechanisms for monitoring democratic practices in member states. Indeed, a major characteristic of coups over the last five years has been the emergence of popular acclaim for military regimes. Such reactions by sometimes large sections of the population are explained partly by the hope of access to socioeconomic dividends to which there was no access under the rule of ousted leaders.
ECOWAS and its members should shoulder their responsibilities to ensure that populations have full access to the dividends of democracy. This requires strong regional mechanisms to ensure the accountability of both civilian and military leaders. Our organisation would also benefit from assistance frameworks that go beyond elections to deal effectively and sustainably with the causes of repeated coups in West Africa.
Civil society must be an integral part of the assistance architecture, given its role as a ‘bridge’ between politicians and civilians. Measures must be taken to ensure its independence from political powers, contrary to what is seen in most of our countries nowadays.
What motivated ECOWAS’s lifting of sanctions against Niger, even though the primary objective of restoring the status quo ante was not achieved?
Only sanctions that severely affected the people of Niger were lifted, according to ECOWAS texts that call for the adoption of repressive measures bearing in mind the wellbeing of populations. In addition, many voices had been raised deploring civilian suffering due mainly the impact of economic sanctions and border closures. Political and administrative sanctions imposed on members of the junta remain in place.
Once you ‘trample’ on fundamental texts and illegally seize state power, you are committing a coup
Also prompting the lifting of sanctions is the desire by heads of state and government to create conditions conducive to a rapid and peaceful transition in Niger. Lifting sanctions will facilitate intensified talks with transitional authorities to uncover their objectives and establish a schedule for a return to constitutional order.
The population must understand that a constitutionally established power generates more confidence among development partners and brings greater socioeconomic benefits. In this new phase, ECOWAS will, therefore, raise awareness of the population and accelerate the transition through dialogue.
However, despite the lifting of economic and financial sanctions and the announcement of border reopening, Niger authorities are slow to act. They are keeping borders closed, raising questions about the real motives behind their seizure of power. Does it serve the interests of the people or their own?
The severity of sanctions on Niger can be attributed to the putsch against President Bazoum’s regime followed by several others that should have served as warnings. ECOWAS sent a clear message that it would not tolerate coups d’état in the region and applied its ‘zero tolerance’ policy firmly.
This was no mistake, as a similar measure applied to Niger in 2011 yielded convincing results ― specifically, a return to constitutional order. However, this recent move risked being counterproductive and failure. And so it transpired.
Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have threatened to withdraw from ECOWAS. What could be the consequences?
No community, organisation or alliance is without challenges. So leaving ECOWAS is not viable for any of these countries. They would forfeit the advantages acquired over decades in ECOWAS, notably free movement of people and goods across the region. The decision would also further complicate political transitions, as withdrawal would automatically end all ECOWAS assistance. In the long run, the move, which would be more political than social, may not necessarily serve the interests of their citizens.
By leaving ECOWAS, countries would forfeit advantages such as free movement of people and goods
he Alliance of Sahel States is not incompatible with participation in ECOWAS, given the many sub-regional organisations whose states are also members of the regional body. These include the Mano River Union and Conseil de l’Entente
The submission of withdrawal requests gives ECOWAS around 12 months to try, with its own resources and AU support, to resolve the dispute. ECOWAS is, therefore, actively engaged in dialogue with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, with three heads of state appointed to lead discussions.
How should ECOWAS manage the threat of withdrawal?
With withdrawals pending, ECOWAS retains a duty to continue assisting the transitions of these countries. It must step up these efforts, ensuring that transition schedules are meticulously drawn up and implemented. In this, the AU should support ECOWAS in line with the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, without restraint or questioning.
However, the reality is quite different, as the AU does not seem to share ECOWAS’s interpretation of these principles nor are both bodies able to find a basis for collaboration during crises. Given the urgency generated by the imminent withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the AU should support ECOWAS in any actions aimed at convincing these states to remain on board.
