ISS Seminar Report: The African Standby Force: An Instrumental Idea Whose Time may be Overdue?
Date: 2012-08-14
Venue: , ISS Pretoria Office Conference Room,
Block C, Brooklyn Court,
361 Veale Street,
New Muckleneuk
The African
Standby Force: An Instrumental Idea Whose Time may be Overdue?
Presented
by the Training for Peace Project at the Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
Division (CMPB), ISS Pretoria Office
CHAIRPERSON:
- Martin Ewi, Senior
Researcher, Transnational Threats & International Crimes Division
KEY SPEAKER:
- Sivuyile Bam, Head,
AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)
DISCUSSANT:
- Festus B. Aboagye, Senior
Research Fellow and Head, Training for Peace, ISS
This seminar was convened
to provide a forum to examine and discuss questions about the progress made so
far in operationalising the force, its status and the challenges militating
against its timely operationalisation.
The key questions that
needed to be answered included: Where are we with the operationalisation of the
African Standby Force (ASF)? What are the challenges militating against its
operationalisation? How are these challenges being addressed? Above all, will
the operationalisation ever happen according to the new schedule, as elaborated
in the ASF Roadmap III? And how and what will the ASF be able to contribute to resolving
continuing complex humanitarian emergencies almost 20 years after the concept
of a regional standby force was conceived of in the mid-1990s?
The two presenters pointed
out that considerable progress had been made in the conceptualisation of the
ASF. However, they also underscored the challenges besetting the timely operationalisation
of the force, attributing the delay to a lack of continental political
consensus and will. On the other hand, the persistent existence and emergence
of complex conflicts in Africa, such as the ongoing violence in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, and the recent outbreak of violence in Mali,
serve to divert and/or divide the attention and efforts of the African Union (AU).
In discussing the evolution
and vision of the ASF, the two presenters referred to the original
conceptualisation of the ASF as a tool for the AU Peace and Security Council
(PSC) to use in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies, especially
against the backdrop of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the lack of a timely,
effective international response. They noted that although the ASF was
envisioned as a multidimensional force, its initial development focused
predominantly on the military component. Between 2006–2008, however, progress
has been made in establishing the police and civilian dimensions of the force,
even though more needs to be done in enhancing the capacities of these two
components.
Against
the background of the history of the ASF, the presenters underscored the
reality that the operationalisation of the ASF is lagging behind schedule, with
the AU having failed to bring it into existence in 2005–08.
The operationalisation of the force was again delayed in 2010, as a result of
serious capability gaps identified during Exercise AMANI AFRICA 2010. The ASF
Roadmap III therefore seeks to address these gaps, especially regarding the
police and civilian dimensions of the ASF. In this respect, the key speaker
mentioned that a special Police-Civilian Focused Exercise (POLCIVEX) is being
planned for October/November 2012, aiming to enhance the capacities of these
two components. It is now anticipated that the ASF will become fully
operational in 2015, after Exercise AMANI AFRICA II.
Some
of the major challenges facing the ASF that were discussed in the seminar
included, firstly, on-going tensions in decision-making for the deployment of
the ASF. This arises largely from a lack of common understanding and/or
acceptance of how to define and clarify the relationship between member states,
regional economic communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and the AU; and
between the AU and the United Nations (UN). There are concerns from member
states and RECs/RMs about the political command and control of the forces and
operations of the ASF. They appear to fear, as contributing countries and
regions, abrogating control to the AU Commission.
Another
challenge relating to the issue of political command and control has to do with
the issue of mandates. It was noted that an interpretation of the AU’s Constitutive
Act gives the AU the prerogative to mandate interventions without first
deferring to the UN. However, there are some RECs/RMs, such as SADC, that are
of the view that any deployment of their forces should be on the basis of a UN
Security Council (UNSC) mandate. It was also doubtful whether ECOWAS would
accept the deployment of its forces without a UNSC mandate. It was explained,
for instance, that in its planning and preparations for intervention in Mali,
ECOWAS has held the view that this was a regional initiative. This lack of
consensus continues to be a problem and is becoming more prominent as 2015
draws nearer.
Yet
another problem that was discussed concerned predictable and sustainable
funding and logistics support, including strategic lift, for peace support operations
(PSOs) mandated by the AU PSC. This challenge also involves the concept of the
continental logistics depot to be located in Douala and how the resources would
be controlled. Here again, the RECs/RMs see more merit in regional logistics
depots under their command and control. The proliferation of logistics depots,
however, raises questions about resource availability, given that invariably
these facilities would depend on external support. This was placed in the context
of the dearth of resources for the four on-going missions, and the huge
expenses involved in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for instance. It was noted that while
member states can provide troops, they often lack equipment and logistical
support, and a presumption all too often prevails that the AU could or should
assume responsibility for making up such deficiencies. This also raised the
question of UN involvement – specifically whether when larger forces are
required the UN should take the lead, or that the AU should lead when the
forces required are smaller.
A
dimension of the foregoing problem of sustainable funding and logistics is the
issue of the equality of member states. In principle, AU member states are
equal, but in reality, only about six African countries may possess the
necessary support capacity. It was added that there is hardly an African
country with expeditionary (contingency or enduring operations) capabilities,
coupled with the disparities in the speeds and capacities of the different
RECs/RMs that serve as the key building blocks of the ASF.
The seminar concluded with
participants discussing the need for an incremental approach in the development
of the ASF, but as a multidimensional force. The idea here is for the AU not to
aim for an ambitious force with capabilities to address all conflicts within
the continent. It should learn from the experiences of the UN, which has
evolved its concept of peacekeeping incrementally to meet evolving exigencies,
given the presumption that only certain ASF components will be ready by 2015.
This would also avoid the problem of mission creep.
It
was noted that these delays in the operationalisation of the ASF have caused
uncertainty, more so in light of the practice of the AU to continue to adopt ad
hoc interventions, not only in
Burundi and Darfur in 2004 but also in the Great Lakes to arrest Joseph Kony,
the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Another example is the proposed
deployment to the eastern DRC to stem the tide of the attacks by the M23 and
other negative elements, while ECOWAS plans its own regional intervention in
Mali.
The
point was made that these interventions were lost opportunities for testing the
policy framework, concept and doctrine of the ASF architecture. Moreover,
on-going missions/deployments were ad-hoc approaches that failed to properly
exercise ASF Planning Elements (PLANELMs), and the whole architecture of the
ASF.
The presenters and the
participants were unanimous in their opinion that the challenges to the
operationaliisation of the ASF were fundamentally political in nature. With
sufficient or reasonable political will and consensus, these challenges are not
insurmountable. It was therefore noted that a key challenge for the incoming AU
chairperson was to review the progress in the operationalisation of the ASF, in
order to mainstream efforts in that direction. In addition, further research on
the challenge of making more effective use of available resources is required,
as well as conceptualising a more compact force structure.
Seminar
Report compiled by Timothy Walker, Consultant, Conflict Management and
Peacebuilding Division, ISS Pretoria Office.