Chapter 5

MONUC Phase II: Concept and Implementation

In his report of 17 January 2000 on MONUC, the UN Secretary-General urged the Security Council to authorise a considerable expansion of the mission — from the existing 77 MLOs to 5 537 military observers and peacekeepers.33 Annan said his proposal was based on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would respect the Lusaka Peace Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions. He added that, even with the willingness of the parties to provide security for MONUC personnel, the general level of insecurity, the difficult terrain and degraded infrastructure of the DRC would not allow the deployment of the additional 500 observers and civilian staff envisaged in Resolution 1279 (November 1999) without the co-deployment of formed units of soldiers to protect the latter and to ‘facilitate’ their activities.

In addition to the 500 military observers, the force was to consist of four reinforced infantry battalions numbering a total of 3 400 troops. These were to be located near the current or potential areas of operation of the military observers and civilian personnel — identified provisionally as Mbandaka in the north, Mbuji Mayi in the south, Kisangani in the east, and at a point to be determined in the south-east. To patrol and provide transport on the inland waterways, two marine companies of 150 troops and four boats each were also requested. In addition, the Secretary-General highlighted the need for very substantial aviation assets, including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

According to the report, the military tasks of the expanded MONUC force would include military liaison, the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities, the investigation of ceasefire violations and the verification of the disengagement of the various forces. The UN estimated that approximately 20 000 RPA and 10 000 UPDF troops were present in the DRC, while on the government side, the estimate was approximately 12 000 Zimbabwean, 7 000 Angolan and 2 000 Namibian troops.34

Annan stressed that the UN troops:

"would not serve as an interposition force; nor would they be expected to extract military observers of civilian personnel by force. They would not have the capacity to protect civilian personnel from armed attack."35

Additional tasks — including facilitating the eventual disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups, and monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces — would require the approval of the Council for a larger operation (the so-called phase III).36

Basically, the envisaged concept of operations was the same as that advocated for the 500 military observers according to the November 1999 resolution creating MONUC. However, it recognised that the observers could not survive in a hostile environment without the support of formed infantry units. These formed units of the expanded MONUC force were not expected to make a direct contribution to the military observers’ capacity to monitor and report accurately on troop disengagement and ceasefire violations. However, when the Security Council finally authorised the expanded MONUC mission on 25 February 2000, it formally changed the mandate to protect UN and JMC personnel as well as civilians. Operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1291 states that the Council:

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."37

However, the authorisation for deployment was postponed until an undefined point in the future through the condition imposed by the Council that:

"the phased deployment of personnel … will be carried out as and if the Secretary-General determines that MONUC personnel will be able to deploy to their assigned locations and carry out their functions … in conditions of adequate security and with the cooperation of the parties, and that he has received firm and credible assurances from the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to that effect."38

The preamble to Resolution 1291 also emphasises that phase II of the deployment of MONUC should be based, inter alia, on the development of "a valid plan for the disengagement of the parties’ forces and their redeployment to JMC-approved positions." The response of the Lusaka agreement signatories to this invocation emerged from a JMC meeting in Kampala, which announced on 9 April 2000 a plan for the total cessation of hostilities, disengagement on both sides of the (ill-defined) frontline to establish a security corridor, and the redeployment of forces. The new ceasefire and disengagement agreement was to come into force on Friday, 14 April.39 The idea was for all combatants to stop fighting; then to pull troops 15 kilometres back along each frontline and to maintain them in those positions for three months, while the UN peace keepers deployed in the buffer zone between the warring parties. If all went well, the warring countries could then begin to withdraw.

The idea of using MONUC as a buffer force was at odds with the UN concept of military operations, which was restricted to the task of verification and monitoring. Nevertheless, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, told the Security Council that the Kampala disengagement plan made the full phase II deployment by the UN more urgent, and that MONUC had stressed the need to deploy in the (government-held) towns of Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi as rapidly as possible. UN spokesperson Fred Eckhard said the JMC and MONUC would monitor and verify the disengagement of forces, while MONUC would also be required to monitor and verify the various combatants’ movements. Eckhard added that the UN mission urgently needed specialist military units "to prepare for the deployment of its troops and equipment in the interior of the DRC."40

While welcoming the new agreement, France cautioned that more details were needed to make sure the deal was in line with the Security Council resolutions authorising the full deployment of MONUC forces. In similar vein, an RCD spokesman said that the new deal specified that the rival forces would pull back only from four small towns — Lisala and Boende in the north, and Kabalo and Kabinda on the southern front — where it was agreed that observers should be deployed. This would leave other key flashpoints, such as Ikela and Dekese, unobserved.41

However, little progress was made, either in meeting the Council preconditions for expanded MONUC deployment (as stated in Resolution 1291), or for satisfactory disengagement plans.

The Kampala agreement was revisited by a meeting of the military chiefs of staff of the parties in Harare on 6 December 2000. The parties, with the exception of the MLC, ratified detailed subplans for the disengagement and redeployment of their forces.

The concept of withdrawal outlined in the Harare subplan requires, in sequence:

the disengagement and withdrawal of all parties to New Defensive Positions (NDPs);

the withdrawal of all foreign forces from NDPs to designated assembly areas; and

the repatriation of forces from the assembly areas to their respective countries.

However, the plan states that the latter provision "does not preclude a Party from repatriating its forces directly from the NDPs." Foreign forces are defined as the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe operating in the DRC.42

MONUC subsequently received notification from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe that executive orders had been issued to their military forces to begin the disengagement process. The Harare disengagement plan stipulated that the military forces of the parties would undertake a 15-kilometre disengagement over a two-week period, starting on 21 January.43 However, the intransigence of the DRC government with respect to freedom of movement for MONUC was still unresolved.

As far as the fighting in the DRC was concerned, by December 2000, fortune still appeared to favour Rwanda and Uganda, but less than it had several months earlier. Since August 2000, the Kampala-backed MLC had threatened the key Congo river town of Mbandaka. Further south, the Rwandans and their RCD-Goma allies had repulsed a government-FAC offensive in Shaba, and captured the border town of Pweto.44 They continued to threaten Mbuji Mayi. On both fronts, only Zimbabwean and, to a lesser extent, Angolan and Namibian forces, stood between the rebels, and Kinshasa. It was under these pressing circumstances that Laurent Kabila was mysteriously assassinated in Kinshasa on 16 January 2001. His cohorts appointed his son, 29-year old Joseph, as president. Sworn into office on 26 January 2001, Joseph Kabila breathed new life into the DRC peace process by consenting to more than token UN deployment and to disengaging the FAC from the frontline according to the Harare plan. Joseph Kabila also removed another huge obstacle to the peace process by accepting Sir Ketumile Masire as facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

Until this point, MONUC had been marking time, but the new attitude of the government created a window of opportunity to proceed with phase II deployment. Whereas Bemba’s Front pour la libération du Congo (FLC)45 now presented the major obstacle to the consensual deployment of MONUC, this was not nearly as problematic as opposition to deployment by the Kinshasa government had been.

During a visit of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) planners to MONUC from 8 to 19 January, a revised draft concept of operations was elaborated. Given the fragility of the ceasefire, the size of the country and the difficulties of access and mobility beyond major towns, the updated concept of operations was based upon a gradual build-up of capability. This was intended to encourage the parties to cease hostilities, position MONUC to respond in a timely and effective manner once the parties began the disengagement and redeployment process, and to minimise risks to UN personnel. It would also set in place the conditions for subsequent expansion of the mission to include possible later tasks in the eastern provinces.46

MONUC was to make maximum use of its existing resources to build on its presence in the DRC by deploying further military observer teams and redeploying others to establish four sector headquarters — at Kisangani, Mbandaka, Kananga and Kalemie. These sector headquarters were to be an integral part of the command, control and communications infrastructure from where MONUC co-ordinates the additional military observer teams required for the verification and monitoring of the disengagement and redeployment. The four regional joint military commissions (which were located at Lisala, Boende, Kabinda and Kabalo) were to be relocated to the MONUC sector headquarters to facilitate the close liaison, co-ordination and confidence-building required to effect the verification and monitoring process.

In the updated concept of operations, the deployment of up to 550 military observers was envisaged, as well as up to 1 900 armed personnel to guard equipment, facilities and supplies located at the sector headquarters and support bases. Two riverine units comprising some 400 troops were also requested, as well as the necessary rotary and fixed-wing air assets. The total military personnel required numbered approximately 3 000 officers and other ranks.47

The Harare disengagement plan allowed two weeks for the completion of the verification phase, which was to begin once the parties had disengaged and moved to designated NDPs. Thereafter, MONUC would conduct verification and monitoring of the process sequentially across the four areas identified within the plan, in blocks of 14 days. Appropriate medical facilities, air assets (including full air operations and ground support), communications, general support services and administrative staff would be deployed to each of the sector headquarters.

The updated concept also called for the deployment of river boat units, probably at Kinshasa and Mbandaka, to build confidence by showing a UN presence, enhancing the flexibility of MONUC resupply activities, and assisting with the movement of military observers where access would otherwise be restricted. An additional benefit would be the stimulation of trade along the river. MONUC also intended to put in place a public information capability that would enable it to explain and clarify MONUC’s intentions and activities, and to respond in a more timely and effective manner to statements by the parties.48 On 22 February 2001, the Security Council reaffirmed the authorisation and mandate for MONUC contained in Resolution 1291 (February 2000), and endorsed the updated concept of operations outlined above.49

In its Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001, the Security Council demanded that the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement implement fully and without reservation plans for the disengagement and redeployment of forces. Warring parties were given two weeks, starting on 15 March, to withdraw by 25 kilometres from their frontline positions.

Taken somewhat by surprise by the sudden concessions of the government, the RCD and FLC initially tried to block the disengagement agreement and thus the further deployment of MONUC, but were forced to co-operate under mounting diplomatic pressure. The ceasefire between the parties was generally being respected, with significant violations (involving FAC and FLC skirmishes) reported only around Bolomba in Equateur province in early May. On the other hand, the RCD continued to report numerous incidents in the eastern provinces, involving attacks on their forces and on civilians by non-signatory armed groups.