Forms of Violence in South Africa and the Responsibilities for its Control*

Prof Paul Zulu
Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal (Durban)

* Edited version of a paper delivered at an IDP/CPS conference on the Future of the National Peacekeeping Force, 25 January 1994, Midrand

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 15, 1994

INTRODUCTION

There are two competing explanations for the violence in Natal and elsewhere in the country. The first is made by ordinary men and women who suffer at the hands of killers. Unfortunately, this version of events suffers from constraints inherent in the relationships of power existing at the present time. Ordinary men and women have relatively little power to influence events. They do not have the technical know-how to present their case in legally convincing terms as is required in the courts, which are vested with judicial authority to apprehend the culprits. The second explanation is a socially-constructed version of reality propagated by the various political elites, the state's security apparatus and consequently, by the government in office.

It is essential to refer to these two competing versions of events because, in spite of an estimated figure of approximately 15 000 individuals who have died in politically-related violence over the past eight years, there are no visible signs of a containment of the violence. The fact that an overwhelming majority of the victims consists of voteless and powerless Africans places the violence squarely within the political domain. Because the violence has been decriminalised and hence it has become unstoppable. This has happened because of: -

Firstly political actors who are, in the main, responsible for the continuation of the violence and have considerable means at their disposal to tackle the causes. But since they are engaged in alliance-building they are unwilling to alienate existing and possible future allies by confronting the problem at its source.



Secondly, the social construction of the violence immobilises the Security Forces because it obfuscates the criminal dimension of violence. Given these factors, the Transitional Executive Council has a mammoth task to accomplish, first in restoring law and order to internationally accepted limits, and secondly in making provisions for effective policing mechanisms. After all the safety of citizens depends heavily on an efficient and trusted police force. As de Haas (1993: 1 so aptly states: '...if the norms and values of society are not upheld by those vested by its members with the authority to do so, disorder and lawlessness will threaten the fabric of society'. In South Africa these chickens have come home to roost.

FORMS OF THE PRESENT VIOLENCE

The nature and course of the violence in Natal is not markedly different from that occurring in the rest of the country. Nationally, inter-communal violence, which some have referred to as low-intensity civil war, operates at five discrete but interrelated levels.

The first level takes the form of random and spontaneous collective action directed against the establishment. In the main, this form of violence arises out of frustration caused by the competition for scarce resources where there is an actual and perceived unevenness in the distribution of such resources. This uneveness may occur, first, between black and white and, second, among blacks themselves. It has arisen where '...a struggle for a greater access to, and control over, the resources of the wider society and economy was deflected and turned into a fight over shrinking resources allocated to blacks on the urban perimeters' (Morris and Hindson, 1992). This applies equally to rural areas where those who occupy official positions are not only relatively privileged compared to the masses of the people, but also control the immediate allocation of those resources. Hence the 'establishment' in this case includes the state and the extended state apparatus, of which structures, such as homeland administrations, form a part.

Specific grievances such as in education, housing, freedom of association, etc., result in protests which, in the main, are directed at the central state. However, due to the immediate control over the same resources by homelands and own affairs divisions, protest action gets deflected on to those structures. Such protests and demonstrations often result in violent confrontation between demonstrators and the Security Forces. In a number of instances, over-reaction by the state apparatus rather than by the protesters has precipitated violence. The Security Forces have often aggravated the situation by reacting to a number of marches and political demonstrations, by tear-gassing the crowds who, in turn, often respond by attacking the nearest target that represents state power. Faced with superior police power, demonstrators have deflected their anger onto town councillors and other officials and attacked them. The usual outcome is that someone is killed, and that sets off a spiral of retaliatory actions.

The second and presently the most pervasive form is inter-party violence particularly between the Inkatha Freedom Party (Inkatha) and the African National Congress (ANC). The root causes of animosity between the two organisations lie mainly in their respective structural positions in the South African political economy and hence their particular locations in the ideological divide. Due to the fact that Inkatha governs the KwaZulu homeland and controls both the allocation and distribution of those scarce resources, it is perceived by the liberation movement to be a beneficiary of the state. Because of this configuration, historical animosities have developed between the ANC and Inkatha. Violence between the two organisations takes the form of struggles for territorial hegemony which manifests itself in the systematic and well-planned assassinations of leaders, by means of pre-emptive and defensive attacks on communities and retaliatory offensives. At first the violence took the form of visible attacks by groups of people though latterly it has been perpetrated by unseen elements operating in the dark. Generally the local leadership is targeted in the hope that eliminating these individuals will weaken the opposition. Examples of such actions include the elimination of office-bearers of organisations in both townships and rural areas. This has primarily been the case in Natal and, to a great extent, on the Reef.

The perception, by of both the ANC and the IFP, that the Security Forces are partisan both in their investigations and intervention when called upon to restore peace, has exacerbated this form of violence. The parties often resort to retaliatory action taking and the law into their own hands in an attempt to settle scores. In a number of cases, 'territoriality' (the monopolisation of physical space by political groupings) has facilitated large-scale violence in that attackers know that targeting specific geographical locations is unlikely to result in harm coming to their ideological supporters. The violence between the hostels and shack settlements or townships can be classified under this rubric.

While it is conceivable that inter-party conflict might culminate in violence, especially where the stakes are high and individuals have had neither the channels nor mechanisms for settling disputes democratically, the history and present behaviour of the state's security apparatus has long been a cause for concern. Such concerns arise, firstly, out of an apparent inability by the Security Forces to deal with the perpetrators of the violence and secondly, from a perceived partisanship of the same Forces when dealing with alleged culprits. Further, members of the Security Forces have been implicated in serious cases of violence such as the Trust Feed and other cases. This has given rise to numerous allegations as to the role of 'third force' elements in the violence.

The third form of violence is indiscriminate assaults on and killings of people in the streets and in commuter transport facilities such as trains, buses and mini buses or, for that matter, in private vehicles. Like the other forms of violence, it is exacerbated by 'territoriality', a situation where political groupings monopolise territory to the extent that the opposition has an insignificant presence there. In this instance one can explain the violence in terms of inter-fractional conflict, but where political visibility is not an issue, it is difficult to attribute this form of violence to inter-party rivalry. A number of monitors and analysts attribute this form of violence to activities and groupings whose primary purpose is to frustrate or destroy the transitional process through destabilisation. For instance, there is ample demonstration of a coincidence between specific landmarks in the negotiation process and massacres, which researchers of the violence believe are intended to derail the peace process. Places such as Boipatong (1992), Phola Park (1991), Swanieville (1991), and Table Mountain (1993) fall into this category. Also, since the announcement of the proposed election date, many people have been killed and this includes the recent carnage in Tembisa, Phola Park and Sebokeng.

Fourthly, there is inter-group violence which occurs when interest groups vie for economic space (and politics is apparently not the primary mode of affiliation) and end up in violent confrontation. Taxi wars fall within this category of violence but already there are growing suspicions that political motives should not be ruled out entirely. There are allegations of 'third force' elements who have spotted weak links and have infiltrated taxi organisations in order to further the destabilisation process. The volatile situation has become exploitable in such a way that it is not difficult to create dissidence in a number of organisations and transform them into conduits for violence. Exponents of this line of thinking argue that the anarchic situation created by an efficient and generally ideologically-contaminated police force is conducive to such developments.

The fifth form of violence is that of thuggery and vandalism. While this form of violence is not purely political, access to weapons and ammunition on a scale that exists at present has rendered the country very difficult to govern. The Security Forces are besieged by lawlessness and anarchy and, by their own activities, further contribute to the chaos that apparently reigns in the country.

A common denominator in all these forms of the violence, and cause for great concern, is the apparent incapability of the state's security apparatus to contain it. Commenting on the recent carnage in Thembisa, the State President, F W de Klerk, called on leaders of political groups to exert strong influence on their followers, as putting an end to the violence was the collective responsibility of all South Africans. A number of commentators find it disturbing that the state appears incapable of acting decisively in the so-called 'black on black' violence, but is quite capable of acting where whites appear threatened. Admittedly, there is an urgent need to exhort each and every citizen and remind them of their moral obligations, but that does not absolve the state from its duty as the protector of lives within its domain. Part of the state's perceived weakness arises out of previous and possibly still current ideological constraints, such as the policy of 'total onslaught' or 'total threat'.

The foundations of the state's incapacity or weakness to act against forces that unleash the violence lie in its incapacity to manage the process of transition. Its past history and particularly the policy of 'total onslaught', as enunciated and put into effect in the 1980's by former State President Mr P W Botha, remain a millstone around its neck. Botha consolidated what had been National Party thinking and practice since the 1950's into an efficient administrative counter-insurgency policy. The policy of 'total strategy' was predicated on the assumption of a total onslaught by the communist world on South Africa. The state declared the liberation movements both internal and external, and particularly the ANC, the PAC and AZAPO as agents of communism and, therefore, enemies of South Africa.

The policy of 'total strategy' entailed total defence of the country against communism. This comprised a two-pronged thrust, the physical and the psychological, which necessitated the formation of co-ordinated structures. To this end, direct links between the army, the police, business and local government structures were formed. The Joint Management Councils (JMC's) corresponding to the nine territorial Defence Commands became the new instruments of defence against communism. They also became centres for organising projects designed to win the hearts and minds of the local communities.

The JMC's were accountable to the State Security Council. It was inevitable that this penetration of the state, through the security apparatus, into civil society would create structural networks and personal allegiances that would prove difficult to untangle and manage, should any process of transition to a new political order ensue. Given that some of the main actors in the present violence have been part and parcel of the previous administration, and that some individuals in their organisations were members of the JMC's, it was inevitable that ideological and personal links with members of the state security apparatus were cemented in this union. Since the liberation movements boycotted participation in state-sponsored institutions, personal ties between members of both these organisations could not be created, while ideological animosities between the state and the liberation movements bedevilled the relationship.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE IN NATAL: THE MILITARISATION OF OPPOSING GROUPINGS

On the 5th of November 1993, the Daily News published an article in which it exposed a secret military training base for Inkatha in the Umfolozi Valley in Northern Zululand. Inkatha's explanation was that they were training self-defence units to protect citizens from attacks by the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) which, they claimed, was carrying out military training openly in the townships. The ANC's response was that they were training the MK for integration into the National Peacekeeping Force. Later, allegations linked the training of Inkatha members to the Right Wing, particularly the AWB. Allegations were that the Umfolozi Camp was not the only one that existed. During the month of December 1993, a number of families and individuals were attacked and killed in the Enseleni district in Zululand, and there has been a renewed and intensive campaign against opponents of Inkatha in the Eshowe and Mandini districts in Zululand. In the Port Shepstone area a number of individuals have been killed, allegedly by ANC-aligned comrades. Worse, the Goldstone Commission has disclosed the existence of hit-squads within the KwaZulu police. Five KwaZulu policemen have been arrested and charged on various counts of murder of political opponents of Inkatha. Given the levels of violence in the region, these revelations are ominous.

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS

A few points should be noted in regard to efforts to control and finally bring to an end the present violence:

in any normal situation, culprits have rarely brought themselves to book;



the protection of citizens falls squarely within the ambit of the state as the authority that has ultimate power in society;



in South Africa the etiology of the violence has been sufficiently documented to allow the state, as the ultimate authority, to tackle it;



the present violence is not uncontrollable; sufficient evidence exists to indicate that, where the state has the will to stop it, it could do so.

Much ink has been spilled in apportioning blame for the violence to the respective political actors, including the state apparatus. There appears to be little co-operation between the Security Forces and the communities who are, in the main, victims of the violence. While it is essential that leaders of political factions should contain their followers, they have not demonstrated that capacity, or (as is probable) are not willing of doing so. South Africa still has a legal government despite the legitimacy crisis and it is this legal power which must be invoked, impartially, to bring the situation back to normal. The magnitude of the problem and the urgency of the situation call for some form of international intervention, if only to legitimise the activities of policing and investigation of the violence. While a number of political actors advocate joint control of the Security Forces by a multi-party forum, the present negotiations have demonstrated the weaknesses of a negotiating forum where the parties do not command equal power. Given these inequalities in power and resources, joint control of the Security Forces will itself need some form of international supervision if it is to be equitable and just.

The most critical practical step is to depoliticise the violence. It does the country a great disservice when the police and other legal institutions take sides in their approach to crime. Violence is a crime and the socially-constructed version of reality propagated by the instigators of crime and those who defend themselves against attackers can only aggravate the situation. They will create a legal impasse, with perpetrators of crime parading as respectable citizens, simply because they are high-ranking political actors.

Since, parties to the violence also aspire to be part of the future government, they have to demonstrate the capacity to exert discipline over their followers. Despite the much-publicised Peace Accord and the fact that political parties are signatories to it, there has been very little evidence of discipline on the part of the same parties, or their affiliates or members who have breached a code of conduct that has been mutually agreed upon.

Finally, there is need for institutional mediation in political education and preparation of the general public for the transition. In the past, politics has tended to follow the 'all or nothing' principle of law, with groups adopting the stance that other groups are either 'for us or against us'. Now that the country is on a road to democracy, institutions like the church, the schools and community organisations should engage in an active campaign for open political education. The public has to be educated to develop an internal locus of control by which individuals become accountable for their own actions, instead of locating responsibility at the collectivity, the leadership, or some other abstraction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

J Aitchison, The Civil War In Natal: Events in Pietermaritzburg Quantifying Death and Destruction - Interpreting the War, Centre for Adult Education University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1991.

M De Haas, Violence and Negotiations in The CODESA File: Negotiating a Non-Racial South Africa, Institute of Black Research, 1992.

Z Gwala, Political Conflict and Violence in Natal 1986 - 1992 in Indicator SA, Special Issue, University of Natal, Durban, 1992.

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A Minaar, Squatters, Violence and the Future of Informal Settlements in the Greater Durban Region, HSRC, 1992a.

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P M Zulu, Durban Hostels and Political Violence: Case Studies in Kwa Mashu and Umlazi in Transformation, No 21, 1993b.