INTRODUCTION

Sudan's post-independence history has almost consistently been characterised by civil wars. The 1972-1983 period was the only time during which Sudan witnessed a lull in hostilities. The cease-fire agreement was reached following the 1971-1972 Addis Ababa Accords negotiated by President Gaafar al Numeiri's government, with the Anya Nya and other southern liberation movements. The first phase of the conflict (1955-1972), pitted the Sudanese Defence Force (SDF) against the southern liberation movement which called itself the Anya Nya (snake poison) movement.¹ This movement, among others, such as the Southern Party, advocated mainly for the autonomy of southern Sudan. Members were opposed to the Islamisation and Arabisation policies pursued by the Sudanese administrations in the non-Arab southern regions and the Nuba Mountains.²

The call for the liberation of southern Sudan, a move that was against the policies of the government in the North, was intensified both at the military and the political levels with the formation of other movements and political parties in the area. Some of the movements and political parties included:

the Sudan African National Union (SANU), formed by Southern Sudanese exiles;



the Azania Liberation Front (ALF), a SANU splinter group;



the Sudan Unity Party (SUP);



the Southern Sudan Association (SSA), founded in London and financed by some British businessmen; and



the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), the political wing of the Anya Nya.

The inter- and intrafactional fighting hampered the southern Sudanese capacity to force Khartoum to accept its demands and to initiate changes. One of the consequences of the factional divisions was the establishment by the southern leaders of a number of competing provisional administrative governments in the region. The administrations included the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG), the Nile Provisional Government (NPG), the Anyidi Revolutionary Government (ARG), the Sue River Revolutionary Government (SRRG), and the Sudan-Azania Government (SAG), all of which were established between 1967-1969. Factional fighting in the area is therefore not a phenomenon only of the 1980s and 1990s.

The second phase of the civil war was rekindled in 1983, following President Numeiri's decree which imposed Islamic sharia law, a decision he later regretted.³ The strict law was imposed in the whole of Sudan. It not only triggered widespread nationalism and militancy in the South and the Nuba Mountains, but also laid the foundation for the formation of the main resistance movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA). The conflict between the SDF and SPLA and other liberation forces has culminated in the loss of millions of lives, the exodus of millions of refugees, and widespread famine.

As was the case in the first phase of the civil war, the issue of the autonomy of the South has remained the central driving force behind the liberation movements. Apart from the SPLM/A, the other movements that have been established to fight for the self-determination of the peoples of the South and the Nuba Mountains include the Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PRMSS), the Nuba Mountains Solidarity (NMS), Anya Nya Two, with the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement as its political wing (SSPLM). The division within the SPLM/A ranks led to the split and the subsequent formation of SPLA-Mainstream (Torit Group) and SPLA-United (Nasir Group) led by John Garang and Riek Machar respectively. However, Machar later formed his own Southern Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A) with Garang retaining the original SPLM/A. Since August 1997, Riek Machar has joined the Khartoum government and re-organised his movement under a new name, the United Salvation Democratic Front (USDF) which serves the interests of Khartoum. The 1991 split not only weakened the liberation movements, but also led to inter- and intrafactional fighting.

In order to consolidate international support for their objectives, Sudan and the liberation movements have sought political and military backing from abroad. The purpose of this article is to put the extent to which the Sudanese civil war has been internationalised over the years into the proper context. Specifically, it identifies the international actors involved in the civil war, as well as their underlying interests. The first part deals with the contentious issues which have led to the civil war, while the second part examines the extent to which the civil war has been internationalised. The mediation attempts initiated by both internal and international actors are analysed in the last part.

CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

Prior to the independence of Sudan, the South demanded self-determination on the grounds that the region was not only administered separately by the British colonial regime, but that the North was culturally, linguistically, and religiously distinct. Sudan's acquisition of independence as a unified sovereign nation-state, therefore, set the stage for the civil war. Central to the continued conflict in the country are the policies of a militant form of Islamic fundamentalism and its corollary, Arabisation, imposed in Sudan as a whole by the different administrations. The adoption of the policies has led to the institutionalisation of sharia law. The conflict therefore centres on Arab nationalism vis-à-vis African nationalism (a subject which requires further research). Of the total population, estimated in 1996 to be about 32 million people, the Arabs (North) and the blacks (South and Nuba Mountains areas) account for 39 and 52 per cent of the population, respectively.⁴

The issue of the uneven development of the South and the North which is a colonial legacy, has also been a contributory factor to the civil war. The North has had better educational facilities, infrastructure and is more economically developed than the South. Exploitation of the South continued even after independence. The people of the South are also of the view that more natural resources, oil included, are located in the south and that they have the right to benefit from the revenues that accrue from these commodities.⁵ The diversion of revenues, to the North, particularly from oil, is interpreted as the perpetuation of the exploitation of the South. Oil production, therefore, became the first target of the SPLA in 1983, which it successfully brought to a halt. Over the years, the civil war in Sudan has attracted both friends and foes from abroad.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT

Sudan's contiguity to the Red Sea places it within the Middle East and the Gulf regions' geopolitical and geostrategic perspectives. As a country led and dominated by Muslims and with its membership of the Arab League, Sudan has been drawn into the conflicts in the oil-rich, but volatile region on a number of occasions. For example, Sudan supported the Arab cause diplomatically and militarily during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.⁶ Similarly, Sudan was the only sub-Saharan African country that supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.⁷

Sudanese Neighbours and the Civil War

A number of neighbouring countries have been involved in the civil war in Sudan over the years. Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo the DRC) allowed Israel to establish military centres in their territories to train the Anya Nya. The neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zaire, were fighting internal civil wars against those advocating for self-determination or secession.⁸ The issue of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism was not only a concern for them, but also for the Israelis. Some of the Sudanese refugees based in these countries were recruited for military training by the Israelis.⁹ They were later expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin, limiting the Anya Nya's access to the facilities and military hardware they were receiving through the country.¹⁰ The southern Sudanese exiles based in neighbouring countries such as the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, gave concerted support to the Anya Nya.¹¹

It was only Egypt and Libya, Sudan's Arab neighbours to the north, that gave Sudan military and financial help. Strictly speaking, the civil war in Sudan (and by extension the region) is more of a dichotomy between the Arabs and non-Arabs, a form of pan-Arabism vis-à-vis pan-Africanism. This is not to argue that the Arab Africans are not Africans. Egypt and Libya solicited financial and military aid for Sudan from Arab League members and other countries. With the influence of Egypt, the Soviet Union not only provided Sudan with over $150 million of aid after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but more than 1 000 Soviet military personnel were stationed in Sudan to advise the SDF in their war efforts against the Anya Nya. The United States' presence in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa served to balance the presence of the Soviets. Whereas Ethiopia supported the Sudanese liberation movements, Sudan gave the Eritreans military and logistical aid in their drive for self-determination.

The institutionalisation and inscription of sharia law in the Constitution of Sudan by Numeiri in 1983 led to the re-emergence and the escalation of the civil war. Sadiq al Mahdi's administration (1985-1989), never replaced Islamic law. General Omar al Bashir who took over with a military coup in 1989 (and was reportedly backed by Egypt), has officially and fully implemented the law.¹² The SPLA, PRMSS, SSIA, NMS, and the Anya Nya Two are some of the liberation movements that have militarily engaged Khartoum's SDF and the People's Defence Force (PDF). As was the case in Phase One, neighbouring countries are still involved in the Sudanese civil war, with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda sometimes engaging in low-intensity conflict with Sudan.

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have remained the main military and logistical supporters of the SPLA. Even Egypt, a former supporter of Sudan, has cautiously switched sides in favour of the SPLA. One of the main reasons for Egypt's reversed position is its fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Sudan. Egypt is fighting its own undeclared internal war against the fundamentalists. The alleged Sudanese-sponsored assassina-tion attempt on Hosni Mubarak's life during the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) June 1995 meeting in Addis Ababa, has worsened the already strained relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, and Egypt and Sudan.¹³ The National Islamic Front (NIF) government is unhappy with Egypt's pro-Western stance and backs the fundamentalists in Egypt. Other countries also targeted by the NIF policy of jihad are the DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea (fighting against the Eritrean Islamic jihad), Somalia and Uganda.¹⁴ The Sudanese assassination attempt on the life of Mubarak earned it United Nations aviation sanctions.¹⁵

Egypt, Eritrea and Uganda have severed diplomatic relations with Sudan. Whereas Eritrea is unhappy with the Sudanese support of the Eritrean Islamic jihad, Uganda blames Sudan for giving military and logistical support for William Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) fighting to topple Yoweri Museveni's government. As a quid pro quo, Uganda also gives the SPLA logistical and military support with Kampala functioning as a conduit for SPLA arms deliveries. It is as a result of this retaliatory practice that Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda received over $20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf of the liberation movements in Sudan in 1996.¹⁶ Apart from its geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the region, which stretches up to the Middle East and the Gulf, the US is specifically concerned with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan. Containment of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism constitutes an important foreign policy focus in Washington. Sudan's neighbours, except Libya, are therefore partners in this US regional policy. The acceptance by the Museveni administration in late 1997 of US marines to train the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) for future missions in Africa, adds another nerve-wracking military equation for Sudan.

The meeting between the SPLA's John Garang and Eritrea's President Aferwerki in 1993 solidified the SPLA-Eritrean relations. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has engaged in a low-intensity conflict with the NIF forces on a number of occasions. Ethiopia's major concern, on the other hand, is the NIF's support of the Oromo Islamic parties. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has also exchanged fire with the NIF forces.¹⁷ On Sudan's western front, the Central African Republic army prevented an entire battalion of Sudanese troops from attacking the SPLA through its territory in 1996.¹⁸ Kenya is also anxious about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, although President Moi reportedly received financial support from Sudan during his 1992 election campaign in exchange for monitoring SPLA activities in his country.¹⁹

The relations with Sudan's neighbours can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the fear of destabilisation by Sudan constitutes an important factor in the minds of foreign policy and military planners in neighbouring countries. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region is viewed by Sudan's neighbours as the main driving force behind its foreign policy behaviour. Secondly, the containment of Sudan's behaviour has become an important component of the policies of its neighbours both individually and collectively. Thirdly, the issue of self-determination for the South is supported by extension by Sudan's neighbours. Thus, the support for the liberation movements operating in Sudan, on the one hand, and in neighbouring countries, on the other, has become the modus operandi in the region, with the liberation movements benefiting from the quagmire. A comprehensive and clear understanding of the level of internationalisation of the civil war in Sudan cannot be complete without integrating the involvement of the other external actors.

External Actors and the Civil War

Sudan, as a country dominated by Muslims and as a member of the Arab League, has traditionally received military and financial aid from members of the League. The support received by Sudan from League members in the 1960s and 1970s, came mainly from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia, with Iran and Yemen joining the bandwagon in the 1980s. The closer relations between Egypt and Sudan, particularly during the Numeiri administration, helped to promote US interests in the area and in the Arab world in general.²⁰ The Egyptian-Sudanese axis was tangibly manifested in 1979 with Sudan being the only Arab country that supported Anwar Sadat's Camp David Accords with Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin, and rejected the Arab League's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.²¹

After winning the elections against the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the NIF, the Communist Party (CP), and others, Sadiq al Mahdi of the Umma Party embarked on a diplomatic offensive that promoted Sudan's ties with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the US. Numeiri supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraqi War and even sent volunteers to assist Iraq. Mahdi, however, re-established the diplomatic relations with Iran which had been severed by the previous administration.²² The current leadership of Omar al Bashir has retained the cordial relations between the two countries, with Teheran providing military and financial support to Sudan. The closer relations between Iran and Sudan (which includes Iranian military advisors) are enhanced by the two countries' policies on Islamic fundamentalism.²³ This has resulted in Algeria and Tunisia breaking off their diplomatic relations with Khartoum, and with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates openly expressing their displeasure after the attempt on Mubarak's life.²⁴ Washington's August 1993 decision to include Sudan, together with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria on its list of states which sponsor terrorism has enhanced Sudan's isolation from some Arab countries and Western allies.²⁵ Apart from being accused by Algeria of supporting the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (AISF), Sudan is also accused of aiding Islamic fundamentalists with the help of Iranian military advisors operating in Mali and Morocco.²⁶ Iran delivered some of the Iraqi war planes which took `refuge' in Teheran during the 1991 Gulf War to Sudan.²⁷ The other countries which have supplied Sudan with arms during the 1990s include Afghanistan, Jordan, Syria and South Africa, with the latter mainly providing artillery in 1993.²⁸

The Sudanese civil war is made more complex by the involvement of the US and other powers. Between 1976 and 1980, for example, Sudan received military aid from the US in excess of $100 million. Compare this to $360 million, $10 million, $10 million, and $5 million Sudan received from West Germany, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and France, respectively.²⁹ China's interest in the area is demonstrated by its military aid to Sudan. Between 1985 and 1989, China supplied Sudan with arms worth $50 million.³⁰ China's entry into the war is based on its continental and global ambitions, with Sudan's oil being an important influencing factor. The entrance of Arakis Energy, a Canadian firm, and the Russian state-owned companies YUKOS and Zarubezh-neftegasstroi, has increased oil production prospects in Sudan.³¹ These prospects are constantly threatened and halted by the incursions of the SPLA, particularly in its latest 1997 successes against the SDF and the People's Defence Force (PDF), its military wing.

It was the SPLA that managed to stop Chevron's oil production in 1983. The 1991 SPLA split weakened the movement for some time through intrafactional fighting. The SPLA-Mainstream under John Garang, however, has continued to dominate the movement with the Dinka (the largest ethnic group in the South) being its main power base. The SPLA-United was established by Arok Thon Arok, Lam Akol Ajawin and William Nyuon after their dismissal by the SPLA and SSIA. Apart from focusing their war efforts against the SDF and the PDF, the liberation movements have engaged themselves in inter- and intrafactional fighting on a number of occasions.

While China, Iran, Libya and Russia are on the side of Sudan at present, Israel, the US, and Sudan's neighbours support the liberation movements. Sudanese-Russian military co-operation has been made possible because of Moscow's interests in oil, of which the production is estimated to cost between US $400 and 600 million.³² The major concern for some of the countries that give military and economic aid to Sudan is its policy of Islamic fundamentalism. In March 1995, some leaders attending the international Islamic conference in Sudan agreed to pursue the policy of jihad in Africa individually and collectively, particularly in Chad, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda (a combined population of about 200 million). It was decided that Sudan would serve as a base for training recruits for military missions on the continent and abroad.³³

The opposition to the regime in Sudan has been boosted in 1995 with the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which embraces most of the liberation movements and some northern political parties opposed to the Bashir leadership. It was founded by the SPLA and the SPLA-United, among others, and some factions of the Umma Party, the DUP, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), and the Legitimate Command under General Fathi Ahmed Ali. The NDA subsequently established what the founders called the Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF), also known as the National or Solidarity Forces operating in the North and the East in collaboration with the SPLA. This is the first time in the history of the Sudanese civil war that the liberation movements have formally entered into a marriage of convenience with the northern parties to oppose the leadership in Khartoum. The former Sudanese leader, Sadiq Mahdi, also publicly supported self-determination for the South which subsequently earned him a sedition trial.³⁴ The most important but contentious decisions achieved by the NDA at its meeting were the recognition of self-determination for the South and the disadvantaged areas, and the separation of the church and the state. This was a major triumph for the liberation movements, particularly the SPLA.

The NDA meeting held in Asmara, Eritrea, with the blessing of Isayas Aferwerki and financed by Egypt, was endorsed by the US, Egypt, Ethiopia and Uganda. The NDA and the SPLA have opened a new front along the Eritrean-Sudanese border with the help of arms from Israel and the US. The diplomatic enclaving of Sudan by Muslim African countries has extended to Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.³⁵ Sudan, however, continues to counter this with diplomatic arm-twisting and military support from, among others, Russia, China, Chile and Indonesia. The NDA Leadership Council (DUP, SCP, SPLA, and Umma Party), with Garang as the head of its military command, has paved the way for US military aid to the SPLA and the SAF.³⁶

As has been explained, US interests in the area centre on the policy of containing Islamic fundamentalism. The humanitarian crisis is also a major concern for US policy-makers. The US provided Sudan with humanitarian aid worth over $2 billion between 1983 and 1994.³⁷ With an external debt estimated at nearly $20 billion, Sudan's civil war is obviously overstretching its economy. The production of oil is therefore viewed by the Sudanese leaders as a potential revenue earner for the war efforts. The Arakis have recruited South African mercenaries from Executive Outcomes to protect their oil production. Arakis are using the example of Sierra Leone where South African mercenaries have been used to protect diamond production while the civil war rages in the country.³⁸ With one of the largest armies in Africa estimated at 100 000 (SDF) and 150 000 (PDF) members, full production of oil would come in handy in the war efforts. However, only a durable solution to the civil war can guarantee the production of oil. A number of internal, regional and international efforts have been made to resolve the Sudanese civil war, but without success to date.

MEDIATION EFFORTS

By the end of phase one of the Sudanese civil war, more than 250 million people were displaced as refugees and thousands were killed. The eleven years' truce (1972-1983), the longest in the history of the civil war, prevailed because of the willingness of the parties to observe the provisions of the Accord. The issue of the autonomy of the South received a boost from Numeiri when he passed a decree establishing the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972. The other central issues, recognised and inscribed in the Accord, dealt with the questions of the separation of church and state, rights (economic, cultural, political and religious) of the southerners, and equitable distribution of resources.³⁹ The central purpose of this section of the article is to identify some of the key players that have attempted to find peaceful solutions to the Sudanese civil war. In particular, the main players will be identified, and the contentious issues agreed upon by the belligerents will be examined. Of the numerous attempts at conflict resolution in Sudan, the efforts of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) later called the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) later re-named the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the US will be examined.

The SCC, together with its counterparts the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), played important mediatory roles during the 1971-1972 peace negotiations. The Sudanese churches, particularly the NSCC, have since then engaged in `grassroots peacemaking' in which their efforts are directed at educating the Sudanese people to appreciate themselves, irrespective of their cultural, ethnic, linguistic, political, religious and sexual differences. The churches have facilitated a number of peaceful solutions among various conflict-prone factions. They managed to resolve conflicts among the Rizeigat Baggara and the Malwal Dinka in Bahr al-Ghazal, the Fur and the Baggara in Darfur, the intra-Nuer fighting in the Sobat Basin, and between the Didinga (Sudan), Turkana (Kenya), and Dodoth and Karamajong (Uganda).⁴⁰ It was through the NSCC that the Dinka and the Miseriya Arab chiefs negotiated a settlement in 1994 which paved the way for cattle grazing across their respective areas.⁴¹

The IGAD front-line states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (given the task by IGAD members of finding a solution to the conflict) have succeeded in initiating cease-fires in the civil war on a number of occasions. One of the major constraints, however, is their own bilateral conflicts with Sudan. The front-line states are also cautious not to overemphasise the issue of self-determination and autonomy, given the potential internal implications in their own countries. However, IGAD's peace negotiating positions with Sudan and the liberation movements have centred on two main issues, namely, the right to self-determination for the South and other disadvantaged areas, and a transitional period within which permanent arrangements are to be finalised.⁴² IGAD has expanded its mandate by functioning as a co-ordinating regional containment policy planning unit for the governments in the region and other international parties to the conflict.⁴³

IGAD's role in the Sudanese conflict has gained international recognition. Former US President Jimmy Carter's peace missions in the area have been carried out either directly or through IGAD, for example. Similarly, a group calling itself IGAD's Friends, and consisting of Britain, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the US, have also commended the role IGAD played in trying to bring about the resolution of the Sudanese conflict.⁴⁴ Being some of the leading aid donors towards Sudan's humanitarian needs, the IGAD Friends are concerned with the continued deaths of millions of people in the area which occur because of the war and famine.⁴⁵ Apart from IGAD, the US Congress has also attempted to resolve the war of attrition in Sudan.

As a continuation of the October 1992 Senate Resolution 94 and the August 1993 House of Representatives Resolution 131, the US Congress brokered a peaceful settlement between the fighting factions. The Washington Declaration, entitled The Forgotten Tragedy in Sudan, was signed by Garang (SPLM/A) and Machar (SSIM/A), the two main antagonists. A split within the SPLA ranks was viewed to be counter-productive by the US, one of the SPLA's military supporters.⁴⁶ The peace initiatives including those not examined in this article, such as the Nigerian Abuja Declaration, and the efforts of neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya generally revolve around the issues of cease-fires, the recognition of the rights of all the peoples of Sudan, and self-determination for the southern peoples.

CONCLUSION

The policies of Islamisation and Arabisation, which have been pursued by the different administrations in Sudan, constitute the central contentious issues which have laid the foundation for nationalism in the South and the Nuba Mountains. The demand for self-determination for the peoples of these areas is therefore a product of the policies and their corollary, discrimination. The internationalisation of the civil war in Sudan becomes a function of the support to both sides in the war from external actors. Within this context, the issue of regional security, a concern for Sudan's neighbours, has also compounded the problem. Whereas the IGAD front-line states have managed to bring the warring parties together at the negotiating table, they are also concerned by Sudan's policies in the region. IGAD members have supported the liberation movements in Sudan as a quid pro quo in the process.

The demand for self-determination and autonomy for the South and other disadvantaged areas is a difficult question for the supporters of the liberation movements. All Sudan's neighbouring countries (with Kenya still uncertain about the volatile situation in the North Eastern Province) are in one way or the other conscious of the liberation movements in their territories.⁴⁷ Indeed, IGAD members also take cognisance of Article III of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity which provides for non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the contracting parties to the Charter.

Apart from the policies pursued by Sudan, which have fuelled conflict over the years, both the Sudanese Government and the liberation movements are fighting for the control of the country's resources. The South is richly endowed with fertile land and natural resources. Sudan is not alone in this wealth cum power entanglement. Angola, Congo, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone are partners in this equation. The removal of Congolese President Pascal Lissouba by former dictator General Denis Sassou-Ngueso in October 1997, the Angolan civil war and the military incursions in Cabinda against the rebels, the frequent clashes between Cameroon and Nigeria over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, and the recurring civil war in Sierra Leone can all be explained within this context. Of course, President Charles Taylor fought the civil war in Liberia with money from diamonds, timber and rubber. The belligerents in Sudan are therefore not alone in this continental quagmire.

ENDNOTES

For details of the Anya Nya rebel movement see, for example, C Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972, David and Charles, London, 1974; D M Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, Africana, New York, 1981; and The Anya Nya Struggle: Background and Objectives, South Sudan Resistance Movement, South Sudan, 1970.



Between 1976 and 1985, Sudan had nine different administrations, some of which survived for only a year. They included the administrations of Ismail al Azhai (1956-1957), Abdula Khalid (1957-1958), Gen Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964), Al-Khalifa (1964-1965), Mohammed Mahgoub (1965-1966), Sadiq al Mahdi (1966-1967), Mohammed Mahgoub (1967-1969), Col Gaafar al Numeiri (1969-1985). Numeiri was briefly overthrown in 1971, but he quickly staged successful a counter-coup with the help of Libya.



Sudan: Empty Words and Pyrrhic Victories, Africa Confidential, 33(10), 22 May 1992, p. 2.



J Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Bands-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, Pluto, London, 1997, p. 5.



Ibid.; see also generally, K O Salih, The Sudan, 1985-89: The Fading Democracy, Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2), 1990, pp. 199-224; A M Lesch, A View From Khartoum, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987, pp. 807-817; and A Heraclides, Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan, Journal of Modern African Studies, 25(2), 1987, pp. 213-231.



H Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies The Sudan Conflict, Westview, Boulder, 1987, p. 78.



Khartoum backs Saddam, Africa Confidential, 38(15), 18 July 1997, p. 1; see also, T Shields, A Tragedy in the Making, Africa Report, March-April 1991, p. 55; and Sudan: The Lone Supporter of Iraq, Sudan Democratic Gazette, 29, January 1992, p. 7.



Assefa, op. cit., pp. 82-83; see also, E O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan, 1955-1972, Oxford University Press, Hamden, 1963, p. 128; and K G Adar, Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia, 1963-1983, University Press of America, Lanham, 1994.



Assefe, ibid., p.83.



Ibid., p. 160; see also, J Howell, Horn of Africa, Lessons from the Sudan Conflict, International Affairs, 54, 1978, pp. 421-436; and J Howell, Politics in the Southern Sudan, African Affairs, 72, 1973, pp. 163-178.



M O Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, Hurst, London, 1975, p. 40.



Prendergast, op. cit., p. 40; see also, Sudan: Collapse, The Economist, 317, 24 November 1990, p. 56.



Sudan/Egypt: Calling the Shots after Addis Ababa, Africa Confidential, 36(14), 7 July 1995, p. 1.



Ibid., pp. 2-3.



Sudan: Arms against a Sea of Troubles, Africa Confidential, 37(23), 15 November 1996, p. 1.



Ibid.



Prendergast, op. cit., p. 65.



Ibid., p. 66.



Ibid., p. 64.



Lesch, op. cit., p. 808.



Ibid., p. 809.



Ibid., p. 825.



Africa Confidential, 33(10), 22 May 1992, p. 2.



Sudan: In the Sights of the New World Order, Africa Confidential, 34(7), 2 April 1993, p. 3.



Sudan: Turabi's Unconvincing Transition, Africa Confidential, 34(21), 22 October 1993, p. 3; and Sudan: Rest Camp for Terrorists, The Economist, 332, 17 September 1994, p. 48.



Sudan: No Peace in Sight, The Horn of Africa Bulletin, 5(1), January-February 1993, p. 25.



Ibid.



Sudan: A Tragedy Stalemate, Africa Confidential, 35(6), 18 March 1994, p. 4.



United States, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1983, p. 117.



United States, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1992, p. 131.



Sudan: Enter the Oil-Generals, Africa Confidential, 36(12), 9 June 1995, p. 4.



Ibid.



Africa Confidential, 36(14), 7 July 1995, op. cit., pp. 2-3.



Ibid., p. 3.



Sudan: Movement in the Minefield, Africa Confidential, 36(5), 3 March 1995, p. 3; see also, Egypt and Sudan: Spitting Fire, The Economist, 336, 1 July 1995, pp. 36-37; and Eritrea and Sudan: We Won't Take Any More, The Economist, 337, 14 October 1995, pp. 60 & 65.



Africa Confidential, 37(23), 15 November 1996, op. cit., p. 1; see also, The Second Anniversary of the NDA, Sudan Democratic Gazette, 16, September 1991, pp. 1-4.



United States Congress & House of Representatives, Testimony: E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 6.



Sudan: Mercury Protection, World Press Review, January 1997, p. 1.



See, in general, M L Pirouet, The Achievement of Peace in Sudan, Journal of East African Research and Development, 6, 1976, pp. 115-145; R P Stevens, The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan's Afro-Arab Policy, Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 1976, pp. 247-274; and P S Mogga, The Addis Ababa Agreement, A Progressive Reconciliation, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1974.



Prendergast, op. cit., pp. 80-81.



Ibid., pp. 81-82.



J Prendergast & S Bickel, Sudan: Scorched-earth War, Africa Report, May/June 1994, p. 38.



Prendergast, op. cit., p. 25.



Sudan: `IGADD Friends' take Initiative to Relaunch Peace Talks, The Horn of Africa Bulletin, 7(3), May-June 1995, pp. 25-26.



United States Congress & House of Representatives, Report: Howard Wolpe , Politics of Hunger in Sudan, Joint Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger and the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1989, p. 1.



Sudan: The South Strengthens its Hand, Africa Confidential, 34(22), 5 November 1993, p. 5.