INTRODUCTION

For those concerned with police co-operation in Southern Africa, experiences elsewhere may be of interest. Issues relating to human security and policing are taking on a regional, continental and global character at an increasing pace. Both the `Europeanisation' of policing within the Eurostate and the debate about the `Americanisation' of law enforcement practices² point in the same direction: the `internationalisation' of policing theories and practices. This trend is of course not a recent phenomenon. There is a much longer history to transnational police co-operation and to police intervention in the affairs of other states than the current debate in Europe would have us believe. To recognise a certain degree of historical continuity, however, is not to deny that there is an intensification of the whole process which parallels the heightened globalisation of the planet at large.

The current trends in the Southern African region are variations on this larger theme, though local conditions will inhibit mere duplication from the affluent West. Police cross-border co-operation is obviously shaped by time and place. Southern Africa is bound to encounter specific obstacles on this front. One, in particular, is the institutional underdevelopment of police agencies in Africa, an aspect stressed in a recent article on policing in Africa by Alice Hill.³ This problem has many facets and will affect the ability of any one police agency to participate in co-operative ventures. Just how the institutional weaknesses of police services in Southern Africa will inhibit the present ambitious plans for cross-border co-operation, however, remains to be seen.

This article attempts to extract some relevant points for regional policing in Southern Africa from contemporary policing debates in Europe. The second objective is to provide an overview of current initiatives towards cross-border police co-operation among the eleven Southern African states committed to joint participation.

TOWARDS THE REGIONALISATION OF POLICING: LESSONS FROM EUROPE

In Western Europe, the drive towards co-operation among the various national police agencies has been fuelled by the emergence of the European Union and its vast array of social and political institutions. In the wake of economic unity and the phasing out of internal border controls, the internal security landscape of Europe has changed dramatically, which has brought about a reshuffling of policing priorities. Terrorism, illegal immigration and drug smuggling have become the three key areas for intensified police co-operation. Over the past twenty years, new agreements and institutions have brought about an unprecedented Europeanisation of the policing effort.

Beginning in 1975 with the TREVI Agreement, European states went on to forge a new state boundary system with the Schengen Convention in 1985, necessitating dramatically restructured security and control arrangements. After much deliberation, these culminated in the formation of Europol in 1995.⁴ Such developments have brought about both a qualitative and quantitative shift in European police co-operation. Van Reenen⁵ has sketched three broad phases in this process:

early and relatively simple forms of co-operation, such as the more efficient exchange of information;



an increasing standardisation or `harmonisation' at the level of technical equipment, organisational structure, operational methods, as well as legal powers; and



vertical integration involving the formation of supra-national policing authorities (such as Europol) that operate in the broader political context of the European Union.

Taking the internationalisation of policing to its evolutionary conclusion seems not only destined to forge a degree of technical and operational uniformity among police institutions and a standardisation of criminal justice procedures, but also to create policing structures situated beyond the political reach of the nation-state. That this poses dangers to the democratic order, while offering advantages in increased police efficiency, has not gone unnoticed.⁶

Despite the major progress to date, European experience suggests that the move towards a convergence of law enforcement practices faces numerous obstacles. For example, different cultural attitudes towards particular forms of `crime' make for dissonance. There is ample proof of the resilience of differences in the terrain of drug policy. Penal approaches to drugs in member states remain infused by different cultural sensibilities and criminal justice policies. Growing consensus across Europe and further afield about the security threats posed by organised crime syndicates may, of course, be a stepping stone towards an increasing standardisation of drug policies across states. But the battle for such harmonisation is far from won.

The institutional arena is another stumbling block. Bigo⁷ has described the evolution of new institutional structures as occurring in a "piecemeal and opportunistic fashion." There is often duplication on the ground as a range of bodies are created to aid trans-European police co-operation. Behind the "monolithic surface" ⁸ of policing co-operation there lurks the battles over turf as states and their policing agencies compete over control of the new terrain. It is in this light that Fijnaut⁹ states that the current policing scene in Europe is characterised by "creative chaos."

However, these negative asides should not blur the fact that something new is emerging in the world of policing in Europe, and with some success. In the consolidation of networks of police co-operation, the opportunities for contact of both a professional and social nature expand greatly. One consequence is the spreading market place for the exchange of policing artefacts. A policing industrial complex has arisen within which a growing export market for policing software and hardware has taken root. Technology, weapons and pre-packaged policing philosophies compete as commodities for exchange. The recent commodification of `community policing' and `victim-centred policing' as products streamlined for export, provide evidence of the market forces which internationalism and regionalism in policing may unleash.

Heightened regional police contact must also influence the evolution of police training. Increasingly, courses aimed at extending the language proficiency of officers across member states are included in police training curricula. Furthermore, police are now routinely exposed to an historical and comparative analysis of the policing systems operative in Europe. It would appear that, in the context of transnational and regional police formations, the need for `diversity training' may take on a slightly different meaning. For here it is not the cultural `other' inside the geographic boundaries of the state, but rather the cultural `other' across the border which becomes the object of scrutiny. At the operational level, training for joint deployment of policing agencies is also to be expected. All of the recent moves point in the direction of an increasingly regional or continental approach to police training at both the theoretical and practical levels. Plans are afoot for the formation of a pan-European police academy.

A new image of what constitutes the police community (that famous in-group or `cop culture') is also emerging in Western Europe. Police co-operation and exchange create opportunities for consolidating professional and social linkages. The conference circuit provides multiple points for contact. The bars and lounges on the social fringe of the intellectual venues are also conducive to police `networking'. Such occasions are important for forging more enduring alliances at both the professional and interpersonal level. From such social interactions, the occupational culture of the police may stand to benefit in more ways than one. Some commentators see an expanding `police professionalism' with a more universalistic, i.e. less culture-specific character. In the European scene, we may be witnessing the emergence of an urbane/cosmopolitan police personality, something perhaps previously thought of as more of a contradiction in terms than anything else.

But universalism in policing may also pose reasons for political concern. Sucked into the vortex of the global village with supranational networks the police may increasingly become resistant to democratic control. Judging by European debates on this matter, there is some concern that `the police' if left to its own global devices, may emerge as one of the crucial power blocs of the next millennium, bent on advancing its own political interests. Under the guise of `police independence' and `professionalism', global cops may develop into the power brokers of tomorrow. In this context, European scholars have begun to speak of an emerging `democratic deficit'. The drift toward regionalism in policing may go hand in hand with an erosion of democratic accountability at the local or national level.¹⁰ Thus, the thrust towards regionalisation in security thinking places the issue of state sovereignty and political control of the police squarely on the table.¹¹ The British policing expert, Sheptycki, has argued that transnationalism in policing is leading to the "hollowing out" of state sovereignty.¹² Some commentators in Europe¹³ have warned that vigilance is required to protect civil liberties in the context of an increasing centralisation of criminal data banks.

Regional co-operation creates the need for a new policing élite and new specialist units (to spearhead joint operations in the areas of drugs, vehicle and stock theft, illegal immigration, etc.). New opportunities for upward and outward mobility are created. It is not far-fetched to predict increasing divisions between cops charged with international/regional cross-border liaison and those stuck at the level of the street inside the country. In the global context, there is considerable status attached to the multi-lingual urbane cop who confidently traverses the cultural and geographical boundaries of the international community. In the face of such developments, one may again be witnessing the devaluation of `routine' policing. Clearly, the potential for such divisions at both a social and operational level need to be counteracted. Regional policing developments on the terrain of drugs, for example, need to be integrated into domestic policing practices. The `war on drugs' waged across regional borders must be tied into the `war on drugs' within national borders. In the absence of such synchronisation, policing in the area of drug control has little hope of having any unity of theoretical structure or of operational logic.

With regards to the liberalising potential embedded in ever denser patterns of police co-operation, opinion seems divided. Some commentators have warned that standardisation and harmonisation need not favour more liberal approaches in matters of criminal justice. This pessimistic view is captured by Sheptycki,¹⁴ who quotes a Dutch police official on the subject of joint anti-drug operations: "If we arrest a drug dealer in the Netherlands he will be given a penalty of a maximum of six months in prison. If we arrest him in Germany we will get a maximum of six years. We arrest them in Germany. It is better I think."

Both the global and regional policing scenes provide new opportunities for certain players to exert dominance and to set the policing agenda. In the area of drugs, the historical evidence seems to suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of the United States has managed to shape, to put it mildly, pan-European law enforcement policy.¹⁵ Viewing international police co-operation through the American lens also points to the potential for a fusion of criminal justice policy at the national level and foreign policy abroad.¹⁶ It is against this backdrop that it seems wise to ask: who sets the agenda and who steers the process in aid of regional police co-operation? The internationalisation of policing clearly provides opportunities to some agencies, more than others, for exerting a colonising influence over the uniformed bodies charged with keeping the domestic peace in neighbouring states. It is an influence of no small political magnitude which those at the receiving end of the colonial equation should not forget. And it is a factor that those participating in Southern African regional developments need to be mindful of, as the police organisation of the industrial centre of the region, South Africa, seems posed to assume a dominant role.

CROSS-BORDER POLICE CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Much of the current impetus for co-operation among police institutions in the Southern African region comes from newly fluid borders and the concomitant accessibility they offer to `organised crime', or `crime syndicates', as the current jargon has it. In the South African case, key policy documents underline the particular problems posed by organised crime. Both the National Crime Prevention Strategy and the Police Priorities and Objectives for 1997/8 point to the need for policing strategies tailor-made to fight crime syndicates. The latter document states the "need for identifying and neutralizing criminal organisations" involved in smuggling, motor vehicle hijacking, drugs, and money laundering. Furthermore, provision is made for the establishment of specialist reaction forces to combat organised crime. The challenges posed by organised crime networks and syndicates, in particular, require policing strategies which are devised in conjunction with the police and intelligence formations of both the region and the broader international community.

On the organisational level, two developments which concern the police deserve particular attention: the re-entry of the South African Police Service (SAPS) into the international policing structure, Interpol, and the formation of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). Both structures are of importance in linking the operational activities of the SAPS with other law enforcement structures.

SAPS and Interpol

Re-admittance to Interpol in 1993 has been considered a major turning point in police co-operation for the SAPS it symbolises the international acceptance of the police of the former pariah state after decades of isolation. In the wake of the adoption of a regionalisation policy by the Interpol Executive Committee in 1995, a Sub-Regional Interpol Bureau has been established in Harare. At present, four SAPS members are stationed at the Sub-Regional Bureau in Harare, as well as at the General Secretariat in Lyons, France. Police liaison officers have also been deployed at a number of embassies in the region, such as in Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland. Further afield, there are personnel in Ghana and the United Kingdom. At present, it is also envisaged that drug liaison officers will be deployed in what are considered to be `strategic locations' elsewhere in the world.

Interpol, Pretoria is currently staffed by 24 people. The Pretoria office aims to "provide an efficient service to the various South African Police Service Units and to facilitate the utilisation of the Interpol data base and infrastructure to the optimum in investigating crime."¹⁸ Interpol, Pretoria receives information by means of a "secure independent telecommunications network", the X400 Network. For purposes of regional communication, the e-mail system, donated by Business Against Crime, is now operative among all member countries of SARPCCO and provides a much needed technological infrastructure. Some indication of the flurry of activity generated within Interpol circles can be gleaned from statistics relating to the number of cases registered on the CAS system for investigation by Interpol. In 1996, 2 453 such cases were on record. The Pretoria office is involved in cases necessitating the extradition of suspects wanted for offences, such as murder, armed robbery, fraud, commercial crime, drug trafficking and child kidnapping, to countries such as the UK, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Malawi, Zimbabwe, the US, and Hungary. Clearly, the Interpol connection also paves the way for some globetrotting in defence of extradition duties, for attending conferences in telecommunications, lobbying action, and so forth.

Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO)

The formation of SARPCCO in August 1995, is an important point of reference for mapping police developments across regional borders in Southern Africa. SARPCCO draws representation at the level of police chiefs from the following eleven countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Provision has been made for other chiefs of police to gain membership of the structure by means of special resolution.

The role of SARPCCO needs to be understood within the broader context of other structures concerned with security co-operation within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC was formed in 1992 consisting of twelve states. While matters relating to economic integration have been the principal focus of SADC, security issues have become increasingly prominent, as Cawthra¹⁹ points out. At the level of SADC, the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) sees to security co-operation with much of the work conducted by three sub-committees: Defence, Public Security and State Security. It is considered to fulfil a much needed co-ordinated approach to security. Sub-committees meet annually to consider reports. In the policing terrain, it is the Public Security sub-committee which is of central importance. As Cawthra puts it: "The Public Security Committee has a range of co-ordination functions, mostly related to cross-border crime and including vehicle theft, drug trafficking, smuggling of light weapons, forged travel documents, counterfeit money and illegal immigration."²⁰

The work of this sub-committee is supported by SARPCCO which, according to SAPS Deputy Commissioner Zola Lavisa, acts as the vehicle for the implementation of decisions forged within the ranks of the ISDSC. Great faith seems to have been placed in this sub-committee to create a collective approach to crime prevention and control in the region. In the words of Lavisa: "In general, it is clear that not only does the ISDSC create a platform by which regional co-operation is enhanced and co-ordinated, but also that it creates a mechanism by which all the role-players are brought together and their activities co-ordinated and combined in order to obtain a collective approach to regional security."²¹

The central objective of SARPCCO, as set out in its Constitution, is to "promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications."²² In pursuit of this objective, there is a commitment to an exchange of information, joint management of criminal records, and the creation of structures in support of combined operations on cross-border crimes. Furthermore, the Constitution also makes provision for the formulation of training policies for the region as the need may arise from operational exigencies.

As to the principles that should inform police co-operation, the Constitution²³ makes reference, inter alia, to the following: "respect for national sovereignty; equality of police services; non-political professionalism; mutual benefit to all members, observance of human rights; non-discrimination of working methods and mutual respect and goodwill."

The organisational structure of SARPCCO consists of the following components:

a Council of Police Chiefs which is the main decision-making body. It meets at least once a year and exchanges views on relevant policing matters. It is primarily responsible for all policy-related matters and oversees the proper functioning of all SARPCCO structures;



a Permanent Co-ordinating Committee which comprises of the Heads of the Criminal Investigation Services of each member state. This committee meets more regularly with the view to enhance co-operation, plan and execute joint crime combating endeavours;



a permanent secretariat for SARPCCO which is located at the Interpol Sub-regional Bureau in Harare. It attends to the administrative and technical needs of SARPCCO. It is also charged with the responsibility of mapping regional trends which may affect policing the region and for the implementation of SARPCCO projects. Given its location, close co-operation between SARPCCO and Interpol is thus the aim;



other committees, sub-committees and task units as may be deemed necessary. The following two are operative at the moment:



the Legal Sub-committee, broadly defined, which attends to legal matters that may hamper police co-operation. This sub-committee is charged with the responsibility for harmonising legislation in order to facilitate joint policing operations;²⁴



the Training Sub-committee which seems poised to take discussions on police training beyond the national level. Its vision has been described as follows: "To upgrade and enhance the level of expertise and competencies in policing skills within the SARPCCO Region by the year 2000, particularly focusing on the prevention, detection and investigation of cross border crimes."²⁵

Given the likely institutional weaknesses referred to at the beginning of this article, police training in the region is clearly a high priority. If effective, the SARPCCO Training Sub-committee would constitute a key agent in forging a regional approach and enhancing the capacity of police institutions in Southern Africa. But in order to do so it will have to negotiate a range of structural and other obstacles.²⁶ The Sub-committee has embarked on an audit of the state of police training in the SADC region. A report on regional training needs by Yach and Lawson has been adopted. Training programmes are to be developed on a very wide range of police activities.²⁷ In the short term, priority is to be accorded to the following programmes:

Regional Operational Skills Course for operational officers;


Course for Border Personnel (police and custom personnel);


Training of Trainers; and


modular-based skills for specialist units to be deployed in cross-border operations.

While the envisaged programmes of action are impressive, the achievements of SARPCCO thus far seem to lie firstly at the level of diplomacy. The current thrust towards collegial interaction in pursuit of common regional goals stands in marked contrast to the bitter feuds of the recent past. Beyond the level of diplomacy, SARPCCO also claims to have prepared the way for a number of joint operations. It has also been instrumental in drafting a multi-lateral police co-operation document presented at SARPCCO's annual meeting in Cape Town in July 1997, which should consolidate existing practices.

In keeping track of the evolution of regional security, the future role of a structure, such as SARPCCO, provides a key point of reference. While it is still too early to tell whether SARPCCO will combine its diplomatic achievements with a hands-on approach to operational police performance, as a structure it seems well positioned to play an increasingly important role in forging a common policy orientation. Two such key areas at present are drugs and the illegal weapons trade. To what extent the policy orientation gets translated into co-ordinated operational practice across the region and for the long term, awaits further evidence.

Bilateral Agreements and Protocols

Any attempt at a complete overview of regional policing developments must also look beyond the deliberations of SARPCCO and Interpol. Much of the policing activity across borders is formalised at the level of bilateral agreements around specific issues. At this level, there is a flurry of activity. There are a number of formal bilateral police co-operation and mutual assistance agreements in the pipeline. Those that have been concluded so far are with Swaziland and Mozambique. Co-operation in respect of the drug trade has also been secured with Brazil. With the view to exert control over the circulation of illegal weapons in the region, common bilateral agreements with Mozambique and Swaziland were signed in 1995. Such agreements make provision for the exchange of crime information, the "interrogation of suspects from either country, the cross-border pointing out of premises which are subject to any criminal offence and joint police action/operations to combat cross-border crime." In the wake of such agreements joint operations have been launched. The `Rachel' operations, which entailed joint search and destroy operations by the police agencies, were considered particularly successful.²⁸ A more recent example of joint operations between Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe are the V4 Operations, which focused on the identification, recovery and repatriation of stolen vehicles.

CONCLUSION

Judging by recent debates, there are many moves afoot towards the consolidation of regional security at both the theoretical and operational levels. The forging of such a collective effort, however, still has a long way to go. Regional initiatives hold a fair measure of potential for affecting organisational change within member agencies. Regionalism may enhance the organisational capacity within individual policing agencies. It may also be a useful lever for effecting organisational change and for `smartening-up' policing capabilities from regional quarters. Viewed from this angle, police co-operation can be considered a source of dynamism for new ideas and new methods to become institutionalised. In the Southern African region, amidst institutional underdevelopment of police institutions, a mobilisation of policing resources across states may be one way of bolstering the organisational capacity of policing agencies in the face of some formidable challenges. However, meaningful reform, like charity, begins at home. Regional police co-operation must not displace, divert or dampen the commitment to domestic reform within the SAPS. The emerging pattern of regional policing will founder unless the SAPS itself successfully completes its current programme of transformation and emerges as a more efficient and motivated law enforcement agency within the borders of the South African state.

ENDNOTES

The author extends her gratitude to Jeff Laver for reading and editing this article.



M Anderson & M den Boer (eds.), Policing Across National Boundaries, Pinter Publishers, London,1994; E A Nadelmann, Cops Across Border: The Internationalization of US Criminal Law Enforcement, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1993.



A Hill, Towards a Critique of Policing and National Development in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 34(2), 1996.



F E C Gregory, Police Co-operation and Integration in the European Community: Proposals Problems and Prospects, Terrorism, 14, 1991.



P Van Reenen, Policing Europe after 1992: Co-operation and Competition, European Affairs, 3(2), 1989.



N Walker, European Integration and European Policing: A Complex Relationship, in Anderson & Den Boer, op. cit.



D Bigo, The European Internal Security Field, in Anderson & Den Boer, ibid., p. 166.



Ibid., p. 167.



C Fijnaut, International Policing in Europe: Its Present Situation and Future, in J P Brodeur (ed.), Comparisons in Policing: An International Perspective, Avebury, Aldershot, 1995, p.115.



E McClaughlin, The Democratic Deficit: European Union and the Accountability of the British Police, British Journal of Criminology, 32(4), 1992.



Walker, op. cit.



J W E Sheptycki, Transnational Policing and the Makings of a Postmodern State, British Journal of Criminology, 35(4), 1995.



M Spencer, 1992 and All That Civil Liberties in the Balance, Civil Liberties Trust, Norwich, 1990.



J W E Sheptycki, Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the Transnational Arena: Reflection on the War on Drugs, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 24, 1996, p. 61.



Nadelmann, op. cit.



This joining of policing and state security issues may result in an increasing interpenetration of what Brodeur described as `low' and `high' policing; see J P Brodeur, High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities, Social Problems, 30, 1983.



D Bruce, Director: Interpol, Pretoria, Personal Interview, Cape Town, 30 June 1997.



Interpol Pretoria, Interpol Annual Report, National Central Bureau, Pretoria, 1996, p. 20.



G Cawthra, Sub-Regional Security Co-operation: The Southern African Development Community in Comparative Perspective, Southern African Perspectives, 63, 1997, p. 4.



Ibid., p. 10.



Z Lavisa, Police Co-operation across Borders and Ideas for Enhancement, address presented at the ISS First International Conference on Comparative Regional Security, Halfway House, 1-3 July 1997, p. 9.



SARPCCO, Constitution, Article 3.1 a.



Ibid., pp.7-8.



J Slabbert, SAPS Legal Advisor and SARPCCO Legal Sub-Committee, Telphonic interview, June 1997.



SARPCCO, Report on Activities of Training Sub-Committee, presented during the Second Summit of SARPCCO, Sea Point, 28-29 July 1997, p. 10.



The lack of resources is one debilitating obstacle which regional projects has to contend with. Another obstacle seems to lie at the political level and relates to the willingness of individual police institutions in the Southern African region to embark on thorough public appraisals of their training needs. Within the collective fold of SARPCCO, the need to porject a favourable public profile of the state of police training, for example, may in fact inhibit such objective appraisals.



Commercial-related crime and corruption, illegal drug trafficking, motor vehicle theft, crime intelligence, serious violent crimes, border personnel, human rights, regional operational supervisory skills, training of trainers, middle management development programme, fire-arms trafficking, scenes of crime, as set out in the SARPCCO Report, op. cit.



H J, Boshoff, Control of Illegal Weapons across Borders: Practical Examples, unpublished paper read at the ISS First International Conference on Comparative Regional Security, Halfway House, 1-3 July 1997.