The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa


Jakkie Cilliers
Executive Director, Institute for Defence Policy (IDP)

Published in African Security Review Vol 4 No 5, 1995

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The liberation of South Africa has had an electric effect on Southern Africa. Following the elections of April 1994, the debate regarding regional security co-operation in Southern Africa has indeed been dynamic. A number of concurrent and overlapping initiatives are in evidence, most of which appear to have been systematised under the broad umbrella of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This article will speculate and comment on some recent developments in this regard, within the broader framework of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). The larger part of the article will focus on the proposed establishment of a follow-up organisation to the Front-Line States (FLS) and the development of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

Progress towards a democratic value system shared amongst the various states in the region, and sustainable and rapid economic growth are clearly the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security in Southern Africa. However, the prospects for a greater degree of regional economic integration are not favourable. This is principally due to the fact that most African economies are similarly structured, in that they produce, consume, export and import essentially similar products. Instead of complementing each other, African countries are competing, especially with regard to the export of mainly primary commodities that are sent to similar markets, generally in Western Europe. They also compete in importing the same products from the same sources - again mostly Western Europe. In a comprehensive historical study released during April 1995, of attempts at regional integration, irrespective of their success or failure and involving all five continents, the World Bank found that the twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest level of complementarity of all those studied. The bank concluded that "[t]his strongly suggests that the structure of African countries’ exports and imports differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for accelerating industrialisation and growth."
1 In fact, only 2,7 per cent of the region’s total trade is amongst members.

In exploring security, co-operation and interdependence, the debate on collective and co-operative security has covered a wide range of policy issues. These include, amongst others, so-called ‘new-thinking on security’, the nature of threats facing Africa, conflict mediation and arbitration, confidence building measures, disarmament, food and health security. The level at which linkage should occur has also been attended to, with possibilities including the OAU (Africa), SADC (sub-regional) or bilaterally, or it may require entirely new bodies and structures. Other issues dealt with the establishment of regional or sub-regional peacekeeping forces and even defence and non-aggression pacts. At every stage, the danger of political agreements being undermined by the limited administrative, technical and military capabilities of African states to convert idealistic goals into reality, has called for cautious expectations. At an Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) seminar in September 1995, the Department of Foreign Affairs emphasised that it "... favours a cautious and step-by-step approach towards regional development, taking into account the availability of resources and of manpower, coupled with the general capacity of the region to accommodate initiatives and to effectively act there-upon."
2

Yet, the successful examples of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking in restoring democracy to Lesotho recently and the breakthrough in the impasse stalling the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement in Angola, have enthused doubters and sceptics alike.

Although regional economic integration and multilateral co-operation may be a slow process, bilateral security arrangements between South Africa and its neighbours on a variety of issues of mutual interest are flourishing. Examples include measures to counter weapon and drug smuggling, cattle rustling and vehicle theft, disaster relief, security training and assistance and policing of maritime exclusion zones. While the commitment to SADC and the OAU dominates at a rhetorical level, it is often these arrangements that rapidly produce tangible results - an impression that is confirmed in private discussions with officials from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. Deputy Defence Minister Ronnie Kasrils has already proposed that the South African Navy could become the ‘leading edge’ of the SANDF in promoting peace, stability and economic development in the littoral states of Southern Africa and that it could assist in the development of neighbouring navies and foreign ports, as far afield as Luanda, Mombassa and Dar Es Salaam.

The recent agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms has led to a joint operation in Mozambique between the South African Police Service and the Mozambican authorities during which more than a thousand weapons have been destroyed in a matter of months. On 12 June 1995 South Africa and Namibia signed a comprehensive agreement on cross-border policing aimed at combating drug and arms smuggling, and vehicle theft. The agreement also included provisions for joint border patrols and sharing specialised training and technology.
3

Bilateral agreements have also been signed at provincial level. During June 1995, for example, Mpumalanga Premier Mathews Phosa signed an agreement with the neighbouring Mozambican provinces of Maputo and Gaza. It includes increased security measures against highway bandits, and for wildlife protection, organised tourist promotion, agriculture, use of common water resources and training of administrative, cultural and sports staff.
4 Individual provinces are becoming involved in the execution of South Africa’s interests in the region, to the extent that the Department of Foreign Affairs is establishing a provincial liaison directorate to act between the provincial administrations and the various branches of the Department and to co-ordinate activities of mutual concern outside the borders of the country.5

In contrast, academic discussions have concentrated on encompassing terms for collective regional security, in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns. The debate has been influenced by the model of the former Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (now the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE’s major strength lies in it being a process in which participating states co-operate to find solutions for shared problems, in contrast with the adoption of prescriptions drawn up by a qualified majority. The sharing of common values, parity in levels of development and similarity of geo-political constellations are some of the factors that ease communications and foster good relations among participating states. It is thus possible for amicable solutions and maximum agreement to prevail.

While co-operation is easily achievable amongst partners sharing a common value system and similar levels of development, it is more difficult to attain when significant disparities exist among participating countries.

Parity in levels of development clearly does not exist to any real degree in Southern Africa. This could lead to the establishment of hierarchical domination among co-operating partners. Economic leverage tends to determine decision making and the ability to execute mandates. In the long term, this could undermine effective regional co-operative structures.

THE ORGANISATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY


The UN Charter anticipated the involvement of "regional arrangements or agencies" in maintaining international peace and security along with the UN. Article 53 of the UN Charter refers to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council." The involvement of regional organisations, however, was severely constrained by the political realities of the Cold War. This may be changing, as the UN is not only overburdened with demands to maintain peace and security in the world, but public opinion in the larger developed countries also appears increasingly reticent to support intervention in conflicts in the developing world. The richer countries are questioning the balance between their financial obligations and the tangible benefits they receive from the UN. This has given rise to attempts to strengthen the capacities and effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organisations.

Since the establishment of the OAU 32 years ago, a system of ad hoc arrangements has been used to deal with inter-state conflict, while intra-state conflict has mainly been left to each member state to handle in an appropriate manner. It is only in the 1990s that the OAU has moved towards a permanent structure that will enable it to formalise and intensify its ability to assist in building peace in Africa. The end of the Cold War and the liberation of South Africa have served to galvanise its efforts in this regard.

The OAU Charter of 1964 provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to encourage members to settle their disputes peacefully. The Commission remained unused as the OAU, involved in decolonisation efforts and torn between the East-West conflict, sought to maintain the inviolability of its inter-state boundaries at all costs and ignored internal conflict generating factors that characterised intra-state relations in many countries. At various times proposals were made for an African Security Council and for Africa to follow the model of the former CSCE through the establishment of a Conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, initiatives that remained unrealised.

In 1990, OAU leaders officially pledged their commitment towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of conflicts. The 1991 OAU Summit of African Heads of State and Government acknowledged in its final Communiqué for the first time that "... there is a link between security, stability, development and co-operation in Africa" and that the problems of security and stability in many African countries had impaired the capacity of the OAU to achieve co-operation.
6

A Division of Conflict Management was established in March 1992 with a small budget. In July 1992 in Dakar, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government agreed ‘in principle’ to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution with the mechanism formally adopted in a Declaration by the Heads of State and Government in June 1993 during the OAU Summit in Cairo.

South Africa subsequently became a member of the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution established by the OAU on 30 June 1993 for one year. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU later stated that "[t]he establishment of the Mechanism was an act of historical significance and self-empowerment. What Africa said to the world is that yes, we may continue to need outside help in dealing with our problems, but we will be centrally involved and provide leadership in any efforts at conflict resolution ... we can no longer fold our hands and wait for the foreigners to come and resolve our problems."
7 The Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment of the Mechanism has committed the OAU to close co-operation with the UN in respect of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the Mechanism is also committed to co-operation with regional organisations such as SADC. Presenting South Africa’s foreign policy priorities to the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs in Parliament during March 1995, Foreign Minister Nzo stated that "... any South African involvement in the prevention or solving of conflict situations elsewhere in Africa, should take place within the framework of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Only if the OAU is seen to be accepting responsibility for, and dealing effectively with its own problems, will the Organisation and our Continent earn the respect of outsiders ..."8

Thus far the Mechanism has not been a spectacular success.
9 Observing elections has been the most active area, a practice that has become particularly prevalent since 1990. By mid-1995 the OAU had observed 39 elections or referenda in 25 member countries.10 According to Nhara, "[c]onflict resolution has also been handled effectively by the OAU through the exercise of preventive diplomacy in many forms, including the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General, Eminent Persons, Special Envoys and Representatives of the Secretary-General. In addition, there has been direct contact between the OAU and governments of countries concerned, as well as missions from the General Secretariat to countries in question. Field trips recently undertaken to the Congo, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon and Lesotho have aimed at facilitating the process of mediation between the conflicting parties, or assessing the conflict situation on the ground, with a view to reporting to the Secretary-General and/or the Central Organ for further action. Within the area of conflict resolution, the OAU has been at the centre stage in the use of mediation as a tool for resolving actual conflicts in countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, the Congo, Liberia, Burundi and Rwanda."11 While these claims flatter the importance of the role played by the OAU, they do indicate an increased activity and role for the organisation that eclipses its previously virtually dormant existence.

Preventive diplomacy falls directly within the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Central Organ. In this regard the OAU has an ambitious programme in mind and it intends to:
  • establish an Early Warning Network to "... cover the entire continent"12;

  • establish and enhance the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Centre through seconding staff from member countries;

  • establish a data-base covering all member states, detailing each country’s general profile, its conflict profile, as well as profiles of individuals who can be engaged as Special Envoys or Special Representatives for conflict prevention duties;

  • have "... Member States earmark forces in their respective armies and security structures for possible utilisation in peace observation and peacemaking operations first and foremost by the United Nations and in exceptional situations by the OAU"13;

  • "... establish a proper machinery and unit to manage peacekeeping operations"14; and

  • "... examin[e] possibilities of establishing a proper military Co-ordinating Unit at the [0AU] Secretariat and Funding."15
Although the OAU has decided that peacekeeping should not constitute a primary activity of the organisation and that conflict prevention and peacemaking are the most important and cost effective areas, pressure from both member countries and, perhaps more important, from donors, is building up for the OAU to extend its activities to these areas.16 By September 1995 the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU stated: "Our experience of the last year and a half with the [Central] Mechanism clearly reveals two shortcomings: The first shortcoming is our inadequacy to fully operationalize the Mechanism in the area of preventing incipient conflicts from erupting into full-blown conflicts mainly due to the lack of speedy exchange of information of conflict situations within Member States. The second problem that the General Secretariat has faced in operationalising the Mechanism, lies in the area of peacekeeping ... our experience demonstrates the increasing reluctance on the side of the United Nations, especially the major powers, to get more involved in peace-keeping operations directly. The General Secretariat continues to believe that time has come for Africa to be prepared to take some degree of responsibility for peace-keeping."17

As a result of various discussions, the OAU Summit of June 1995 endorsed the establishment in Addis Ababa of an Early Warning Network. It will be based in a co-ordinating facility located in the Conflict Management Centre being constructed with the assistance of the US Government at OAU headquarters. The Summit has agreed to hold a seminar on early warning systems in Africa during November 1995 in Addis Ababa, although this is only likely to occur during 1996. The seminar is meant to be attended by member states, NGOs, academic and research institutions and the media.

Speaking at an international conference on peacekeeping in Africa during July 1995, South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad encouraged the proposed OAU Early Warning Seminar, stating that it should primarily:

  • "take stock of Africa’s present early warning and communications capacity;

  • define the anticipated capacity and need for future early warning and communications abilities;

  • determine the implications for national sovereignty and non-interference in affairs of other states; and

  • investigate the relationship between an OAU early warning capacity and those of the sub-regions on the one hand and between the OAU and the UN on the other."18
If an early warning of a potential crisis is given, and the will to act is present, a wide variety of tools exists in theory for such action, whether it is undertaken by the UN, the OAU, SADC or by one or more countries acting in collusion. Tools include fact-finding missions, small preventive or observer missions (such as those of the UN and OAU in Burundi), and the use of a special envoy or an eminent person. With regard to the latter, the OAU has recently requested member states to identify eminent persons who could be considered as special envoys or representatives. Preventive military deployment is also an option, although it is beyond the reach of the OAU and possibly also of SADC in the immediate future. The OAU has also decided to establish a stand-by capacity for a 100-person preventive observer mission. The material for the mission is expected to be assembled by January 1996. OAU member states would then be approached to identify available personnel to participate on a stand-by basis.

A Crisis Management Room where a core of civilian and military officers will monitor crisis situations in Africa on a 24-hour basis, will be established, and in this regard, the OAU has appealed to member states to provide personnel for the operations centre.

Two years after the adoption of the Mechanism, Nhara identifies serious shortcomings in the OAU’s ability "... to fully operationalise the Mechanism in the area of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, because of delays in the exchange of information on conflict trends and a shortage of resources. Information on new developments relating to conflict situations within member states has been sought, often to discover that it is not possible to obtain the knowledge that would enable the OAU to take the necessary political action. Additionally, serious difficulties and constraints in managing OAU missions in the field and in consulting with African leaders in the various national capitals about conflict situations ... have been experienced. This is mainly due to communication problems impeding the decision-making process."
19 In fact, the Commander of the Tanzania People’s Defence Force, General Mboma, stated during July 1995 that "[t]he OAU’s programme on conflict resolution appears to be faced with some crucial problems, including the lack of the necessary financial resources, as well as the absence of an Africa Rapid Reaction Force. Consequently the OAU appears to be playing only a peripheral role, while the UN and sub-regional organisations are taking the lead in the quest for peace in troubled African states such as Sudan, Senegal, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi."20

Even these comments are cautious when measured against regular newspaper reports with headlines such as ‘Broke, helpless OAU meets amid woes’. The Citizen, for example, reported on 26 June 1995 that "[o]ne year after the genocide in Rwanda, Africa’s leaders gather today for the latest summit of the Organisation of African Unity at a time when the body’s impotence to tackle the continent’s woes has seldom been so pronounced ... Now the Pan-African body is practically broke and appears helpless in the face of wars, famine and the ravages of AIDS."
21

Many countries and analysts still find the extent to which the OAU is able to intervene and effectively co-ordinate operations to be dubious, despite the UN’s programme of capacity building at the OAU that has started recently and the possible contribution of South Africa to the organisation. In fact, it would probably be accurate to state that South African foreign policy initiatives will continue to pay lip service to the OAU, but will concentrate in building relationships with SADC and the UN (i.e. sub-regional and international levels). Therefore, it is perhaps at the sub-regional level that preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, mediation and peacekeeping in Africa by Africans may come to the fore.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA


At present, substantial additional negotiations and preparations will be required to establish either an African or Southern African peacekeeping or rapid reaction force. The practical, logistic and financial implications of such initiatives would tax the resources of participating countries. A variety of unresolved issues, such as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states of the OAU and SADC, further complicate matters. Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad recently commented that "... serious questions need to be asked about the effectiveness of outside military intervention to prevent or stop internal conflict ... The most important contribution that South Africa can make in preventive diplomacy at present is the moral authority it has derived from its own process of national reconciliation and democratisation."
22

Several countries in Africa are already offering peacekeeping training at staff colleges, namely Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SANDF recently listed the following tasks that the South African Department of Defence could undertake in peace support operations in the region:
23
  • electoral support such as the provision of air transport (the SANDF were involved in similar operations in Angola in 1992 and in Mozambique in 1994);

  • humanitarian assistance (the SANDF provided humanitarian assistance in Rwanda in 1994);

  • engineering operations, especially mine-clearing (the SANDF and South African companies are involved in Mozambique and Angola);

  • observation and verification of agreements such as cease-fire or troop withdrawal;

  • preventive deployment;

  • medical assistance;

  • demobilisation and arms control;

  • securing the delivery of humanitarian aid; and

  • disarmament of paramilitary and irregular forces.
In the interim, member countries, the OAU and sub-regional organisations can improve their preparedness for eventual participation in peace support operations in Africa in a number of ways. These include the following24:
  • improving the level of preparedness of troops, i.e. better trained, equipped and battle ready troops to enable participation;

  • encouraging the standardisation of equipment, doctrine and standing operating procedures among African countries, which would greatly enhance interoperability and co-operation25;

  • encouraging countries to participate in UN stand-by arrangements, with governments indicating in principle to the UN which personnel and equipment they will be willing to make available for UN peacekeeping operations (by July 1995 only five out of the 41 countries participating in UN stand-by arrangements were from Africa);

  • partnership arrangements between African and donor countries whereby the former provide troops and the latter assist in the provision of heavy equipment for peacekeeping;

  • pre-positioning of non-lethal equipment, such as tents and communications equipment, at advance logistic centres in select locations throughout the continent; and

  • dedicated peacekeeping training assistance by and to African countries, as well as conferences and seminars on the subject.
A reason for the increased enthusiasm of the OAU to involve itself in peacekeeping activities, is the pressure from foreign donor governments on African countries to accept a greater degree of responsibility for peacekeeping in Africa. The British Government, for example, has convened seminars in Camberley, Accra (October 1994) and Cairo (January 1995), the United Kingdom/Zimbabwe Workshop on African Peacekeeping in Harare (January 1995) and the United Kingdom/Botswana Workshop in Gaberone (7-8 August 1995) to investigate doctrine, training, logistics, an early warning system, preventive diplomacy, etc. The French have proposed an African Intervention Force during the Biarritz Summit of 1994. Finally, the US Government has funded the Conflict Management Division project of the OAU to the tune of several million dollars, while a number of countries have also contributed to the OAU Peace Fund. Both the British and French initiatives borrow from the original proposals made by the OAU Secretary-General in Dakar in 1992 and Tunis in 1994.

The British proposal would require the establishment of logistics bases, skills centres and involve military training assistance. It consists of a range of services, including:
  • improving communications between the OAU and the UN;

  • strengthening the capacity of the Mechanism to analyse information and assessments that would be provided by African Governments and other sources;

  • strengthening co-operation between the OAU and sub-regional organisations to harmonise initiatives and conflict management approaches;

  • clarifying the roles of NGOs in conflict prevention and management;

  • recognition of the role of the OAU especially in early warning and preventive diplomacy, and the primacy of the UN with regard to peacekeeping; and

  • building an OAU stand-by capacity to rapidly launch small scale Military Observer Missions.26
The French proposal centres around the setting up of an African Rapid Intervention Force at sub-regional level, under the political direction of the OAU. Essentially, the French Government have proposed the creation of a modest permanent force, with possible contributions from African countries during times of crisis. As proposed, the OAU would have to make an agreement with the European Union (EU) to provide peacekeeping items at short notice once a decision is taken to deploy an OAU force under a UN mandate. African countries would be required to put aside equipment for logistics bases, with the EU supplementing air transport, air support, intelligence information and technical advice on request.27

However, the capacity of the OAU to undertake these duties effectively is questioned by donor countries to the extent that the OAU has stated that "... at the initial stages, both the British and French initiatives were not strictly speaking OAU centred and the involvement of the Organisation only came after the insistence of African leaders and Member States on the centrality of the Conflict Mechanism to African peacekeeping efforts."
28 Yet the OAU believes that it "... must provide the necessary leadership ... to co-ordinate the various initiatives from Africa’s external partners. It must also prepare itself to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities."29 In order to address these deficiencies, the OAU intends to establish a conflict management observer mission at the UN in New York and is considering an enhanced UN liaison office in Addis Ababa, staff exchanges and the electronic exchange of information. However, early implementation of some of these ideas is constrained by the current shortage of personnel and inadequate capacity within the OAU Secretariat.

In the light of the perilous state of the OAU’s finances, the funding of such ventures is a key consideration. A special fund, the OAU Peace Fund, was created in the wake of the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution with the purpose of providing exclusive support to OAU conflict management activities.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY


There are five main sub-regions in Africa, each hosting a sub-regional organisation: the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in the east, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Maghreb Union (UMA) in the north, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). While the main focus of sub-regional groupings is economic development, intra-regional rivalry and squabbles between member states have impeded integration and development. In addition, increased domestic tension and conflict have a negative impact on economic performance. Intra-state conflicts have affected even those neighbouring states that have once been stable. Nhara recently stated that "[t]here is ... a pressing need to restructure and strengthen these sub-regional organisations so that they can become an integral part of the partnership, with the UN as a world body and the OAU as a regional organisation, to foster peace and security on the African continent."
30 Of these organisations, much of Africa is looking to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to provide an example worth following.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).
31 For the first twelve years SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. Conscious of the poor record of regional economic integration schemes in Africa and other developing countries, the founders opted for a loose organisation promoting co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal integration. With members’ economies being mainly, but not exclusively, dependent on apartheid South Africa, they aimed to reduce this dependency while simultaneously promoting development. SADCC’s original strategy was to concentrate on promoting co-operation in the area of infrastructure. In practice its primary activities were the co-ordination of members’ development initiatives and assistance in raising funds for these projects. The focus of the organisation, therefore, has been on issues of economic co-operation and development.

SADCC only had limited success in this endeavour. Trade with South Africa increased, even during the time when the organisation actively sought to limit this growing dependency, and so has dependence on donors. According to the Africa Institute, projects depend on donor finance for ninety per cent of total costs. Donors are openly critical of members’ failure to mobilise their own resources and to maintain completed projects. Despite criticism, one important contribution to regional development " ... has been the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa."
32

In 1989 at the SADCC Heads of State meeting in Harare, it was decided to formalise the organisation by giving it legal status that would replace the existing Memorandum of Agreement. Four years of consultation followed. The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC was eventually signed by Heads of State and Government in Windhoek in 1992 and expressed confidence that developments, such as the independence of Namibia and the transition in South Africa, "... will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development ..."
33 With the change of name the emphasis changed from ‘development co-ordination’ to ‘development integration’. The true vision of SADC is in essence full economic integration of the Southern Africa region and trade liberalisation. However, Dube has stated that "[w]hile the old SADCC always portrayed itself as an economic body, the organisation had more political and ideological inclinations than economic concerns. Its policies always portrayed political beliefs, particularly of the founding father. Still, like other international bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity, SADC failed in many instances to condemn its own members."34 Although SADC defines itself as a development agreement, it sees itself at the same time as a sub-regional political organisation under the OAU. This has resulted in considerable ambiguity and confusion on the real nature of SADC, with the organisation often involved in areas far removed from that of development co-ordination and facilitation.

One possible explanation is the weakness of the SADC Treaty on the central focus of the organisation. In Article 4, member states adopted the following principles without any discussion or elucidation of the implications of each principle:
  1. "sovereign equality of all Member States;
  2. solidarity, peace and security;
  3. human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;
  4. equity, balance and mutual benefit; and
  5. peaceful settlement of disputes."35
Article 5 of the Treaty lists eight further objectives, including the promotion and defence of peace and security. In order to achieve its objectives, the Treaty lists ten activities, without referring to defence or security co-operation. The closest is a commitment to "promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations of Member States" and to "develop such other activities as Member States may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this Treaty."36

The Windhoek Declaration of 1992 that established SADC, called for, among others, "... a framework of co-operation which provides for ... strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony ... The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security."
37

A number of Commissions and Sector Co-ordinating Units has been established by SADC to guide and co-ordinate regional policies and programmes in specific areas. Sectors are allocated to individual member states to co-ordinate and provide regional leadership. Sectoral activities are supervised by Sectoral Committees of Ministers. In reality the capacity of many countries to co-ordinate activities in their allocated sector is limited. Progress in that particular sector is therefore also limited. This is perhaps most pronounced in the case of Tanzania who is responsible for the vital sector on trade and industry. Where the local civil service suffers from a lack of resources to fulfil its daily, ongoing tasks, SADC responsibilities are an extra function that is often last on the list. The formalisation and expansion of SADC’s bureaucracy seems inevitable, with the most likely route an increased reliance on commissions, of which two have already been established, on transport and communications. In this process, the size of the Secretariat in Gaberone could become a severe limiting factor. At present, the Secretariat already has to stay abreast of developments in seventeen sectors and sub-sectors. However, a major advantage of this approach has been that it has kept costs to a minimum, with South Africa contributing a mere R1,8 million annually.
38

SADC presently has twelve members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, with South Africa joining in 1994 and Mauritius in 1995.
39 Among these members are some of the poorest nations in the world. The total combined GNP of the former ten members of SADCC in 1992 was US $28 billion, and that of South Africa was US $106 billion. More countries want to join SADC, among them Madagascar and Zaire, with the latter having applied three times for membership. SADC has recently decided on a list of criteria for membership in an attempt to limit further expansion.

Despite questions on its past achievements, SADC is poised to enter a new era. Article 22(1) of the SADC Treaty provides for member states to conclude a series of protocols to "spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for co-operation and integration."
40 These protocols will be negotiated by member states and, after approval by the Summit (i.e. the Heads of State), become an integral part of the Treaty. During its August 1995 meeting, SADC signed a binding agreement for the first time to share the scarce water resources available in the region.41 This Protocol on ‘Shared Water Course Systems’ is, therefore, a test case for SADC and will be pivotal to the success of subsequent endeavours, such as the establishment of a sector on security.

SADC has an ambitious agenda, if the plans of its Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, are a yardstick.
42 The organisation is, for example, drafting a treaty that would eliminate internal trade barriers and export subsidies in the region by the year 2000.43 A further treaty on the free movement of people is planned. Both agreements would present South Africa and some other member countries with a major dilemma. South Africa’s economy is nearly four times larger than the combined economies of the other eleven members. South Africans are 35 times richer than Mozambicans, the poorest SADC country. However, development indicators show that black South Africans are often not much better off than many of their neighbours. Intra-regional trade is growing: South Africa’s export to the continent, seventy per cent of which goes to the SADC region, hasincreased by more than 25 per cent from 1993 to 1994, although its imports from the region remain at a low level. Sharing a single currency will be difficult without significantly increased intra-regional trade, despite the fact that the currencies of Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho are all pegged, at par, to the South African Rand. No wonder that South Africa, in charge of SADC’s finance sector, has not even begun to look at the matter of further spreading this monetary area. With an estimated five million illegal immigrants already in the country, the South African Government also fears that the complete freedom of movement pursued by SADC would mean that millions of people will move South, legally and illegally.44 However, none of these concerns question the logic of regional integration and co-operation, but suggest that, in certain respects, South Africa would rather err on the side of caution in pursuing regional integration and would prefer an open-ended and phased process without a pre-determined timetable.45

Following the resolutions and recommendations of the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, held in Windhoek in July 1994, SADC appeared set to enter the areas of security co-ordination, conflict mediation and even military co-operation on a grand scale. This was further strengthened by the decision of the FLS on 30 July 1994, to dissolve and "become the political and security wing of SADC".

One of the Windhoek working groups on Conflict Resolution recommended that "... Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation become a ‘Sector’, the responsibility for which would be allocated to a SADC member state" and that a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution was to be formulated. This recommendation was eventually confirmed at the Heads of State meeting in South Africa during August 1995, but only after many of the other recommendations of the Windhoek conference had either been toned down or abandoned.

Among the multitude of recommendations, the Windhoek Working Group on Disarmament and Demilitarisation called for the "development of regional mechanisms for peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities" and "equipping and training of national forces for peace keeping roles".

These proposals were subsequently referred to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers in Botswana where many of the intrusive and potentially prescriptive recommendations that could infringe upon the sovereignty of member countries, were abandoned. It was decided at the meeting rather to establish a wing for conflict mediation and prevention, as opposed to a sector. This was followed by further dissension and discussion in Lilongwe, Malawi in February 1995. Here the SADC Secretariat tabled a Non-Paper that proposed the creation of a regional peacekeeping capacity within the national armies of the region, but received a cold response from South Africa. The proposal was apparently not resuscitated at the Heads of State meeting in August 1995.

THE PROPOSED ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES


Pursuing the decision to establish a wing for conflict mediation and prevention, a meeting of SADC Foreign Ministers in Harare on 3 March 1995 recommended the establishment of an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as the political arm of SADC under Chapter 7, Article 21(3)(g) of the SADC Treaty. According to these recommendations, ASAS would replace the now defunct FLS co-operative framework and would become the primary mechanism to deal with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa.
46 The meeting proposed the organisation of two specialised sectors within ASAS, namely a political and a military security sector. ASAS would be guided by the principles of the July 1994 Windhoek document, that included the following47:
  • the sovereign equality of all member states;

  • respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;

  • peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation or arbitration; and

  • decisions on military intervention of whatever nature only to be taken after all possible remedies have been exhausted, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the UN.
The Ministers further proposed that the following objectives would apply to ASAS48:
  • protection of the people of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;

  • full co-operation in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;

  • maximum support to the organs and institutions of SADC;

  • mediation in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;

  • co-ordination and harmonising, as far as possible, of policy on international issues;

  • promotion and enhancing of the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and encouraging member states to observe universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the OAU and the United Nations;

  • promotion of peace and stability; and

  • promotion of peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.
ASAS would be independent from the SADC Secretariat, and would report directly to SADC Heads of State. The ASAS proposal, therefore, was a deliberate attempt to preserve the key features of the FLS arrangement, namely an informal and flexible modus operandi with direct access to SADC Heads of State, and minimal bureaucracy. Speaking in Parliament on the Foreign Affairs budget vote in May 1995, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo commented that ".. the Foreign Ministers of SADC have proposed that the former Front-Line States be turned into a new political and security arm of the SADC."49

But this was not to be. The first problem to surface was the fact that the various Ministers of Defence and Police and the intelligence communities were not consulted in the formulation of these recommendations, nor, for that matter, some of the Ministers responsible for SADC liaison within member countries. As a result, a final decision on the structure that had already become known as ASAS, was delayed for an additional twelve months at the August 1995 Summit Meeting in Johannesburg.

The first sign that the ASAS proposal was going to run into trouble at the Summit appeared when Nzo told a press briefing that the foreign ministers of SADC would have to reconsider the name ASAS, as well as whether it would be an association or a sector. Many commentators saw the reason for delaying the creation of ASAS in a disgruntled Prime Minister Robert Mugabe who felt that Zimbabwe had a right to a commanding position in any new grouping, similar to the role it played in the FLS, and was piqued at the increased dominance of South Africa. Zimbabwe had apparently insisted, among others, that the permanent chairmanship of ASAS be given to the longest-serving SADC Head of State (Mugabe), but Namibia’s proposal that a two yearly revolving chairmanship would be more appropriate won the day.
50 However, such a chairmanship appears to err on the side of excessive caution, as the implication is that a member country would only chair the sector once every quarter of a century. The final communiqué issued in Johannesburg therefore deliberately omitted the name ASAS, and simply stated that "[t]he Summit reviewed its decision of Gaborone in August 1994, to establish the sector on Political Co-operation, Democracy, Peace and Security. The Summit considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the sector, to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations among themselves and with Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures, for the sector."51

Despite these delays, much of the conceptualisation of the ASAS proposal, such as informality, flexibility and confidentiality, were accepted as cornerstones for the envisaged SADC sector. With the political framework established, a considerable amount of work remains to be done with regard to organisation, structures, specific terms of reference and, most importantly, the decision to allocate the sector to a specific country, or to allow it to rotate still has to be taken. Given the sensitivity of the sector, allocating the sector to a single country will probably be difficult and it could be expected that the final agreement will provide for either a rotating system between countries, rotating chairpersons from different countries or strict criteria for a multinational staff. In preparation for the next Heads of State meeting in 1996, the various ministers concerned would therefore be expected to produce specific proposals in this regard.

THE INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE


The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is a forum where ministers of Southern African states, responsible for Defence, Home Affairs, Public Security and State Security, discuss a wide range of issues relating to individual and collective defence and security. At present, it seems as if ISDSC will become part of the SADC sector on security. Established in 1983 under the aegis of the FLS, ISDSC initially included seven member states, with South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland joining it in November 1994.

ISDSC is an informal structure operating according to practices agreed upon by member states and developed over time. It has neither an executive secretary nor a permanent secretariat. The Chief of the Zambia Air Force listed the objectives of ISDSC as follows:
  • "Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.
  • Prevention of coups d’etats.
  • Management and resolution of conflicts.
  • The promotion of regional stability.
  • The promotion of regional peace.
  • Promotion and enhancement of regional development."52
Based on its agenda, the primary functions of the three ISDSC sub-committees may be summarised as follows53:

Defence:
  • to review and share experiences on the prevailing military security situation in respective member states;

  • to explore areas of further multilateral military co-operation and practical means to realise this objective; and

  • to exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the Southern African sub-region in particular, and Africa in general.
Public Security:
  • to co-ordinate public security activities in the sub-region;

  • to exchange experience and information between member states on public security issues such as motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents and fire arm smuggling; and

  • to explore areas and means of enhancing co-operation among police agencies in the sub-region.
State Security:
  • to review the security situation in the sub-region and to analyse issues affecting respective member states, including political instability, armed conflict, influx of refugees, religious extremism and organised crime;

  • to recommend appropriate measures to deal with potential threats to the stability of the sub-region; and

  • to consider ways of consolidating and expanding co-operation between member states on matters relating to state security.
In the past, ISDSC played a key role in conjunction with the liberation movements, in co-ordinating strategy and activities against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Its mandate, however, has always been and appears to remain confined to making recommendations for the consideration of the Heads of State and Government of member states.

During its meeting in Arusha in November 1994, it has been decided that the organisation and structure of ISDSC will remain, pending further discussions, and that it will not immediately become part of SADC or constitute the proposed Sector for Defence and Security of the SADC structure envisaged by the Windhoek conference of July 1994. The meeting recognised that it had to redefine its role and establish a new basis for common security and multilateral co-operation. The Defence Sub-Committee consequently held seminars in Gaborone (16-17 March 1995) and Cape Town to discuss the possible expansion of its structure.

ISDSC Organisational Structure

The sub-structure of the Military Sub-Committee of ISDSC, however, would only be finalised after discussions in Cape Town during September 1995. Here ISDSC decided on a streamlined organisation, consisting of a functional sub-sub-committee (including operations, intelligence, personnel development and logistics), a professional sub-sub committee (including the chaplains, lawyers and medical associations), a sports committee and the standing maritime and aviation sub-sub-committees. The Defence Sub-Committee also decided to support the East and Southern African Liaison Offices of the International Military Sports Council (Conseil International du Sport Militaire - CISM) in their efforts to build confidence and friendship through sport. In practice, each member country would nominate one or two persons to participate in each of the committee’s activities.

The proposed functions of the Military Operations and Intelligence components are:
  • "To promote a common understanding amongst the member states of each of the states’ operating and planning procedures.

  • Determine to what extent command and staff procedures, tactics and equipment are compatible and in what fields standardisation should be sought.

  • Do contingency planning for the establishment of an operational centre in the case of disaster relief operations being launched.

  • To co-ordinate the conduct of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military and military related activities from outside the region which may threaten the sovereignty and stability of one or more of the states in the region.

  • To co-ordinate the conduct and integration of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military related factors and developments influencing/affecting security stability within the region.

  • To support strategic planning within the Region.

  • To facilitate and support combined operations.

  • To co-ordinate military intelligence and counter-intelligence in the functional fields to be identified.

  • To participate in an ASAS or any other "‘arly Warning Mechanism’ which may be established."54
The extent of potential co-operation on maritime affairs was significantly increased when Mauritius, the only island member of SADC, joined ISDSC in 1995. However, the Arusha meeting already recommended that, although they were not SADC members, Madagascar, Kenya, Zaire, Congo and Gabon were invited to join the Standing Committee on Maritime Co-operation that held its inaugural meeting at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe on 15 June 1995.

Attendance of maritime and aviation meetings will occur at the level of naval and air force chiefs. The proposed purpose of the Maritime Committee is to promote co-operation in developing professional capabilities and a common doctrine and standing operating procedures to achieve interoperability. This can be achieved through, amongst others, common training, combined exercises and operations and student exchanges. An obvious priority would be to establish an effective command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure for maritime co-ordination. The agenda of the Standing Committee could also include assistance with the protection of marine resources (notably fishing) and the marine environment, ecological pollution control (including oil spills, transportation of hazardous cargo), disaster relief, combating piracy, drug and arms trafficking and illegal immigration, safety of life at sea (through search and rescue operations and monitoring sub-standard vessels), hydrography and navigation aids and the support of scientific research. It implies that civilian components, such as departments of Transport, Environment, Safety and Security would have to be involved.
55

The decision to opt for a single professional sub-sub-committee replaced the earlier idea to establish a separate Military Medical Doctors Association, a Military Lawyers Association and a Military Chaplains forum to discuss training, development and management of the respective areas within the armed forces.
56

ISDSC adopted a principle of unrestricted bilateral defence co-operation between member states, as well as between member states outside the region. It will promote multilateral co-operation and provide intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in cases of pending or actual hostilities. It must also be able to plan combined operations. It appears increasingly that ISDSC will become the formal mechanism for multilateral military, police and intelligence co-ordination.

It is expected that discussions on the establishment of a regional non-aggression pact will proceed soon, but that any movement on a mutual defence pact or treaty organisation, as proposed at the Windhoek conference in July 1994, will not readily occur. While a non-aggression pact is a virtual requirement to ensure regional stability and build confidence among SADC member states, the implications of a defence pact are far-reaching and complex.

Shortly after the SADC Heads of State conference in Johannesburg, the 17th conference of ISDSC, the first to be held in South Africa, began on 4 September 1995 in Cape Town. Preliminary meetings of top officials were held prior to the arrival of Defence, Home Affairs and Police Ministers on 7 September. The agenda included subjects such as the smuggling of illegal weapons and drugs, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents, counterfeit money, protected animal products and the extradition of fugitives. During the meeting South African Defence Minister Modise took over as chairman of ISDSC from the Tanzanian Minister of State, Defence and National Service, A.O. Kinana. Chairmanship of the newly established Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation was accepted by South African Police Service Commissioner George Fivaz.
57

During September 1995 the SANDF issued the following programme of action, based on the Modise’s closing statement at the conference
58:
  • "In the light of the report from the sub-committee, the following is the outline of a programme for co-operation over the next twelve months:

  • Apply resources to stem cross-border crime.

  • Stop the illegal flow of arms between Southern African countries and into our region from elsewhere.

  • Undertake joint intelligence exercises and develop a regional threat analysis that can usefully serve as an early warning system.

  • Undertake the necessary training, logistical and operational preparation for peace operations, on land, air and at sea.

  • Invite member states to participate in training exercises and attend educational and training courses.

  • Continue to engage in confidence and security building measures. An example of this is the SANDF’s invitation to other Southern African Development Community (SADC) states to observe Operation Southern Cross at South Africa’s Army Battle School.

  • Help emerging democracies in building civil-military relations consistent with democracy through regional workshops, educational programmes and practical support.

  • Promote naval co-operation and protection of the region’s marine resources.

  • Be ready to meet requests for assistance from the Government of Angola."
The statement listed the following ‘Organisational issues’ that required attention during the next twelve months:
  • "Resolve the debate around the future of the Association of South African States (ASAS) and its relationship to SADC.

  • Determine the structures appropriate to each of the defence, police and intelligence sub-committees and ensure effective co-ordination amongst them.

  • Consider the establishment of a crisis management centre on an ad-hoc basis for when crises arise.

  • Appoint an official from each country to take responsibility for inter-state liaison and co-ordination.

  • Be more transparent. Although some aspects discussed were sensitive, much can be conveyed to parliaments and citizens without prejudicing security interests."
As part of the crisis management centre, Modise also called for the establishment of a hotline between leaders and senior officials of the various countries.59 Newspaper reports speculated on the possibilities of a joint weapon acquisition programme, since a single weapon system would equip the region better for joint peacekeeping operations.60

As yet, there is no agreement on the establishment of a regional ‘early warning system’ within ISDSC or SADC that would
enable timely preventive diplomacy and thereby avoid the requirement for additional military or other measures. Although this has been debated for some time, the only consensus appears to be that such a mechanism should not be a permanent structure, for example part of ISDSC, and that this role could be fulfilled through co-operation among members and based on information provided by non-state actors, such as NGOs and academic institutions. In the Southern African region, South Africa is the only country with a diversity of research institutions and would possibly dominate such a system. In this context, the establishment of a regional security ‘think-tank’, as considered by various organisations, may be appropriate. However, its establishment thus far has been hampered by institutional rivalry.

Sub-regional organisations such as SADC have the potential to act as building blocks in a system of preventive action and early warning. They could, in particular, promote confidence building measures, such as security agreements, or provide assurances at sub-regional level.

Increased military co-operation in the region could decrease the reliance on external assistance and provide additional stability in a volatile area. In this regard, a number of measures are already in place or are planned to increase transparency, interoperability and professional standards:
  • the mutual secondment of soldiers, including regional training co-operation;
  • equipping and assisting African forces, for example for land mine clearance;
  • goodwill visits and informal liaison;
  • conducting combined exercises;
  • a non-threatening force design;
  • the development of common doctrine and procedures;
  • participation in multilateral co-ordination structures; and
  • co-operation in terms of logistics.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era has collapsed most of the political space that the Third World occupied during the East/West struggle. For the most part, the former Third World is no longer of significant strategic interest to developed countries, neither as a location for military bases nor as the source of prizes in the ideological competition. The demise of the Socialist World has not resulted in promoting developing countries, but in their demotion to peripheral status. Cutting evidence of African marginalisation is found in comments in the US Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Strategic Assessment 1995: "The US has essentially no serious military/geostrategic interests in Africa anymore, other than the inescapable fact that its vastness poses an obstacle to deployment to the Middle East and South Asia, whether by sea or air."61

Virtually all recent wars in Africa were fought over independence and decolonisation. They have been fought within states, as opposed to between countries. Even after independence, this deadly legacy persists. In 1990, thirteen open conflicts were recorded, including major civil wars in Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Chad. Armed struggles by minorities occurred in Uganda, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, the Western Sahara, Sudan and Rwanda. Droughts and famine have transformed many conflicts into major disasters. The problems caused by concentrations of refugees and successive strata of exiles sow the seeds for the next crisis, as witnessed in the constant see-saw in Rwanda and Burundi.

The vast majority of conflicts in Southern Africa, therefore, have been largely intra-state. Complex as they are, they are further aggravated by distrust, religious fanaticism and ethnicism. Old animosities are kept alive and a culture of tolerance remains evasive. In Southern Africa in particular, the legacy of apartheid, colonial exploitation and policies of the ruling elite have contributed to refugee problems, economic migration, smuggling, drug-trafficking, poaching and piracy. Ethnic divisions have forced countries into downward spirals of civil wars, lawlessness, anarchy and misery. The extent of the decline brought about by the struggle for independence, the resistance to such struggles, and by corrupt and inept despots, can hardly be overestimated. The collapse of state institutions and the disruption of government functions severely complicate attempts to intervene and assist these countries, either by the more affluent, developed countries, or by Africans themselves.

In this context, any military attempts to ensure a settlement, intervene in a dispute, or deploy armed forces for humanitarian assistance, are bound to be either limited or would require substantial resources. As such, peacemaking and peacekeeping involve constant danger and are more complex and expensive than the classic monitoring of cease-fires, the control of buffer zones or even preventive deployment. It implies that outside intervention, as has been the case in Somalia and Rwanda, must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and might include the re-establishment of effective government and the promotion of national reconciliation. Should the ‘intervening powers’ come from the region, the potential difference between the needs of the population who require assistance and the national interest of intervening countries will inevitably complicate the situation further. But more importantly, there must be serious doubts about the persistence and ability of either Africa or the international community to effect such measures.

There is no short term answer to the multitude of problems that confront Africa. Regional security arrangements could play an important role in stabilising the region, although such arrangements are only part of the recipe that will eventually enable sustainable development and stability.

ENDNOTES 

  1. R. Umoren, World Bank Pessimistic about Region’s Economic Integration, Economic Bulletin, IPS, April 1995, p. 14.

  2. DFA, The Southern African Development Community: an Integrated Approach towards Regional Co-operation and Development, paper presented at an IDP round-table discussion, The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives, 26 September 1995, Pretoria, p. 12.

  3. Anon, SA-Namibia deal to fight border crime, The Citizen, 13 June 1995.

  4. Anon, Phosa signs security pacts in Mozambique, The Citizen, 13 June 1995.

  5. DFA, op. cit.

  6. A. Haggag, OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, paper presented at the ISDSC meeting in Cape Town, 7 September 1995, pp. 4-5.

  7. S.A. Salim, The Front-Line States: A New Alliance for Peace and Development in Southern Africa, keynote address to the Meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of the Front-Line States, Arusha, Tanzania, 10 November 1994, reprinted in Backgrounder 17, University of the Western Cape, 1994, p. 8.

  8. A. Nzo, Statement before the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 14 March 1995, p. 11.

  9. W. Nhara, The OAU and the Potential Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations, paper delivered at an IDP/SAIIA conference, South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 5.

  10. Ibid.

  11. Ibid., pp. 5-6

  12. OAU, OAU’s Position towards the various initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV), undated, Addis Ababa, p. 4.

  13. Ibid., p. 10.

  14. Ibid., p. 21.

  15. Ibid., p. 22.

  16. See, for example, I. Johnstone and T. Nkiwana, The Organisation of African Unity and Conflict Management in Africa, Report of a Joint OAU/IPA Consultation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 19-21 May 1993, p. 4.

  17. Haggag, op. cit., p. 8.

  18. A. Pahad, South Africa and Preventive Diplomacy, paper presented at an IDP/SAIIA conference, South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 6.

  19. Nhara, op. cit., p. 6.

  20. R.P. Mboma, The Role of Regional Bodies in Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, paper delivered at an IDP/SAIIA conference, South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, p. 5.

  21. Anon, Broke, helpless OAU meets amid woes, The Citizen, 26 June 1995.

  22. Pahad, op. cit., p. 8.

  23. South African Policy on Global Peace Support Efforts, Cape Town, 17-18 May 1995.

  24. Based on H.K. Anyidoho, Prospects for Co-operation in Peacekeeping in Africa, paper presented at an IDP/SAIIA conference, South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Johannesburg, 13-14 July 1995, pp. 5-7.

  25. The Chief of the SA Air Force recently made a number of specific proposals in this regard, for example in the standardisation on the Pilatus PC-7 trainer aircraft.

  26. Haggag, op. cit., p. 12.

  27. Ibid., p. 13

  28. Ibid., p. 19.

  29. Ibid., p. 20.

  30. See, for example, the remarks by Nhara, op. cit., p. 3

  31. Through the Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, adopted in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980. The concept of regional economic co-operation was first discussed at a meeting of the FLS foreign ministers in May 1979 in Gaborone. The meeting led to an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania two months later that brought together all independent countries, except Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa, and international donor agencies. The Arusha conference in turn led to the Lusaka Summit in the Zambian capital in April 1980. After adopting the declaration, which was to become known as ‘Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation’, Sir Seretse Khama was elected the first chairman of the SADCC. P. Dube, Historic SADC summit in SA, Sowetan, 25 August 1995.

  32. Ibid., p. 3.

  33. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States, Towards the Southern African Development Community, Declaration Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community, Windhoek 17 August 1992, p. 2.

  34. Dube, op. cit.

  35. Treaty Declaration and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community, op. cit., p. 5.

  36. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

  37. Ibid., pp. 5 and 10.

  38. From discussions at the IDP round-table discussion, The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives, Pretoria, 26 September 1995.

  39. The South African decision to join SADC was taken at a cabinet meeting on 3 August 1994. The accession was approved by the Senate and National Assembly on 13 and 14 September 1994, respectively. DFA, op. cit., p. 3.

  40. Declaration, Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community, op. cit., p. 19.

  41. Angola and Zaire (not a SADC member) wanted to consult further.

  42. Mbuende, Namibia’s former Assistant Minister of Agriculture, took over the reins of SADC in January 1994 after the unceremonious departure of Zimbabwe’s Dr. Simba Makoni. P. Dube, Making economies grow, Sowetan, 25 August 1995.

  43. As a first step, SADC would embark on an impact study in 1996 to assess the effect of dropping tariffs. This study would also form the basis for a mechanism to be used to compensate countries that could be harmed from the loss of import tariff revenue. The trade and industry sector was also involved in removing non-tariff barriers to trade through the harmonisation of standards in the region. A key part of this process was the establishment of national standards authorities. Only five SADC countries have these institutions. J. Dludlu, SADC plans free trade area, Business Day, 24 August 1995.

  44. Anon, Catching the golden goose may be easier said than done, The Star, 5 September 1995.

  45. DFA, op. cit., p. 1.

  46. The FLS organisation was set up in 1970 by the already independent Southern African states, notably Zambia and Tanzania, to lobby for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

  47. Pahad, op. cit., p. 4.

  48. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

  49. Remarks by Minister Alfred Nzo, Foreign Affairs budget vote, National Assembly, Cape Town, 18 May 1995, p. 6.

  50. S. Brummer, Mugabe is a spanner in the works, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 25-31 August 1995.

  51. SADC Summit Communiqué, 28 August 1995, Johannesburg, p. 3.

  52. See R.S. Shikapwashya, Presentation on the Aim, Roles, Functions and Organisation of the Standing Aviation Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee for the Southern African region, paper presented at the Sir Pierre van Rhyneveld Air Power Conference, Pretoria, 3 October 1995, p. 14.

  53. The kind assistance of Maj. Gen. D. Hamman (ret.) is acknowledged.

  54. D. Hamman, The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee: Defence Sub-Committee, paper presented at an IDP round table seminar on South African and Global Peace Support Initiatives, Cape Town, 17-18 May 1995, p. 5.

  55. Ibid., p. 5-6.

  56. Ibid., p. 2.

  57. Anon, Top brass launch bid to improve security, The Citizen, 5 September 1995.

  58. Anon, Minister Joe Modise at the 17th session of the ISDSC, Cape Town, SANDF Communication Bulletin 92/95, 12 September 1995.

  59. N. Chandler, Southern African hotline mooted, The Star, 13 September 1995.

  60. Anon, Southern Africa most stable region: Mbeki, The Citizen, 8 September 1995.

  61. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995, US Security Challenges in Transition, Washington DC, 1995, p. 101.