Taxi violence

The regulation and enforcement route

Taxi violence reached its peak during the late 1980s, but many of these incidents were tied up with political conflict that wracked the nation at that time. While the problem subsided somewhat after 1994, South Africa has continued to be subject to periodic waves of taxi-related bloodshed up to the present day.

For example, from January 2001 to the time of writing, at least 60 people have been killed and 38 injured in 67 incidents in a conflict between rival organisations operating in the Eastern Cape. Among the groups involved were UNCEDO Taxi Association, the Border Alliance Taxi Association (BATA), South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) and Bisho-King William’s Town Taxi Association (Bikita). The conflict is believed to be a turf war over the Port St Johns-Umtata route and Umtata-King William’s Town routes.

While this prominent conflict might give the impression that taxi violence is presently concentrated in Umtata, this is not the case. Most of the incidents since January have been reported in just four provinces: KwaZulu-Natal (70), the Eastern Cape (67), Gauteng (24) and the Western Cape (18). A few incidents were also recorded in the North-West, the Free State and Mpumalanga.While the latter incidents may be regarded as less important, they remain a cause for concern. Any violence in this industry points to underlying tensions and any given conflict could flare up if not addressed.

Until this year, taxi violence appeared to be on the decline. Incidents of violence went down 30% between 1999 and 2000, from 436 incidents to 299. But this trend may be reversing. From January to May of 2001, a total of 174 incidents were recorded in the country as a whole (Table 1). Should the incidence of taxi violence continue at the current monthly rate, we are likely to see an increase over the 2000 figures. However, given that taxi violence is highly episodic and varies between months with no discernible pattern, trends are difficult to predict (Figure 1).

Since most taxi conflicts are highly localised, national figures can be misleading. Fluctuations in the number of incidents occurring on a monthly basis could be explained by a detailed examination of where and under what circumstances these incidents occurred.

The trend for taxi violence to occur intermittently throughout the year means that it is difficult to police proactively. There are simply too many operators spread over too wide an area for police to predict where the next flash point will be. Thus, law enforcement is normally consigned to a reactive role, and can be most effective in preventing future conflict by performing this role effectively. By providing swift and sure investigation and prosecution of offenders, these troublemakers are taken out of the equation and a message of general deterrence is spread.

Responses to the violence

Of course, the responsibility for ending taxi violence is not solely that of the national police and the courts. In fact, the Department of Transport is the key responsible authority. The relevant local governments and their traffic or metropolitan police services also have a role to play.

Unfortunately, thus far, these agencies’ responses to the problem have not been adequate. It often takes a series of incidents before there is any visible concerted effort to address the situation. Among the range of possible interventions non-police actors might undertake are:

Insisting on re-registration of taxis to ensure compliance with assigned routes.

Shutting down troubled taxi ranks.

Entering into direct negotiations with taxi associations.

Impounding taxis of offending organisations.

Forming commissions of inquiry or task teams to look into ongoing conflicts.

Who represents the industry?

Efforts to deal with the issue are complicated by the high number of taxi associations, with over 3 000 currently in existence. To compound the issue, these organisations frequently change their names and vary the numbers of taxis registered with their associations. For example, one of the largest groups recently changed its name to the South African Local and Long Distance Taxi and Bus Organisation.

And these are only the legal operators. It is estimated that 31000 taxis are currently on the road illegally. Thus, even if the state is eager to enter into negotiations, it is unclear who can speak authoritatively for such a decentralised industry. Focusing only on the larger organisations may alienate the smaller associations.

The recent transformation talks and draft legislation aimed at taking the 16-seat taxis off the streets and replacing them with larger 18 to 30-seat minibuses brought this issue to the fore. In addition to the simple question of who should be consulted, several additional considerations have hindered the progress of these talks:

There is concern that taxi drivers will lose their jobs as a result of the changes.



Operators using stolen or illegally registered vehicles are unlikely to participate in vehicle exchange programmes.

This last point highlights one of the greatest challenges to any attempted reformation of the industry — that of enforcement. How is the state going to impound 31000 illegal taxis and arrest those who continue to operate? Illegal operators are unlikely to go to the trouble of registering their taxis once impounded, and owners will not bother claiming their vehicles. Instead, they are likely to simply change their routes of operation and obtain another vehicle.

Problems with regulation

Past efforts at reform have, on more than one occasion, left many commuters stranded. At least 65% of South Africans rely on the taxi industry for transport and are often at the mercy of rude, reckless drivers, many of whom have no valid driver’s licence and whose vehicles are not roadworthy. The taxi drivers themselves are at the mercy of their unscrupulous employers who pay them very little and have no regard for the conditions to which they are exposed.

Neither taxi drivers nor commuters are normally consulted in negotiations around the industry. As a result, little has been done to improve the working conditions of taxi drivers. Commuters are often not informed when taxi ranks are closed and while buses are sometimes organised, these travel awkward routes and are often in short supply.

Past efforts at regulation have also shifted the violence associated with competition for routes to new areas, and disrupted longstanding truces. In attempting to regulate in the past, not enough was done to identify, arrest and prosecute those involved in the taxi violence. Failure to do this has led to a sense of impunity among taxi operators and their owners. Allegations of police collusion with taxi ‘bosses’ have also been raised, particularly in cases where police members own taxis or are members of associations. Cases in point include conflicts in Umtata in the Eastern Cape and Rietgat in Pretoria.

During 1998, Soshanguve in Gauteng and Mabopane in North-West experienced serious incidents of taxi violence. Efforts to address the conflict were highly successful. Key to these successes was the arrest of prominent taxi owners and their hired assassins. Even though some of these cases are still progressing through the courts, this type of law enforcement is proving successful and has drastically reduced the violence. Until the climate of impunity is dispelled, and organisers of the violence and their assassins are prosecuted, the transformation and regulation of the industry alone will not end the violence.

Makubetse Sekhonyane
Institute for Security Studies